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Abstract
This study explores in a comparative way the works of two American pragmatist
philosophers-John Dewey and Richard Rorty. I have provided a reading of their broader
works in order to offer what I hope is a successful sympathetic comparison where very
few exist. Dewey is often viewed as the central hero in the classical American pragmatic
tradition, while Rorty, a contemporary pragmatist, is viewed as some sort of postmodern
villain. I show that the different approaches by the two philosophers-Dewey's
experiential focus versus Rorty's linguistic focus-exist along a common pragmatic
continuum, and that much of the critical scholarship that pits the two pragmatists against
each other has actually created an unwarranted dualism between experience and
language. I accomplish this task by following the critical movement by each of the
pragmatists through their respective reworking of traditional absolutist truth conceptions
toward a more aesthetical, imaginative position. I also show how this shift or "turning"
represents an important aspect of the American philosophical tradition-its aesthetic axis.
I finally indicate a role for liberal education (focusing on higher nonvocational education)
in accommodating this turning, a turning that in the end is necessitated by democracy's
future trajectory.
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One of the great joys of my undergraduate degree in literature was the exposure I
received to hitherto unexamined dimensions of the human story. I found many of my own
deep-seated convictions and taken-for-granted assumptions shaken up by the sheer
diversity and richness of the narratives that were my required academic reading. I came
slowly and painfully to be able to read Shakespeare and appreciate the power of
metaphors for conveying such utter human diversity and muddiness. I immersed myself
in the Romantic poets, finding therein rich qualitative reservoirs of my own being that I
never knew existed. Through the modem novel I came to love grappling with difficult
books that equally could realign one's purposes and make a shambles of one's antecedent
structures. When I look back at all that shaking up and the faculty that had their own
ways (sometimes harsh) of shaking you up if the literature was not doing the trick, I see I
was in a place that was concerned about my forming, about my movement into
adulthood. The university as an institution of higher learning had become like a sanctuary
for me. It was a place where I could search around for I know not what - many journeys
with few destinations.
I did have a few fairly solid intentions, however. I thought that I might like to be a
literature teacher myself. But what the rigors of an undergraduate degree giveth with one
hand they taketh with the other. My marks proved uncompetitive for teachers college at
that time, but a position on the university's custodial staff provided some needed income
for a fresh graduate and n~wlywed. Serendipity works in strange and seemingly
mysterious ways, as my custodial job found me working fulltime in the Faculty of
Education cleaning up after all those students who did find their way into teachers
2college. How I got into the Master of Education degree when I was previously
unsuccessful in getting into Teachers College is only the slightest unorthodoxy when
viewed against this most humane fact; that when you are able to talk to people rather than
bureaucratic number crunchers, you get seen as a person, and in my case I guess I
appeared as someone who had something to offer higher education. Thus I moved from
the humanities discipline to the education discipline. The shift was not without its
traumas.
I did not realize that education was a social science. I thought education covered
everything, encompassing all the disciplines, and that, at the very least, I might still be
able to continue engaging in what I would now refer to as my wisdom journeys without
overly burdening myself with worries about destinations. It appeared that even at the
graduate level I was still searching for I know not what. Now the path of the lifetime
student is a precarious one for a married man with three children. But I had retained my
employment as a custodian and even got promoted to the classification of Service Person
before my Master degree was completed. So I spent my time divided between my studies,
my job, and my family - my holy trinity. As a student in education I was not happy. I
knew I was not a social scientific researcher, quantitative or qualitative. I yearned for
something of what turned me on in my undergraduate days, and if it was not for my
hitherto undiscovered advisor bringing to my attention that there was something called
"philosophy of education" and an important philosopher of education by the name of
John Dewey, I know not w,hat I would have done. I had noticed this name John Dewey
popping up a lot in the educational literature, but when I was turned to his works
explicitly my (academic) world opened up again.
3Dewey it seemed to me was telling a big human story. He was a philosopher, not
a novelist or poet, but the effect on me was pretty much the same as that I received from
my Humanities experience - I was once again grappling with a large thinker who was
fueling my imagination and my spirit. Dewey reinvigorated in me that human eros of
reading and thinking that I had come to love. The more I read of his work, the more
deeply what he had to say resonated with my own humanistic educational bearings. I thus
set myself on a path of reclaiming something of the comprehensive integrity of Dewey's
work. The nature of so many contemporary social problems necessitated the potential
value of doing so. Dewey still is enormously relevant for speaking to the nature and
potential reconstruction of contemporary social problems. And so I set about reading as
much Dewey as I could handle and dove into the vast secondary literature as well.
Having tapped into what I thought was the most profound element of Dewey's work,
namely his aesthetical pragmatism, I completed a thesis that was well received by my
peers.
Yet, I still recall the response by many prior to my defending my finished work.
"You can't do that!" was the bold comment offered me by most of my fellow students
and a few faculty as well, upon showing them a rough draft of my thesis some six years
ago. "Where's your literature review section, your methodology section?" they asked,
scanning my table of contents somewhat in dismay. I explained that I was not trained in
the Social Sciences, and that my background in the Humanities, with its slightly different
modes of engaging texts, ~nd its different modes of writing represented, for me, an
alternative and viable approach to research in the Education discipline. I told them that
my literature review was buried in the content of my analyses and arguments, that my
4methodology, too, was a function of the content and more importantly, the process of
writing, unfolding, as it were, in the process of investigation. Generally speaking, mine
was a mode of philosophical writing, and my advisor encouraged me onward in such a
mode. Yet, it was obvious to me by these otherwise near unanimous responses that such
an approach was oddly strange and foreign in education. "You're really allowed to do
this?" people continued to probe. I told them I was quite pleased and pleasantly surprised
as well, with the result, because I had not, in the beginning, set out with a clear pre-
defined blueprint. But, nor had I set out blindly.
Whatever the progressive function of Social Scientific research (in its many
varieties), I was struck, by what in retrospect I might call a Heideggerian impulse, that
there was occurring an ever thickening theoretical layering that was covering or
burying-with what seemed to me an almost reckless abandon-important educational
foundations. Now one might consider a healthy foundation to be like a healthy habit,
present as a kind of tacit support, and largely unthought because so secure. But I did not
view Dewey as being properly understood as to warrant such secure foundational status,
regardless of how often he was cited as such. In this sense the progressive scientific
element within much social scientific research-the near impatience to thrust ahead in
novel ways, the near singular fetish for contemporaneity of sources-belied the fact that
Dewey, for all his seeming status as a foundational educational philosopher, was in fact
being buried beneath much theoretical rubble. My reading of him led me to conclude that
this was a grievous oversight perpetuated, at least in part, by a singularly unself-
conscious sense of history in much educational research. The near absence of a robust
conservative and custodial function with regard to the foundational element (typically
5associated with Humanities modes of investigation) was utterly disturbing to me, and it
reinforced that perhaps a different kind of writing and research was needed to provide
balance within the Education discipline.
My interlocutors' queries told me I was on the right track, that, indeed, my
Humanities background might serve some function in this regard. One even asked,
sensibly enough, why I was doing a M.Ed. and not a M.A. in Philosophy or Literature. I
responded that Dewey was not (typically) found in Humanities syllabuses either (here in
Canada, at least), and that much of what was going on in the Humanities was itself
historically threadbare and overly professionalized. Dewey's Pragmatism was, it seemed
to me, radical in its implications for both the Humanities and Education disciplines, but
because the Education discipline had a more explicit concern for theories of practice I felt
I had chosen the right field. I also recall saying something about philosophy (historically)
conspiring with the forces that have led to our pressing sense of (Nietzschean) nihilism,
and that new spaces were needed for re-visioning what philosophy, generally speaking,
might be good for in our world now. And Dewey's philosophical democratic vision had
just such a reconstructive impulse at its core. In short, I was arguing that with some
reconstructive surgery philosophy could still be educationally relevant. Importantly, I
thought it was very relevant to study Dewey more comprehensively so as to move more
intelligently past him-past the specifics of his time and place-to those specifics of my
own that were and are in need of critical attention. And so, feeling often like a square peg
fitting myself into a round qole, I wrote the kind of thesis that I felt I needed to write and
was happy I did. I now know with certainty that there is an important place in education
6for this kind of philosophical writing, and that those who think there is not will have to
make room.
Moving past the specifics of Dewey's historical position led me straight into the
works of Richard Rorty, a contemporary pragmatist. If Dewey resonated with me in a
way that tended to verify the rigorous comforts I had felt in my earlier studies, then Rorty
resonated even more with my own liberal educational leanings. But, he also shook up
certain habitual comforts I had with regard to Dewey's works. The comprehensive
pragmatic hero Dewey had become for me started to look a bit disheveled under Rorty's
lights. No doubt, Dewey was a hero for Rorty as well, but not without some critical
accusations from the pupil. So I set about reading as much Rorty as I could. In the end I
carne to understand and sympathize with the critical slamming Rorty was receiving from
the broader philosophical community, especially Deweyan scholars. Much of what they
said made sense given my own reading of Dewey's central works. Rorty had, whether
through a conscious creative misreading or not, misread certain elements of Dewey's
pragmatism. And yet, the more Rorty I read the more I felt he was getting Dewey right in
all the important ways. I started to think about my own internal tensions in the education
field, tensions that were manifesting themselves in the conflicting affiliations I felt to
both conservative and progressive educational functions.
I found myself wanting to conserve Dewey in education from too hasty a burial,
even as Rorty kept front and center what was most compelling about Dewey-his
thoroughly progressive turp. to the future and the notion that consequences mattered as
much or more than antecedent rules, laws, principles, truths, etc. Rorty's reading of
Dewey was conflicting with my conservative side while simultaneously fuelling my
7progressive side. I was not sure if Rorty was intentionally playing undertaker to dead
philosophical preoccupations in order underhandedly to keep them (and the conversation)
alive, or if he in fact wanted to move beyond what he saw to be intractable philosophical
dilemmas. I still think there is a bit of both going on in Rorty's works. At any rate, he was
immensely enjoyable to read and I constantly felt that he was keeping alive the very best
elements of Dewey-what I would call a democratic artfulness. My PhD journey was
well under way with these two pragmatists, and the work that follows is my attempt to
highlight what by both of their lights is the best in pragmatism-the democratic nature of
which looks ahead to imaginative possibilities heretofore undreamt.
Pragmatism: Some General Background
Outside of synoptic textbooks, it is altogether improbable that "Pragmatism" can
be understood as a unified or homogenous school of philosophical thought. While it is
relatively safe to point to it as a particularly American philosophical initiative, it would
yet be entirely misleading to attribute to it any overarching structural integrity. Such is
the danger, I suppose, of ascribing to many a complicated thing, one title. But the title
sticks, and for the adventurous investigator, entering into a serious engagement with the
principal texts within this school proves a difficult endeavor. Yet, I need to reiterate I
have not set as my task an explication of all the classical pragmatists and their texts. That
is not the purpose of this work. That being said, however, in no way alleviates me from
providing at least a cursory and general introduction to the broader philosophical terrain
called pragmatism, simply ,because the two pragmatists I do focus on elicit broad
pragmatic themes and dimensions in their respective works. What I hope to provide here,
then, is a brief overview of what I will very loosely call the school of pragmatism more
8generally before I move to an overview of what I will be exploring in Dewey and Rorty
in particular.
What is now referred to as classical pragmatism emerged out of the writings of
three American thinkers: the natural scientist and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839-1914), the psychologist and philosopher William James (1842-1910), and the
philosopher, psychologist, and educationist John Dewey (1859-1952), although in
slightly more peripheral ways, the psychologist and philosopher George Herbert Mead
(1863-1931) and the philosopher Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) also are considered
to have made important contributions to the development of pragmatism (Biesta &
Burbules, 2003).
Pointing out that the evolution of pragmatism was continuous with the rest of
developing America, Campbell (1995) notes that it is important to distinguish it from two
other "strains" of so-called pragmatism in American society. First, philosophical
pragmatism should not be confused with the overly mythic sense of America's
practicality and simplicity-that anti-intellectualism that posits action as fundamentally
"useful" and speculation as fundamentally "useless." While anti-intellectual, such a view
does harbor a sense of America's ceaseless drive in the early years to conquer the
American continent. Signaling the difference between this kind of pragmatism and
philosophical pragmatism, Addison Webster Moore wrote:
We insist that [Pragmatism] does not call upon the scientist to turn out every week
a new flying machin€ or a new breakfast food. It has nothing but the approval for
the investigator who shuts himself up with his 'biophors,' his 'ions' and
'electrons,' provided only he finally emerge with some connection established
9between these 'idols of the den' and the problems of life and death, of growth and
decay, and of social interaction. (cited in Campbell, 1995, p. 14)
A second rather unsavory pragmatic strain within American society, though one that can
be seen as more or less strong in all societies, is highlighted by Campbell as the shallow
opportunism associated with the self-styled "pragmatists" in any field of endeavor. This
more corrosive form of competitive individualism, harbored by those who seek personal
victory at all costs, is condemned by William James as "the exclusive worship of the
bitch-goddess SUCCESS" (cited in Campbell, p. 14). Indeed, when Bertrand Russell
attempted to equate pragmatism solely with shallow American commercialism, Dewey
had this to say in response:
The suggestion that pragmatism is the intellectual equivalent of
commercialism... is of that order of interpretation which would say that English
neo-realism is a reflection of the aristocratic snobbery of the English; the
tendency of French thought to dualism an expression of an alleged Gallic
disposition to keep a mistress in addition to a wife; and the idealism of Germany a
manifestation of an ability to elevate beer and sausage into a higher synthesis with
the spiritual values of Beethoven and Wagner. (cited in Biesta & Burbules, 2003,
p.4)
In contradistinction to these more myopic ascriptions to "pragmatism," and
transcending mere association with nationality or commercialism, philosophical
pragmatism, as developed 9Y Peirce, James, and Dewey, offers theories of meaning and
theories of truth grounded in a vision of improved human existence. The plural "theories"
is relevant here as this represents a complicated, and from early on, diverse aspect of
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philosophical pragmatism. One might speak very broadly and say that what they all share
in common is a rather problematic philosophical inheritance-in its modem
manifestations principally a Cartesian and Kantian inheritance-that needs relatively
drastic pragmatic reconstruction. Second, and commensurable with this reconstruction,
pragmatists each exhibit a general acknowledgement and embrace of the practical
consequences of conduct and action. Indeed, what can be claimed as knowledge, or
otherwise as retaining some form of meaningfulness and value, is engendered by the
consequences elicited in the very process of their developing. In other words, everyday
practical consequences become the test of epistemic and potentially metaphysical
meanings. Hillary Putnam (1992) puts the point succinctly when he writes,
"epistemology is hypothesis" (p. 186).
Another thoughtful expositor of American pragmatism, John J. Stuhr (1997),
notes that the complex features of philosophical pragmatism might be broadly defined as
"the unity and continuity of belief and action" (p.23). That is, belief, for philosophical
pragmatists, as called forth by "genuinely doubtful and problematic situations, is
primarily and irreducibly an instrument in, through, and for action" (Stuhr 1997, p. 23).
To this extent belief arises within human experience, and experience, in tum, "supplies an
adequate method for judging belief as it functions to regulate further experience" (p. 23).
Within classical pragmatism it is important to note that its birth in the ideas of
Peirce, James, and Dewey coincided with unprecedented industrial, technological, and
social changes throughout tre entire western world. Discoveries in both the physical and
biological sciences were substantially altering the assumptions of philosophers and
educated people everywhere. While the scientists informed us that, against vital and
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deeply rooted philosophical and religious traditions, we humans could no longer be
considered to have a privileged position in the universe, Darwin informed us that he had
undermined many basic assumptions about human nature. It appeared that the very
ingenuity of the human species harbored also our alienation in the face of a cold and
inhospitable universe. With this came a radical new kind of fear, and our socio-political
and economic structures manifested this accordingly (and still do) as expressing the
volatility and precariousness of these sea changes in thinking (Gouinlock, 1994). It comes
as no surprise, then, that the classical pragmatists all argued to varying degrees that
philosophy had to take into account the methods and insights of modem science and
therefore make explicit the intimate connection between knowledge and action. Dewey,
for example, thought that the experimentalism at the heart of modem science held
enormous significance for humanity's ability to act on and solve real-world, day-to-day
problems, not only acquiring knowledge, but intelligently shaping new and more humane
futures (Biesta & Burbules, 2003).
Returning, then, to what I said at the start, "Pragmatism" is a name for something
not easily defined. Of course, it is rather natural to seek definition in such matters, but the
elusiveness of such a task is palpable. However, for Pragmatism such elusiveness is not
so much a matter of lack of definition as it is of proliferation. Goodman (1995), pointing
to William James's book Pragmatism, notes that this one book alone, published in 1907,
contains "at least six accounts of what pragmatism is or contains: a theory of truth, a
theory of meaning, a philo~ophical temperament, an epistemology/metaphysics stressing
human interest and action, a method for dissolving philosophical disputes, and a skeptical
anti-essentialism" (p. 3). Even as far back as 1908, Arthur O. Lovejoy had published his
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now famous essay, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," which early on put into question
pragmatism's philosophical unanimity.
In spite of the proliferation of definitions, I am in substantial agreement with
Cornel West (1993) when he cites this passage from C. I. Lewis as being one of the best
characterizations of pragmatism ever formulated. Lewis writes:
Pragmatism could be characterized as the doctrine that all problems are at bottom
problems of conduct, that all judgments are, implicitly, judgments of value, and
that, as there can be ultimately no valid distinction of theoretical and practical, so
there can be no final separation of questions of truth of any kind from questions of
the justifiable ends of action. (p. 109)
With the words, "the justifiable ends of action" in mind, we clearly see that pragmatism's
philosophical impulse is inextricably tied to temporal consequences, with the idea that the
future is of ethical significance. In addition to Lewis's overview we can add these words
from Dewey. West calls our attention to Dewey's essay "The Development of American
Pragmatism," in which Dewey says:
Pragmatism, thus, presents itself as an extension of historical empiricism, but with
this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but
upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities
of action. And this change in point of view is almost revolutionary in its
consequences. An empiricism which is content with repeating facts already past
has no place for pos,sibility and for liberty....Pragmatism thus has a metaphysical
implication. The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future
into consideration. And this taking into consideration of the future takes us to the
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conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is
still, in James' term "in the making," "in the process of becoming," of a universe
up to a certain point still plastic. (p. 111)
In what ways, then, is "neo-pragmatism" comparable and different from the "classical
pragmatism" outlined in the passages above?
To approach an answer to this, albeit for my purposes here, a very broad answer,
it is important to note why pragmatism faded off of the philosophical map during the
midpart of the twentieth century and did not reappear in earnest until relatively late
(during the 1980s and1990s). Clearly, what was going on philosophically on the
European continent had an impact. As Biesta and Burbules (2003) point out, occurring
along a roughly commensurate timeline with the classical pragmatists was the work of
important continental thinkers in the areas of phenomenology (Edmund Husserl, Martin
Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty), existentialism (Jean-Paul Sartre), and neo-
Marxism (Max Horkeimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas). In
the Anglo-Saxon world analytic philosophy reigned supreme in the works of Gottlob
Frege, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. These
analytic philosophers wrote extensively on logic and language and would be a major
influence on members of the so-called "Vienna Circle" made up originally of Moritz
Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Otto Neurath (Biesta & Burbules). When Carnap, Russell,
and Wittgenstein made their presence felt in the United States, they brought with them a
heavy emphasis on logic alld language analysis. Indeed, according to Hillary Putnam, the
complex systems of these three thinkers were put forward as all-out attacks on
metaphysics, but were really "among the most ingenious, profound, and technically
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brilliant constructions of metaphysical systems ever achieved" (cited in Goodman, 1995,
p. 1). What would come to be called the "linguistic tum" signified a turning away from
the experiential philosophy of the early pragmatists (given their supposed entrapment in
old-style metaphysics) as well as from the broader moral and social philosophy of both
James and Dewey, and quickly led, in the 1940s and 1950s, to the classical pragmatists
fading off the radar screen. The analytic philosophy that these thinkers developed would
come to dominate the American philosophical scene for most of the rest of the twentieth
century.
Yet, as analytic philosophy went about doing its philosophical work, key analytic
philosophers like W.V.O Quine, Donald Davidson, and Hillary Putnam would all come to
question from the inside many of the fundamental assumptions within the analytic
tradition, leading Hillary Putnam finally to say that "at the very moment when analytic
philosophy is recognized as the 'dominant movement' in world philosophy, it has come
to the end of its own project-the dead end, not the completion" (cited in Goodman,
1995, p. 1). Contemporary or neo-pragmatism would find its revival in the later work of
Putnam, but especially in the work of Richard Rorty, whose groundbreaking Philosophy
and the Mirror ofNature, written in 1979, almost singlehandedly put pragmatism, and his
self-proclaimed hero, John Dewey, back on the philosophical map. As Goodman makes
clear, the revival of pragmatism late in the twentieth century represents, not the
emergence of new, more up-to-date metaphysical systems, but rather a convergence of
twentieth century thought ~n the classical pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey and
the European/Continental thought of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Clearly, the neo-
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pragmatists blend elements from all these writers and others. As Goodman goes on to
say,
they know their Dewey but also their Derrida; their Peirce but also their Freud;
James's 'Stream of Thought' but also Wittgenstein's discussion of a necessarily
private language. The new pragmatic consensus that emerged in the 1980s has its
source not only in philosophy but in literary criticism, legal theory, feminism, and
political theory. (p. 2)
Yet, using the word "consensus" here is a bit misleading, as Rorty's particular use of
classical pragmatist thinking (especially Dewey's) in conjunction with his reading of
various Continental thinkers (especially Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida), along with
his acceptance of the "linguistic turn," led him to readings of his classical pragmatic
forebears that cut strongly against the grain of staple pragmatic positions. Especially in
reference to Dewey (Rorty's self-claimed pragmatic hero), Bruce Wilshire puts the matter
succinctly in his forward to Tony Johnson's (1995) book:
Rorty says some interesting and timely things. But he guts Dewey of his real-
metaphysical and existential-punch, and refuses to face the deepest issues left to
us by the [classical] pragmatists-truth, learning, self, subconscious experiencing,
technological society, the depth of consumerism and alienation-all that we must
face if we would be serious educators. (p. xiii)
The tenor of Wilshire's comments is echoed by throngs of Dewey scholars who, in spite
of throwing kudos Rorty's /way for reviving interest in Dewey, otherwise think he has
done more to eliminate what is best and most powerful in Dewey's work. At any rate, my
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point thus far has been only to give my readers a sense of the general terrain that
traverses this thing called Pragmatism.
Placing Dewey and Rorty
Given, as I have mentioned above, that Pragmatism suffers not from a lack of
definition but rather from an overly ripe surplus, I am inclined, pace the good advice of
Boisvert (1998), to read the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty in the spirit
for which anyone should want to read any philosophy-"because [it] sheds light on the
issues that dominate our own time." Boisvert continues:
We, like Dewey, find ourselves moving into a new century. Like him, we wonder
how to realize democratic aspirations in a large, technologically advanced, multi-
ethnic society. We worry about the inadequacy of our schools, and seek for ways
to resolve the tensions between big business, big government, and the public
interest. The problems of incorporating the discoveries of the sciences with the
everyday search for the good life, of overcoming the disjunction between art and
ordinary life, and of sorting out the opposition between an overly rationalized
secularism and a closed-minded religiosity, are as real today as they were in
Dewey's time. (pp. 11-12)
What, then, can we say philosophy might be good for? Can philosophy help us grapple
with these big social and moral problems? From a pragmatic perspective, it is not
unreasonable in our own time to take stock of the serious undermining that has been
undertaken by classical an~ neo-pragmatists against that classical Greek "queen of the
sciences," PHILOSOPHY, and wonder what is left to work with, philosophically
speaking. If, indeed, Philosophy has lost its Platonic status as "queen of the sciences"
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should this be construed as an educational benefit or an educational curse when it comes
to dealing effectively with our big social and moral issues? As a pragmatist I tend to think
it a benefit, but a mixed benefit to be sure. But, here again, the proliferation of definitions
proves a difficulty, for even those hunkered down in the pragmatist camp, are unable to
agree in just what measure a de-throned, more pragmatic philosophy is able to shed "light
on the issues that dominate our own day."
Of importance, we need to be aware, generally speaking, just what the de-
throning of the "queen of the sciences"-Philosophy-means. As Critchely (2001) says,
the birth of modem science in the seventeenth century had the consequence for
philosophy of turning it into a purely "theoretical enquiry into the conditions under which
scientific knowledge [was] possible" (p. 5). For the Greeks, and this is crucial, theoretical
knowledge and practical wisdom were unified. The quest for wisdom (philosophy) was a
mode of reflective practice that inhered in the polis (the public realm) and, as such, was
an eminently practical activity. However, with the advent of the new science, theoretical
knowledge and practical wisdom were sundered (Critchely). What has come to us
through the centuries establishes itself now predominantly as a/elt (rather than known)
gap between knowledge and wisdom, and it is this felt gap that for many manifests in a
(for the most part vague) sense of crisis and alienation (Critchley). It needs to be stressed
that it is indeed afelt gap rather than a known gap because I think there is a fair amount of
consensus among pragmatists, old and new, as well as among continental thinkers, that
when it comes to dealing w,ith big questions about the meaning of life, the universe, and
our place in it, such things are not reducible to strictly empirical investigations. As
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Critchely says, "it is just not a causal matter" (p. 6). He goes on to indicate, I think
rightly, that
"[if] all epistemic worries are to be resolved empirically by scientific enquiry,
then we might feel that even if-one fine and beautiful morning-all those
worries were resolved, then this would somehow still be irrelevant to the question
of wisdom, to the question of knowing in what exactly a good human life might
consist" (p. 6).
And so it is in the quivering of this ''felt gap" between knowledge and wisdom
that I enter into this study on the pragmatisms of John Dewey and Richard Rorty. In
Chapter Two I open with Dewey's interpretation of the history of science and how his
interpretation indicates his own grappling with this so-called felt gap between knowledge
and wisdom. The whole chapter offers an indication of some very Deweyan pragmatic
possibilities for closing this gap, or at least articulating the gap in such a way as to
indicate a more productive pragmatic (nondualistic) relationship between science and
philosophy. Dewey's pragmatic philosophy thus establishes itself as being against all
those artificial dualisms (foundational or transcendentally hypostasized absolutes) that
tend to block the road of inquiry. Knowledge and wisdom tend to get established within
such a context as hardened and irreconcilable opposites. Dewey's pragmatism consists in
making functional conceptual distinctions out of the lived matrix of everyday experience
in which such distinctions are lived as a concatenation of feelings and knowings.
Knowledge and wi~dom can then become expressive of different phases of our
experiential comportment in the world, alternating between precariousness and stability,
between had felt qualities and known outcomes or consequences. The main point for
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Dewey is that whatever distinctions are made, they are functional or working distinctions
drawn from lived social life. And it is from that lived life that such distinctions must seek
their warrant as distinctions, that is, must return to the primary sociopolitical ground from
whence they were drawn as distinctions to begin with in order to test their functional
status as distinctions. For Dewey, science is a part of that lived experiential matrix-a
part of the larger potential artfulness of livin-g. Scientific inquiries arise out of and are
conditioned by day-to-day lived experience, and therefore it becomes hard to establish in
any rational way that there exist pure scientific Truths outside of experience as we live it.
For Dewey, then, philosophy, rather than being an underlaborer for science, is
instrumental for helping tell a larger human story wherein science is itself a valuable
human art.
If the gap between knowledge and wisdom is a gap reflecting vaguely some sort
of felt crisis in our late modem times, indicating a matter of philosophical import, then in
Chapter Three Richard Rorty is turned to in order to problematize a bit the notion of
gaps. Turning to his autobiographical essay, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids" (1999b) I
follow Rorty's exploration of his own past philosophical preoccupation with closing
gaps. The words he uses to express the rough equivalent of the knowledge/wisdom gap
are "reality" and "justice." Through his autobiographical account, Rorty renders the
philosophical trajectory of his own efforts (borrowing from Yeats) to "hold reality and
justice in a single vision." The shift in Rorty's thinking that eventually leads him to tum
away from such an effort el}ds up being a decisive shift for pragmatism generally. Rorty's
neo-pragmatism, as a "linguistic tum" form of pragmatism, instantiates some
confounding elements into the notion that closing up philosophical gaps is a necessary or
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required preoccupation for confronting our pervasive late modem vague feelings of
alienation and meaninglessness. As Rorty tells us in his autobiographical piece, the more
philosophy he studied, the more he saw that the attempt to "hold reality and justice in a
single vision" (or knowledge and wisdom) was an attempt to get to the top of Plato's
"divided line," to some position of metaphysical and epistemological certainty "beyond
hypothesis." As a pragmatist unable to sustain such a pursuit, Rorty comes, like Dewey,
to institute some working pragmatic distinctions, not the least of which manifests itself as
a pervasive public/private distinction. A problem arises however for Rorty's pragmatism
insofar as his distinctions represent a jettisoning of Deweyan notions of experience.
Dewey's organic experiential philosophy which attempts to institute the functional space
for qualitative, noncognitive and nonlinguistic experience, Rorty sees as a hangover of
old metaphysical yearnings. Experience is linguistic top to bottom (and side to side).
There is no point in talking about that which in Dewey's account is noncognitive and
nonlinguistic. Rorty thus establishes his public and private distinction as itself a
functional distinction necessitated by different language games, rather than different
qualitative and quantitative dimensions of lived experience. Lived experience is linguistic
experience in Rorty's pragmatism.
Rather than taking up immediately the tension between the classical (experiential)
pragmatism of Dewey and the neo-(linguistic) pragmatism of Rorty, I go on in Chapter
Four to continue to use Rorty as proxy for pragmatism generally, in particular, as
expressing what is central to the entire American pragmatic tradition-namely, its tum
against absolutist conceptions of Truth. I use Rorty to show that this turning represents
pragmatism's strong tum from past antecedent conventions to future artful possibilities
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for social improvement. I also enlist the work of James Edwards (1997) for his
articulation of what he calls "normal nihilism." This is the condition in which we all find
ourselves during these late modem times (whether we know it or not), and it is the result
of the collapse of our once highest and most perdurable (and most taken-for-granted)
religious and philosophical Truths. I align Edwards's notion of "normal nihilism" with
Rorty's notion of 'irony' to show how each is articulating something that resonates with
what Critchley (2001) refers to above as the knowledge/wisdom gap-that vague feeling
of alienation that sets in once you can no longer justify your highest values to yourself in
good conscience. Yet, the results need not be the automatic tailspin into chaos, moral
relativism, or pervasive ennui, even as we witness examples of such on our evening
news. Picking back up on the strong pragmatic tum from past establishments to future
possibilities, I highlight the reversal of the now insubordinate imagination, establishing
its own disciplining force over truth, and the shift therein from the necessity of absolutist
Truth conceptions to more pragmatic notions of truthfulness disciplined by imagination
rather than some or another antecedent absolute. Truthfulness then becomes a necessary
element of our sincerest and most authentic comportment in day-to-day life that
recognizes the conditioning sources of past cultural conventions, but that also now
recognizes that such conventions must face the rigors of temporality's ongoing march-
the requirements, that is, to imagine ourselves anew.
I then tum in Chapters Five and Six to that which is necessitated by pragmatism's
great turning from past to (uture-its aesthetic trajectory. I deal with Dewey's aesthetic
tum in chapter five and Rorty's in Chapter Six. In chapter six in particular I try to
articulate that many of the differences between Dewey's experiential and Rorty's
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linguistified pragmatism appear slightly overblown when the future is taken seriously as
an artful/poetic necessity of living. I believe both offer powerful and dominantly
privative accounts of this artful/poetic requirement that they then translate (via their
functional distinctions between public and private spheres) into practical piecemeal
reforms at the public level. Their respective aesthetical positions thus reject the extreme
positions of leftist social revolutions and rightist conformism. The functional distinction
between private and public realms allows for poetic revolutions in the private sphere that
might or might not lend themselves to slower and saner reforms in the public sphere. I
also try to establish the ways in which both Dewey's and Rorty' s aesthetical modes
require qualitative starting points (or some indeterminate-event trajectory) as a condition
for any poetic/novel movement into the future. I show how Dewey's notions of
"pervasive quality" and "indeterminate situation" resonate with Rorty's notion of
metaphor, and that finally Rorty does in fact (wittingly or not) harbor a place for the
noncognitive and nonlinguistic via, interesting enough, a linguistic device. How Rorty
uses his notion of metaphor (inspired very much by Donald Davidson's groundbreaking
work) starts very much to take on the feel of what Dewey meant by "primary"
experience.
In my conclusion I tum to some educational implications of this large turning
from past to future, to the necessity of the demands of what Rorty calls a literary (as
opposed to a religious or philosophical) culture. The implication for Rorty' s distinction
between socialization in thy primary grades and individualization at the nonvocational
higher educational level becomes another important functional distinction in the
pragmatist's lexicon. In an age of normal nihilism we must guard against some negative
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aspects of living in such an age. As more people jump into the frenetic demands of what
Edwards (1997) calls a "runaway humanism" wherein the marketplace becomes a site for
the exchange of values with ever shorter half-lives, society starts to suffer from a nagging
restlessness. Nothing ever satisfies. Alternatively, as more people jump willingly into
blind conformism to one or another value system, and once there, set up dogmatic camp,
society starts to erect hard walls between competing value systems, and productive
communication into the future becomes difficult if not impossible.
CHAPTER TWO: DEWEY ON EXPERIENCE, SCIENCE, AND METAPHYSICS
John Dewey (1925/1994) asks this question in his magnum opus Experience and
Nature: "If philosophy be criticism, what is to be said of the relation of philosophy to
metaphysics?" (p. 334). Margolis (2002), taking up this question, states unequivocally,
"there cannot be an end to metaphysics there" (p. 115). He continues:
Dewey's theme, of course, is the unrelieved "contingency" of nature and how its
discovery is "the beginning of wisdom." This is what separates Dewey from the
classic metaphysicians. There is no postmodemism there, because there are no
absolutes to provoke it. Dewey has defined a tenable middle ground, and
metaphysics remains in full play. (p. 115)
This chapter will attempt to show just what "metaphysics remaining in full play" entails
for Dewey's philosophy. Such an exploration is important, a kind of ground-map, if you
will, for more properly locating Dewey's larger philosophical and educational challenges
as well as locating central criticisms brought against Dewey by fellow pragmatist Richard
Rorty-issues that will be taken up in subsequent chapters. By engaging here Dewey's
epistemological and metaphysical reconstructions (the two not so easily separable in a
contingent universe), the sheer radicality of Dewey's larger philosophy will have the
necessary footing from which to emerge. The first three sections deal with Dewey's own
historical overview and pragmatic analysis of epistemological issues, pointing to the
tense relationship between science and philosophy. The last section deals explicitly with
the metaphysical implications of Dewey's reconstructed epistemology and the further
implications for his larger philosophical vision.
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The Greek Inheritance
At the outset I need to make clear I am not investigating in a comprehensive way
the full complexity of Greek thought as it came down through history. I will focus almost
exclusively on Plato and Aristotle and at times will use them almost synonymously in
reference to general Greek thought. I am conscious of the reductionism of doing this, but
it is justified only to the degree that Dewey tended to do the same, and I am, after all,
interested only in conveying Dewey's take on the Greek inheritance. It is important to
note that Dewey was primarily concerned with conveying the general nature of the
philosophical problems, especially the problems inherent within the quest for
epistemological certainty, as they were passed down from Greek culture. Dewey was not
interested in conveying the full implications of Greek philosophy in general, but rather in
highlighting some of the problematic philosophical issues that arose out of Greek
philosophy and continued to have a prevalent influence in future scientific and
philosophical thought. He was interested primarily in providing support for his own
philosophical reconstruction. He therefore tends to refer to "the Greeks" when in fact he
is referring to Plato and/or Aristotle.
We might say, then, that Dewey used Plato and Aristotle as generally
representative of Greek philosophy only because their respective philosophies manifested
not only the more general philosophical issues prevalent within that culture but also the
specific issues that Dewey needed to take up in his own philosophical project. The
content that Dewey draws from Plato and Aristotle is I think appropriate and would stand
up to historical scrutiny, but it is that content that is most important. We might forgive
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Dewey, then, for his tendency to take the specific Greek content relevant to his own
philosophical project and equate it with "the Greeks" in general.
Fundamental to an understanding of how Greek philosophy set in motion the
tendency of dualistic thinking, as it has come down through history, is their postulation of
a hierarchical model of being. This model distinguished between inferior and superior
realms of human experience, the lower workaday realm representing the material,
contingent, and temporal qualities of practical life and the higher eternal realm
representing the imperishable, perfect, and timeless qualities of true reality. Having
inherited the mythical dimensions of truth from earlier religious thinking, the Greeks
sought to supplant these mythical conceptions by giving them a rational philosophical
conception. In this, Plato and Aristotle undermined the mythic forms of earlier Greek
religious belief, but not its substance: "The belief that the divine encompasses the world
was detached from its mythical context and made the basis of philosophy" (Dewey, 1929,
p. 13). In denying the mythic status of earlier thought/belief, Plato and Aristotle provided
the ideals of science via a life of reason, but they did no disservice to the dichotomy
between "a higher realm of fixed reality of which alone true science [was] possible and of
an inferior world of changing things with which experience and practical matters [were]
concerned" (Dewey, p. 13).
Thus Greek philosophy became a science of Being, and the resulting metaphysics
was such that the cosmically real was equated with the finished and perfect, made up of
pure transcendent forms, while the less real was made up of the contingent material of
everyday human experience. For Dewey, what was most interesting was how the two
realms were related, for the inferior realm justified and made possible the existence of the
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superior realm. This posed some serious difficulties for both Plato and Aristotle, who had
to maneuver their metaphysical systems in such a way as to justify the life of reason at
the recognized expense of an entire underclass of artisans and servile workers whose very
work made the idea of eternal forms (along with a leisured class of philosophers for
whom such forms were not alien) possible. For eternal forms, to put it rather simply,
needed inspiration, and this inspiration was the contingent flux of everyday life that,
paradoxically, was deemed less real (inferior) by virtue of its manifest relation to the
realm of true Being. Those who worked in the material world, who labored in the
practical (industrial and political) arts, engaged their activities in such a way that eternal
form was manifested as the rational end of their labor, but it was an end rendered alien to
them by virtue of their work being the stuff of material change. Only the class of rational
thinkers (philosophers) could perceive and enjoy the perfect fruits of their leisured
contemplation.
It was truly disturbing to Plato that the artisan class could not perceive the pure
forms of their labor. Their ignorance was deemed the commonplace of anything having to
do with the world of ongoing change. This was enough to justify the regulation of the
habits and practices of those who worked, by an enlightened elite who were, by nature,
above entanglement in change and practice. Aristotle in tum escaped this dilemma "by
putting nature above art, and endowing nature with skilled purpose that for the most part
achieves ends or completions. Thus the role of the human artisan whether in industry or
politics became relatively negligible, and the miscarriages of human art a matter of
relative insignificance" (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 78). By endowing nature with skilled
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purpose Aristotle transferred the role of artist to that of nature itself, which worked its
canvas from within instead of from without:
Like other artists, nature first possesses the forms which it afterwards embodies.
When arts follow fixed models, whether in making shoes, houses or dramas, and
when the element of individual invention in design is condemned as caprice,
forms and ends are necessarily external to the individual worker. They preceded
any particular realization. Design and plan are anonymous and universal, and
carry with them no suggestion of a designing, purposive mind. (Dewey, p. 78)
Essentially, Aristotle rendered the activities of human artisans mindless in order that he
might constitute mind as the end of nature and establish philosophers as the only class
capable of the "immediate possession and celebration [that] constitutes consciousness"
(Dewey, p. 79). The Greek elite needed most those for whom they had the lowest opinion,
namely artists, for they provided for and operated within the very conditions that made
rational science possible and necessary. Artists mimicked the world of flux, but
philosophers had access to what was behind the imitation, to reality in its purity.
As Dewey (1925/1994) points out, the Greeks confused, on principle, the
aesthetic and the rational and "they bequeathed the confusion as an intellectual tradition
to their successors" (p. 75). It might be argued that Greek rationalism represented a
species of fear based on the overwhelming need to escape the contingencies and inherent
precariousness of daily life. The qualitative dimensions of lived experience flourished as
the sine qua non of Greek art, but it was a language Greek philosophers could only
attribute to mind as a realization of nature in perfected form. This was Greek science, but
it was a science in which its conception of experience afforded "no model for a
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conception of experimental inquiry and of reflection efficacious in action" (Dewey, p.
79). The Greek unity of knowledge and wisdom, in other words, was transcendentally
inscribed under an umbrella of final, indubitable causes.
By positing a transcendent plane of absolute reality, the Greeks introduced the
idea of the ends of nature as intrinsically good, whole, and self-sufficient. While this
superior reality was deemed an absolute end in and of itself, it depended on means,
subservient in nature, for its realization. By positing a gaping distinction between means
and ends the Greeks were able to successfully separate the inferior and superior realms.
Inquiry itself became an inferior species of the good, entangled as it was in the material
flux of the workaday world. However, knowledge accumulated through inquiry-inquiry
to be understood as embodying the work of the arts-was in the final instance the stuff of
rational mind attaining the level of the really real. As already mentioned, this is what the
Greeks called the science of Being, and it had its justification in the qualitative
dimensions of aesthetic production. It could not, of course, be understood as science in
the modem experimental/hypothetical sense because Plato's and Aristotle's systems had
no room for the possibility that ongoing experimentation could be capable of providing
objects of knowledge. Experimentation or the creative arts were mere means to the
realization of absolute ends, and therefore were deemed inherently defective and
dependent. Those things embodying the inferior realm of mere means, as Dewey
(1925/1994) says,
can never be known' in themselves but only in their subordination to objects that
are final, while [transcendent ends] can be known in and through themselves by
enclosed reason. Thus the identification of knowledge with esthetic contemplation
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and the exclusion from science of trial, work, manipulation and administration of
things, comes full circle. (p. 105)
With the Greeks, therefore, the distinction between inferior and superior realms
establishes a hierarchy of Being. Sensitive as the Greeks were to the immediate
qualitative dimensions of human experience, a sensitivity furnished by their recognition
in the arts of "esthetic objects with traits of order and proportion, form and finality," they
most naturally built their hierarchical system of Being upon this qualitative sensibility
(Dewey, p. 79).
Dewey, it should be said, was quite sympathetic to the Greek philosophers
(especially,Aristotle). While he faulted them for their demeaning (in its most literal
sense) of the workaday world of human striving and flux, he nonetheless recognized that
this need to establish some reality safe from the hazards and vicissitudes of a contingent
world was natural enough, especially given that there had yet to be developed effective
scientific tools for controlling, to some stable degree, an otherwise precarious world.
What precluded the Greeks from a more rigorous experimental approach was not that
they had "more respect for the function of perception through the senses than has modem
science, but that, judged from present practice, they had altogether too much respect for
the material of direct, unanalyzed sense-perception" (Dewey, 1929, p. 72).
Epistemologically, the Greeks knew that there were defects in this approach, but they felt
that they could correct any defects through purely logical and rational means. By
eliminating the contingent qualities of ordinary perception, they could reach perfected
and immutable forms (ends) and then deem these forms truly real by virtue of their
manifest relation to the particular characteristics available to ordinary perception.
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In this sense, because the Greeks had not developed what we understand today as
being more rigorous scientific procedures, its physics were more or less in harmony with
its metaphysics, because its metaphysics were teleological and qualitative. By the
seventeenth century, however, the "doctrine that objects as ends are the proper objects of
science, because they are the ultimate forms of real being, met its doom" (Dewey,
1925/1994, p. 80). With the advent of the seventeenth century, an unprecedented level of
growth was ushered in as science began to establish more instrumentally effective
methods whereby human beings could begin for the first time to exercise some intelligent
control over the changes of their world. With this experimental tum, science could be
used to figure out how and why the world worked the way it did, and it no longer needed
the asylum of an a priori perfect reality.
The New Science
This more effective instrumentalism represented for Dewey a watershed
development in the human ability to potentially understand and exercise a more
reasonable degree of control over the ongoing changes that animated the world. The work
of Sir Francis Bacon was especially revolutionary in its implications for human inquiry
and progress. Bacon was the first to react strongly against the Aristotelian dogmatism
passed down through medieval scholasticism. His reaction was one that fundamentally
attacked the correspondence theory of truth as it was inherited from antiquity. The Greek
notion of a priori truth, which could be attained by the best philosophical minds, was
flawed because it aimed at the understanding of mind rather than of nature. What was
passed along from the Greeks and what remained relatively unchanged until the
seventeenth century was the notion that all inquiry had to correspond to the Aristotelian
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method, which was based on a faulty spectatoriallogic whereby knowledge was equated
with the contemplation and demonstration of preexistent truth.
Bacon was interested in something far more ambitious. He had little use for
received truth as the best test of knowledge. He proposed an experimental approach in
which the guiding logic was that of discovery rather than demonstration. Old truth was
useful insofar as it led to the detection of new truth. He was interested more than
anything else in finding out how best to go about intelligently finding new truths rather
than relying on the antiquated prescriptions of already-had truths. This was a radical
conception, because the key to success lay not in testing theories as corresponding to the
respected authority of Aristotle, but in testing them against the benchmark of common
experience through the use of rigorous and repeatable experimentation. Bacon refuted the
idea that growth of knowledge, implicated as it is in the world of becoming and change,
in learning new things about the world, was somehow inferior to the possession of
knowledge preexistent and infinitely stable. Science, as Dewey says in reference to
Bacon, was an "invasion of the unknown, rather than repetition in logical form of the
already known" (Dewey, 1920/1952, p. 49).
Bacon's call for new rules of intelligent hypotheses and rigorous experimentation
and testing thus drew on a distinction between perception/observation and
conception/theory. It was based on the necessity of being able to sort between good and
bad theories and, importantly, these rules had to be rooted in the world of common
experience. The advancement of knowledge therefore was about making intelligent
theoretical guesses and then rigorously testing those guesses through experimentation.
Bacon's new critical empiricism advanced a metaphysics expressing the idea that reality
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was independent of our experience and judgment and claims about this reality could not
be reduced to our experiential reports. The epistemological import of Bacon's thinking
was that our claims about reality had to be supported by evidence. Science thus had a
powerful new method, and it was well on its way to deciphering more rigorously how the
world worked. It was no longer a purely contemplative affair, but instead was operative,
practical, and experimental. It engaged the world of change by inducing further changes
in order to gather better knowledge for inferring more accurately how the world worked.
That which showed signs of apparent fixity and stability blocked the path to knowledge
and needed to be broken down and put under a variety of circumstances in order to get at
the true character and behavior of that which was under investigation.
Modem science thus made a tremendous advance when it recognized the
limitations within Greek science of a heavy-handed aestheticism. The new science was a
forward looking rather than an upward looking mode of investigation and as such needed
to strip nature of its qualities in order to understand the hidden workings within nature
that made such immediate things possible. In essence, the new science sought to get
behind or underneath the immediate objects of qualitative experience in order to
conceptualize the nonimmediate workings of nature on which the immediate, self-
sufficing objects of perception depended. The new science saw as a roadblock to inquiry
the Greek emphasis on immediate qualities as indicative of transcendent and timeless
perfection. Inquiry was about determining how and why the objects of immediate
qualitative experience were the way they were, and this involved peeling away their
qualities in order to determine the processes operating underneath, processes unavailable
to ordinary sense perception. Knowing in this sense became less contemplative
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(contemplation being more properly associated with aesthetic enjoyment and
appreciation) and more practical. Knowledge, if it could be had, inhered in the world of
change and becoming-the very world the Greeks had deemed inferior-and what the
new science was quickly discovering was that nature operated on fundamentally
mathematical and mechanical principles. Science thus began down a new path of
abstraction wherein nature gained in significance and power by virtue of what it could
teach via its own processes. "It is a transaction," says Dewey (1925/1994), "in which
nature is teacher, and in which the teacher comes to knowledge and truth only through the
learning of the inquiring student" (p. 127). Human experience of the world now reached
down into nature. Via the new instrumentalism, change was harnessed and shown to have
signifying power. It was no longer a matter of change being arbitrary and corrupt, but
rather a matter of change itself exhibiting the capacity to indicate and imply new and
possibly better things.
This new experimental method was, as Dewey (1925/1994) says, "imperious and
impatient" (p. 112) in its attack against the old Aristotelian methodology, but this in itself
was not a matter for great concern. Dewey's overall optimism about this advance of a
more effective instrumentalism is tempered by a sober recognition that in spite of the
increased possibilities that this advance procured, there were still some lingering
problems. The major problem, as Dewey saw it, was the inheritance of a bad metaphysics
that continued to equate what was known cognitively with what was purely real. What
did concern Dewey was the persistence of the classic epistemology wherein knowledge
was understood as the immediate possession of real being. Even with the new
experimental method, knowledge was still equated with insight into and grasp of real
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being, and other modes of experience were, by this measure, deemed inferior and
imperfect. Furthermore, the new science came to understand itself within the logic of
mathematico-mechanical operations. Science came to speak the language of Physics. For
Dewey, this presented a serious problem:
If the proper object of science is a mathematico-mechanical world (as the
achievements of science have proved to be the case) and if the object of science
defines the true and perfect reality (as the perpetuation of the classic tradition
asserted), then how can the objects of love, appreciation - whether sensory or
ideal- and devotion be included within true reality? (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 113)
The implications of this for achieving knowledge, and especially the assumption that
knowledge is automatically equated with absolute reality, are enormous. The fact that
science did come to see itself as inhering ultimately within the logic of physical
processes, and equated these processes as the only indubitable reality, resulted in a faulty
reductionism that ended up having serious consequences for scientific investigation. The
consequences were particularly serious for philosophy, which still desperately tried to
speak to important human values, many of which were suddenly outside the purview of
reality.
The major obstacle that the new science saw itself overcoming was severing the
philosophical link that inhered between the superior and inferior realms in Greek science.
The new science now had no need for conceptualizing a transcendental realm of absolute
being; it now engaged the "inferior" world of change in order to locate its own brand of
(epistemological) certainty. Unfortunately, by equating what was known with what was
absolutely real, the new science committed the same philosophical error as the Greeks,
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only inversely. The new science in effect replaced a transcendent realm of pure forms
with a physical realm of indubitable knowledge and ended up in tum designating the
world of common sense just as inferior as it had been for the Greeks. Knowing was thus
itself "transformed... into a morally irresponsible estheticism" (Dewey, 1920/1952, p.
103). The Greek unity of knowledge and wisdom was sundered. The key to
understanding Dewey's take on the scientific revolution lies in paying close attention to
his balanced reasoning as to why this need not be the inevitable mode of scientific
advance.
As Dewey understood it, the need of science to strip nature of its qualities in order
to get at its underlying (mathematico-mechanical) relationships did not in itself pose any
great problems. This is exactly what made the new science so revolutionary. Its
empiricism was wholly progressive in nature, and it introduced a new way of regulating
human experience by delivering it from the limitations of ordinary sense perception
which, as the sole (classical) mode of attaining knowledge was complicit in the
perpetuation of stale custom and dogmatic habit. Alternatively, the new science was a
forward-looking mode of experimental investigation that necessarily had to breach
immediate quality in order to progress, that is, locate those relations that lent what was
immediate its effective quality. In this sense, immediate qualities sustained underlying
relations that could be known. It was these underlying relations that could be known (in
their mathematico-mechanical capacities) that science mistakenly understood as the only
true reality apart from whieh any other mode of experiencing the world must be judged
inferior. This is one plausible interpretation of what science was about, but could there be
another? Dewey argues that indeed there is another interpretation that makes a great deal
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more sense. Analyzing Dewey's alternative conception will take us to the heart of the
widening disparity between science and philosophy (knowledge and wisdom) as well as
offer some clues as to how that disparity might be bridged.
Epistemology's Error
In a way, the history of the relationship between science and philosophy is an
intimate one, but the underlying dysfunction as it developed was based on a profound '
misunderstanding of what each was about. This misunderstanding was in tum
exacerbated by the fact that both science and philosophy misunderstood what experience
in general was about. Nowhere was this more apparent than in science and philosophy's
acceptance of the ubiquity of cognition. Only those experiences that could be known
were deemed absolutely real and certain. In this sense, it was not the operations of
science per se that were the problem, but rather science's entanglement within a lingering
metaphysics that could not and would not abandon the idea of absolute certainty. It was
essentially a philosophical problem.
This philosophical problem involved a fundamental confusion between primary
and secondary qualities within experience. Borrowing William James's terminology,
Dewey refers to "experience" as "a double-barrelled word" (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 10).
That is, "it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material,
subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality" (Dewey, pp. 10-11).
We can look at this phase of experience as being pretheoretical in its constitutive
integrity. This is at the heart of Dewey's refined empiricism, and it is necessary to a
proper understanding of his larger body of work. We find here the critical empiricism of
the seventeenth century taken a step deeper, implicating the more complex dimensions of
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experience. While experience (primary) is double barrelled in its recognition of'
unanalyzed, total experience, object and subject are single barrelled (secondary) because
"they refer to products discriminated by reflection out of primary experience" (Dewey, p.
11). We might call this phase of experience theoretical. Only when these distinct but
inextricable phases of experience are recognized can there be a truly empirical method,
for a properly aligned empiricism alone "takes this integrated unity as the starting point
for philosophic thought" (Dewey, p. 11).
Nonempirical methods, on the other hand, are reckless with primary experience,
when and if they recognize primary experience at all. Nonempirical methods start off
with the results of reflection (secondary experience), discriminations made, and then
posit them as if they were primary and already given. This is the philosophic error
committed in science. The weakness of its empiricism is not in its modes of experimental
inquiry and hypothesis testing, but rather in taking its discoveries or results as a priori
givens and, as such, primarily real. Given that science is rooted in the Latin word scientia
(knowledge), this weakness becomes fundamentally an epistemological weakness and
can be found in any number of areas of inquiry. It is what Dewey refers to generally as
the "conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence: a conversion that may be
said to be the philosophic fallacy: whether it be performed in behalf of mathematical
subsistences, esthetic essences, the purely physical order of nature, or God" (Dewey,
1925/1994, pp. 27-28).
It is this general philosophical problem that has lent a degree of arbitrariness to
the particular investigations of the natural (physical) sciences. It is not that the progress
made within the physical sciences has been slowed down by this philosophical
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shortcoming. A cursory look at the history of its discoveries makes this obvious enough.
What it does mean is that those discoveries have not become fully implicated or blooded
within the all-important territory of human valuation and meaning. This is where
philosophy should become most relevant. Unfortunately, philosophers have been so busy
attempting to secure an otherworldly realm for all those human qualities that do not fit
neatly into a physicalist conception of the universe that they have failed to understand
that they might have something of great relevance to say on behalf of human interest and
value about the appreciation and the potential uses of science's discoveries.
It is in this sense that the discoveries of science are left dangling in mere logical
space, left that is, in a technical stage of advance, with no more than a coincidental
connection to human values and the ends that might more efficaciously expand human
meaning and general well-being. In short, knowledge is severed from wisdom. For
Dewey, the reflected products or acquired knowledge of science are merely part of the
story. To leave such outcomes dangling in logical space without making revised
connections back to the primary experiential flux from which these outcomes evolved is
to effectively stunt our ability to guide and test our knowledge more widely and thus
more wisely. Dewey drives this point home when he writes that the reflected outcomes of
inquiry (or science),
define or layout a path by which return to experienced things is of such a sort that
the meaning, the significant content of what is experienced, gains an enriched and
expanded force because of the path or method by which it was reached. Directly,
in immediate contact it may be just what it was before-hard, colored, odorous,
etc. But when the secondary objects, the refined objects are employed as a method
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or road for coming at them, these qualities cease to be isolated details; they get the
meaning contained in a whole system of related objects; they, are rendered
continuous with the rest of nature and take on the import of the things they are
now seen to be continuous with. (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 8)
In calling for wisdom to be enjoined with knowledge, Dewey is here starting to map a
larger terrain of philosophical meaningfulness in which our knowings (reflective
outcomes) are continuous with a larger experiential context. He is attempting to indicate
that our experience in its primary integrity changes when we reflect, investigate, evaluate.
The key point, however, is to refer outcomes back to the primary experiential flux in
order to realize out of that flux determinate consequences. Are the original dumb qualities
enlarged or enriched, or are they worse off than they were when merely in their dumb
state? Qualities, whether they remain dumb or not, occur and have existential impact and
thus are implicated in possibilities and consequences.
Unfortunately, too often philosophy has played the role of the estranger. In
leaving the outcomes of science alone and granting them a kind of epistemological
autonomy and ubiquity, philosophy has become an overly abstracted enterprise. Such, of
course, has been as bad for science as it has for philosophy. Under these estranged
conditions it is not a far step, given this lack of philosophical guidance, for scientists to
start believing that indeed they are, through their physical investigations, tapping into the
primary and only true reality of the world. As a result, both philosophy and science end
up adopting a myopic approach to the human condition and the world in which that
condition finds its place. Caught up in pronouncing the objects of its inquiries as
primarily given and thus certainly real, science unfortunately undermines its own
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empiricism, unwittingly trading in for a nonempirical approach. This is when science
proper turns into a more imperious scientism. I have already highlighted what was
positive and progressive about science's mode of investigation. It may be good at this
point to clarify this a bit further. It is important to note that scientific inquiry, as a mode
of enlightened hypotheses, rigorous experimentation, and thorough testing was for
Dewey, the method of intelligence.
To reiterate, scientific reflection and discrimination were vital to the idea of
progress. As Dewey says in regard to this more robust empiricism:
To a truly naturalistic empiricism, the moot problem of the relation of subject and
object is the problem of what consequences follow in and for primary experience
from the distinction of the physical and the psychological or mental from each
other. The answer is not far to seek. To distinguish in reflection the physical and
to hold it in temporary detachment is to be set upon the road that conducts to tools
and technologies, to construction of mechanisms, to the arts that ensue in the
wake of the sciences. That these constructions make possible a better regulation
of the affairs of primary experience is evident. Engineering and medicine, all the
utilities that make for expansion of life, are the answer. There is better
administration of old familiar things, and there is invention of new objects and
satisfactions. Along with this added ability in regulation goes enriched meaning
and value in things, clarification, increased depth and continuity-a result even
more precious than' is the added power of control. (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 12)
Here we might recognize conduct of the intelligent variety (Dewey's naturalistic
empiricism), and this brand of conduct implicates human beings within a more expansive
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web of value and meaning. For the physical sciences, nature is what is experienced
(having realist implications) and experience is how nature is converted to objects through
human mediation and reflection (having idealist implications). The key is to recognize
that the "what" and the "how" are necessary to one another, and meaningless when set
apart in separate, and utterly discrete realms, hardening instead into a dualism.
The physical sciences, in specific, were responsible for "the enlarging possession
by mankind of more efficacious instrumentalities for dealing with the conditions of life
and action" (Dewey, 1925/1994, pp. 12-13). The philosophic fallacy, as it set in to
physical science's understanding of itself, might best be delineated by the distinction
between its intelligent methodology and its imperious clinging to reason's quest for
certainty. Science's neglect (a neglect that is philosophical) of the connection of its
objects with the affairs of primary lived experience thereby resulted in a dichotomous
picture of the world, a picture of objects "indifferent to human interests because it is
wholly apart from experience" (Dewey, p. 13). Intelligence, on the other hand, represents
a way of knowing in a world that provides no certainty. It is, as Dewey (1929) says,
associated with judgment; that is, with selection and arrangement of means to
effect consequences and with choice of what we take as our ends. A man is
intelligent not in virtue of having reason which grasps first and indemonstrable
truths about fixed principles in order to reason deductively from them to the
particulars which they govern, but in virtue of his capacity to estimate the
possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with this estimate. In the large
sense of the term, intelligence is as practical as reason is theoretical. (p. 170)
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The necessity, therefore, of trading a loss of theoretical certainty for a gain in practical
judgment gives "intelligence a foothold and a function within nature which 'reason'
never possessed" (Dewey, p. 170). Reason, as it came to be understood in most
philosophical thinking (principally in its Aristotelian, Cartesian, and Kantian
expressions), was always a mere spectator outside of nature and therefore could never, in
principle, participate in nature's changes.
If science engaged the world of change by stripping nature of its qualities, and if
this stripping of qualities is what lent a potential increase of value and control to human
experience, then science undermined its power only insofar as it conflated experience in
its integrity with knowing. We begin to see Dewey's alternative philosophical conception
taking shape when he says:
If and as far as the qualitative world was taken to be an object of knowledge, and
not of experience in some other form than knowing, and as far as knowing was
held to be the standard or sole valid mode of experiencing, the substitution of
Newtonian for Greek science (the latter being but a rationalized arrangement of
the qualitatively enjoyed world of direct experience) signified that the properties
that render the world one of delight, admiration, and esteem have been done away
with. There is, however, another interpretation possible. A philosophy which
holds that we experience things as they really are apart from knowing, and that
knowledge is a mode of experiencing things which facilitates control of objects
for purposes of non'-cognitive experiences, will come to another conclusion.
(Dewey, 1929, p. 79)
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Science, properly conceived, is not (or should not be) about denying the relevance of
primary qualities within nature. Scientific investigation simply sets aside concern with
immediate qualities in order to get at their underlying relations. Immediate quality is in
this sense an effect of underlying relations. Knowing these relations could afford science
a greater degree of control over effects as well as expand their variety in positive and
purposive ways. These underlying relations, therefore, are "hardly a competitor to the
thing itself' (Dewey, 1929, p. 105). To discover the underlying objective relations that
lead to certain qualitative effects is not logically to banish those effects from existence. It
is simply determining how and why a given effect at a given time has that particular
quality. Science's knowledge is thus instrumental, and this instrumental knowledge
cannot replace that which is noncognitively had, that which is immediately perceived and
enjoyed or suffered, with something wholly derivative and secondary. That is, there is no
mere replacing of one state (immediate/precognitive) with another (reflective/cognitive).
Rather, there is a change of meaning within the whole context in which reflection draws
immediate qualities into dynamic relations hitherto unacknowledged. Such
discriminations, necessary as they are, nonetheless arise from the primary context, the
integral practical context, and it is this context that must be returned to in order to
effectively gauge consequences. Theory is thus itself a form of practice for Dewey.
We can get at this complexity if we understand with Dewey that the process of
knowing is a matter of predication, that is, a propositional mode having subject-predicate
form. Knowing thus "marks an attempt to make a qualitative whole which is directly and
nonreflectively experienced into an object of thought for the sake of its own
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development" (Dewey, 1930b/1960, p. 188). This is what theory does. Using the
proposition "that thing is sweet," Dewey explains:
A certain quality is experienced. When it is inquired into or thought (judged), it
differentiates into "that thing" on the one hand, and "sweet" on the other. Both
"that thing" and "sweet" are analytic of the quality, but are additive, synthetic,
ampliative, with respect to each other. The copula "is" marks just the effect of this
distinction upon the correlative terms. They mark something like a division of
labor, and the copula marks the function or work done by the structures that
exhibit the division of labor. To say that "that thing is sweet" means "that thing"
will sweeten some other object, say coffee, or a batter of milk and eggs. The intent
of sweetening something formed the ground for converting a dumb quality into an
articulate object of thought. The logical force of the copula is always that of an
active verb. It is merely a linguistic peculiarity, not a logical fact, that we say
"that is red" instead of "that reddens," either in the sense of growing, becoming,
red, or in the sense of making something else red. Even linguistically our "is" is a
weakened form of an active verb signifying "stays" or "stands." (Dewey, pp. 188-
189)
The quality of a thing is thus a result of the relations it sustains. Human experience of the
world adds a level of complication to the implicit potentialities within nature. The
difficulties that attend the problem of predication, therefore, are the result of a long
epistemological tradition that supposes that terms and their connections have meaning
apart from their implications within organic lived experience. The only alternative to this
supposition, says Dewey, "is the recognition that the object of thought, designated
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propositionally, is a quality that is first directly and unreflectively experienced or had... .it
forms that to which all objects of thought refer... it is the big, buzzing, blooming
confusion of which James wrote" (p. 189).
Living Metaphysics
In the previous three sections I have provided a brief overview of Dewey's
historical analysis of some of the principle epistemological and metaphysical issues that
are at stake in his philosophy overall-indeed, for which his conception of philosophy
itself is at stake. My primary target in this historical overview has been epistemological
in scope. That is, by indicating some of the salient evolutionary factors in the historical
development of science, I have hopefully also indicated, through the connection of
knowledge to human experience, a sense of Dewey's radical natural organicism. At this
point I would like to explore this organicism and locate its expression in Dewey's
reconstructed metaphysics, providing an enlivened sense of some of the implications of
the foregoing epistemological considerations. In this way a clearer picture of Dewey's
larger pragmatic project should start to emerge.
To begin, it cannot be stressed enough the extent to which Dewey inverted the
traditional philosophical priorities pertaining to metaphysics. We can start to get at this
by stating what his metaphysics was not. It was not an attempt to get beyond the physical,
nor was it an attempt to situate "being" in some atemporal suprasensible realm. If
anywhere, "being" occurs within primary experience, within the day-to-day realities of
lived life. Dewey did not seek to establish a neutral Archimedean standing point from
which to view reality in an untainted way-to establish the absolute ultimate traits of
what could be considered really real. Dewey was also uninterested in building the kinds
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of metaphysical systems that philosophers in the past thought possible. As Boisvert
(1998) points out in this regard, highlighting Dewey's metaphysics as a kind of mapping
project rather than as a kind of system building:
Philosophical systems, since Descartes, have sought to discover a central,
unassailable starting point (sense data, atoms, protocol sentences, innate ideas)
upon which can be erected a logically consistent, rigorously developed system.
The guiding image has been that of an edifice meticulously constructed upon the
single foundation. (p. 150)
It may appear, then, absent any kind of transcendental or absolute foundational goal that
Dewey did away with metaphysics altogether-and, indeed, from the perspective of
much traditional philosophy, he did. But Dewey never was one to abandon older ways
root and branch. His was always a tempered criticism that recognized strengths as well as
weaknesses in past modes of thought. So, for example, when it came to his understanding
of the Greek inheritance (outlined above), his metaphysics retained virtually nothing of
the Platonic longing for otherworldly perfection, its hierarchical mode. Yet, in both
Plato's and Aristotle's ancient wisdom, Dewey would continue to appreciate the generous
and inclusive scope of their metaphysics, recognizing that even their "highest flight[s] of
metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical tum" (Dewey, 1930al1960, p.
13). Even Kant's revolution, which consisted in an attack on earlier metaphysical
systems, could not avoid artificial hierarchies and ended up establishing free-floating
"reason" as categorically separate from the world of sensation, in essence reversing the
old hierarchy of metaphysics and epistemology. The seemingly intractable dualisms that
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Kant's revolution instantiated was what Dewey's metaphysics sought to supersede
through a new and more pragmatic revolution.
Needless to say, Dewey was quite conscious of the realism/idealism debates
generated by Kant's legacy of dualisms and was early on quite sympathetic to Hegel's
subsequent attempts at organic reintegration of many of those dualisms. But Hegel's own
dialectical syntheses inhered in a strong (absolutistic) idealism. This clearly resonated
with the early Dewey's spiritual questioning. Dewey wrote that Hegel's philosophy
satisfied
a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet
was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy. It is more
than difficult, it is impossible, to recover that early mood. But the sense of
divisions and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence
of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from
the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression-
or, rather, they were an inward laceration. (Dewey, 1930al1960, p. 10)
Hegel, as a post-Kantian philosopher, thus offered syntheses that rehumanized the world
against Kant's a priori transcendental ego, and this appealed to the early Dewey's own
yearning for unification. Through his collapsing of so many dividing walls, Hegel
provided Dewey with an intense spiritual liberation. Yet, Dewey's metaphysics as it came
to develop could not have survived had it retained solely its Hegelian deposit, no matter
how much that deposit invigorated the younger Dewey and even necessitated his eventual
and more mature metaphysics. As Dewey started to drift further from Hegel's strong
idealism so too did Dewey drift from idealistic metaphysics. His early philosophy of
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immanence (his particular neo-Hegelianism) which sought to unify organic selves with
an absolutized uber-self, nature with spirit (in essence, Dewey's own quasi-theistic or
pan-psychist metaphysics), slowly was to give way to his concern with science wherein
metaphysical considerations gave way to (or at least had to make room for) more
practical methodological considerations. Other influences were shaping Dewey's
thinking as well.
Key among these early influences was Dewey's move away from the purely
ideational processes of Hegel to the more naturalistic processes of Darwin. Through
Darwin's attack on the notion of fixed species in biology, Dewey found a naturalistic
mode for attacking fixities of all kinds, not the least of which entailed philosophers'
proclivities for finding or establishing fixed truth. Compelled by Hegel's unifying
synthetic, Dewey came to appreciate in Darwin's work a way of grounding Hegel's
idealistic excesses via emergent and process-oriented inquiry. Rooting intelligence in the
world of flux and change spelled a key emancipation from a long philosophical tradition
that sought after fixed origins as well as fixed finalities. Life's qualities and the values
that arose through the very act of living sounded a death-knell for the kind of teleology
that located every earthly human action under the dispensation of remote causes and
eventual absolute final goals. Dewey thus arrived at a more radically naturalized sense of
the importance of temporality, a sense that was able to exceed Hegel's particular
dynamism. As Dewey says, this radical shift in perspective is
from the wholesale 'essence back of special changes to the question of how special
changes serve and defeat concrete purposes; shifts from an intelligence that
shaped things once and for all to the particular intelligences which things are even
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now shaping; shifts from an ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of
justice and happiness that intelligent administration of existent conditions may
beget and that present carelessness or stupidity will destroy or forego. (Dewey,
1909, p.11)
There can be no clearer statement of Dewey's intention to naturalize and reanimate (that
is, to make practical) our human world, to make it safe for thoroughly grounded modes of
inquiry. Dewey's naturalized and temporalized organicism also became integral to a vital
realignment and reconstruction of his metaphysics.
The reevaluation of a viable metaphysics came by way of Dewey's association
with a new colleague, Frederick Woodbridge, at Columbia in 1905.1 Woodbridge would
prove a deep influence on Dewey's thinking about metaphysics, leading Dewey to
consider seriously a uniting of his own scientific (methodological) considerations with
the possibility of an empirically situated metaphysics. The mature metaphysics that
Dewey would come to develop, different from his earlier idealistic metaphysics and
hinted at in the above three sections, would place Dewey as one of pragmatism's ablest
expositors. It can be argued that this is a position he still retains, the radical nature of
which is still being mined these many years later. So what is it that makes Dewey's
metaphysics different and viable, if, indeed, it can be considered as such? This dimension
of Dewey's work has not been without its controversies over the years. In his own day,
Dewey squared off against many critics2 and even today there is still vocal reaction to
Dewey's metaphysics, not the least of which comes from the neo-pragmatic ruminations
by Richard Rorty himself. That Dewey's metaphysics can be tricky and elusive to grasp,
even perhaps in some ways problematic, does not lessen the benefit of trying to
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understand his rich thought in this regard. Typically scholars will bring Dewey's
metaphysical position alive by highlighting the arguments against him and then showing
how Dewey deftly outmaneuvers and undermines each in tum. The only critic of
Dewey's metaphysics I want to deal with is Rorty. He stands sufficiently, I think, as
proxy for the many others. But I plan to take up that criticism explicitly in later chapters.
At this point I wish only to look at Dewey's own position, at what makes his metaphysics
radical and revolutionary, and when I come to take up Rorty's counterposition later, a
fuller illumination should start to emerge.
If we return to the experiential account highlighted in the previous three sections,
we begin to see the vital role experience plays in Dewey's overall philosophy. It's as
though Dewey's own "inward laceration" is an expression of the kind of laceration he
sees in the world. His pragmatic surgery uses experience as the thread for closing this old
wound. But experience was not without its problems for Dewey. Many of his major
works had the word "experience" in their titles, for example, Experience and Nature
(1925), Art as Experience (1934), and Experience and Education (1938). Yet, late in his
life, as he ruminated on the word in the context of his metaphysical magnum opus,
Experience and Nature (1925/1994), he regrets having used the word at all, determining
that he should have used the word "culture" instead.3 Whether the word "culture" would
actually have fared any better is difficult to determine. I would think it doubtful. At any
rate, there is little denying from our own vantage point that "experience" was the most
central concept in Dewey's entire philosophy and integral to his metaphysics. For Dewey,
experience is what occurs as a result of the transactions between living organisms and
their environment. Dewey had attacked the Kantian dualism in which experience was
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seen as a veil shutting persons off from nature, in which there was a world-in-itself
(nature) that could not be known and a world created by our senses, representing the only
world to which we could have access. Collapsing this dualism entailed abandoning any
notion of a static and wholly separate reality. Experience thus was the indication that
reality was a time-bound and dynamic process imbued affair.
The reconnection of philosophy to lived experience and our modes of knowing is
thus of paramount importance and can be achieved only if we give up the epistemological
conception that "being" and "being known" are one and the same thing. Recognizing that
experience involves a relationship in which experiencing subject and experienced object
inhere in one another highlights Dewey's metaphysics as situating experience in nature
and not apart from it. Knowledge comes by way of the connection between subject and
object, not by way of their separation. It is neither solely a private (purely individual)
subjective affair (idealism), nor is it solely an external (purely abstracted material)
objective affair (realism), if that affair be construed as a mind transparently and passively
receiving the objects of the world in an unmediated way. Thinking (inquiry) as a mode
of initiating and embodying our experience within the world, that is, as a mode of
mediating nature's intimations and penetrating nature's depths, is thus construed as a way
of making what is dumb or only implicit within nature (its quality) manifest through
mediated articulation and reflection. The world changes by virtue of our experience
within it, and our experience necessarily implicates us as reflective beings capable by
virtue of our reflective habits of expanding experience's potential, thereby enriching
meaning within our world.
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To be engaged in thinking is "to participate," as Kaufman-Osborn (1991) makes
clear, "in the activity through which some things, issues, and affairs become apparent
within experience, while others recede" (p. 107). Kaufman-Osborn goes on to show quite
nicely the way in which Dewey confounds the traditional appearance-reality dualism:
The term "appearance," consequently, does not refer, as it did in classic and
medieval philosophy, to a realm of being infected with the defect of non-Being.
Nor does it refer, as it does in modem epistemology, to the ontological gulf
between things as they really are and things as they seem to be, where "seeming"
designates what exists only in virtue of the subject's distortion of the single kind
of Being that remains when the ancients' graded cosmos is denied its sense.
Neither of these two understandings can acknowledge that things appear and
disappear only because temporality, altering the relations among nature's
interwoven affairs, presses experience past what would otherwise be
contemplation's blank stare. The term "appearance," accordingly, denotes the fact
that at any given moment in time some matters are showing and hence
conspicuous, while others are latent and hence withdrawn. Its antonym is not
reality but disappearance. (p. 107)
So construed, our experience is an embodied, time-bound transaction within nature.
When reason severs experience from nature, as Dewey makes clear,
"experience itself becomes reduced to the mere process of experiencing, and
experiencing is therefore treated as if it were also complete in itself. We get the
absurdity of an experiencing which experiences only itself, states and processes of
consciousness, instead of the things of nature" (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 13).
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Here we have the baggage of a faulty metaphysics that makes theory alone the guardian
of meaning and values in timeless abstraction. Such a faulty metaphysics takes
experience's goals (ideals), its ends and outcomes, and tum them into absolute and
timeless antecedent existences, thus providing experience its causal justification. In short,
there is a denial of the temporal quality of reality. As Dewey says,
"such a theory is bound to regard things which are causally explanatory as
superior to results and outcomes; for the temporal dependence of the latter cannot
be disguised, while 'causes' can be plausibly converted into independent beings,
or laws, or other non-temporal forms" (Dewey, p. 124).
Human values, represented as timeless absolute ends, are thus dialectically whisked away
to a realm safe from the temporal flux of the lived world.
One of the single most important philosophical moves that Dewey makes with
regard to his pragmatic (naturalized) metaphysics is to make a distinction between
primary and secondary modes of experience. I have spoken briefly to this above, but it is
now necessary to rehearse in more detail what this distinction entails. It is necessary for a
proper alignment of Dewey's metaphysics to his broader philosophy. One of Dewey's
most astute readers, John E. Smith (1978), points out that it is easy to conflate what
Dewey means by philosophy with what he means by metaphysics. The distinction,
however, is an important one. As Smith states, metaphysics for Dewey meant "reflective
analysis aimed at disclosing what he called the 'generic traits of existence' or the
pervasive features which manifest themselves in every specific subject matter which
defines or marks off a distinct field of inquiry" (p. 143). While each subject matter (say,
insects as the subject matter of entomology) is distinct and individual, there are
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nonetheless generic traits that cut across all discrete subject matters, thus forming the
subject matter of metaphysics itself. Philosophy, alternatively, is to be understood as a
"reflective enterprise of criticism pointing in two directions. There is first the task
of interpreting or functioning as a liaison between the technical languages of
special areas of inquiry, and secondly, a focusing on the goods or values
ingredient in science, art and social intercourse" (Smith, 1978, p. 143).
This was Dewey's way of keeping philosophy aligned with its traditional (if not
etymological) function, that is, as being concerned with wisdom. Wisdom, as such, is not
reducible to knowledge, but nor can knowledge be deemed merely the province of
science and thus dispensable for philosophy. Dewey's organicism is root and branch. His
metaphysics, then, becomes what Dewey characterizes as a "ground-map of the province
of criticism" (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 334). If philosophy has a central critical function, as
it must, then metaphysics in Dewey's lights becomes a way literally of grounding
criticism. It was also his way of accessing the richer dimensions of experience and
restoring reality to all of them as such.
Those familiar in any way with the history of metaphysics will immediately call
into question Dewey's delineation of the generic traits of existence. This facet of his
work sounds suspiciously like good-ole-fashioned metaphysics, but is it? Well, to the
extent that Dewey is positing generic traits across distinct subject matters, he is in fact
engaging in a traditional style of metaphysics, but to the extent that such traits are not
only practical, but also thoroughly practicable, the substance of his metaphysics is
revolutionary. He is, in fact, delineating the empirical space (i.e., the concrete practical
sphere) in which science and philosophy are blooded, so to speak, and where knowledge
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and wisdom are operant in close correspondence, and in which experience manifests the
possibilities of intelligent inquiry. Experience is a real part of the world. A quick look at
some of the generic traits themselves makes it clear that Dewey had no otherworldly
aspirations. A short list includes: stability, continuity, repetition, interaction, change,
openness, possibility, irregularity, quality, variation, certainty, and precariousness, to
name only a few. Such a list is also and always provisional. How could it be anything
other than provisional?4 But to get back to the way in which Dewey's conception of
experience is integral to his existential metaphysics, the way in which all of his
metaphysics inheres in a kind of logicability, we need to grasp what he meant by an
"indeterminate situation."
Dewey's Darwinism is, in effect, a radical anti-Cartesianism. Integral to this
Darwinism is Dewey's positing of an "indeterminate situation." Margolis (2002)
highlights this aspect of Dewey's work, stating that "[Dewey's] invention of the
'indeterminate situation' was pragmatism at its leanest and existential best" (p. 116).
With this important and compact clue, we can start to gauge the way Dewey effectively
bypassed the realism/idealism debates that still plague analytic philosophy today. His
anti-Cartesianism as it is expressed via his working out of an "indeterminate situation,"
fuelled by his Darwinian tum, still places Dewey's experiential account as thoroughly
radical in scope. Margolis, in five compact points, captures this radical point:
[Dewey] maintains that "experience" is a real ingredient in the world; that it never
constitutes or constructs the "independent world"; that the world, when "known,"
is known under the condition of the inseparability of the subjective and the
objective; that knowledge of the world emerges from some real but non-cognitive
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experience (or "ingredient") of (and in) the world; and that whatever we view as
the features of the "independent" world are, epistemically but not ontically,
artifacts of our evidentiary sources. (p. 112)
This is as compact a statement as you can get for properly situating Dewey's
metaphysics, which in the end, entails and endorses a form of pragmatic constructive
realism.
Dewey's genius, and the genius, I think, of his metaphysics, was to establish a
realist footing for emergent (rather than teleological) cognition. This realist ground was
what he called an "indeterminate situation." An indeterminate situation is a natural event.
It is also the situational space from which all inquiry develops (including scientific). The
oft-cited passage from Dewey's (1938a) Logic: The Theory ofInquiry reads as such:
"Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation ofan indeterminate situation into
one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified whole" [italics in the original] (p. 108).
What is important is that the "indeterminate situation" is noncognitive, but as a natural
event (Dewey's vital intuition of existential import), it can gradually transform into a
problematic situation. A problematic situation arises out of an "indeterminate situation"
that has evolved an existential impasse for the human subject, a felt quality that
something is out of sorts.
Once a situation is felt (not known) to be problematic the impetus for inquiry is
established from which future cognition (potential knowing) emerges. Of importance, if
there was no "indeterminate situation" noncognitively had (rather than known)-which
already establishes the brute embodied integrity of primary experience-then cognition
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(secondary experience) would retain a merely Cartesian (and arbitrary) facultative status.
As Margolis (2002) points out, this noncognitive ground has realist status that does not
privilege the cognitive as a starting point for inquiry. To note this fact,
is to see at once the advantage of Dewey's characterization of knowledge in terms
of practical know-how, of savoir-faire, rather than of savoir. In effect, theoretical
knowledge is itself a form of practical knowledge, and its realist standing depends
on the continuum that runs, via a "problematic situation," from non-cognitive
impasses engaging our animal existence, the emergence of animal cognition from
that, and the emergence of linguistically structured cognition (and science) from
that. In this way, Dewey deftly obviates the entire Cartesian aporia. (p. 113)
What I hope is becoming clear is that Dewey's metaphysics is itself a form of inquiry and
can make sense only if it starts out of actually living existential situations. Dewey's
metaphysics is functional to the extent that it never starts with theory, but rather what
Margolis calls "the non-cognitive conditions of animal survival" (p. 113). All of the
provisional generic traits that Dewey established as being indicative of this more
Darwinian existential reality established his own metaphysics as thoroughly pragmatic
and progressive. It allowed for the bravest kind of philosophical inquiry-inquiry as
criticism-and to Dewey being able to supply new kinds of questions, effectively placing
philosophy in a more fruitful relation to human life as it is actually lived. He suggests the
following as,
a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is offered us: Does it end in
conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and
their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make
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our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things
of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them
of having in "reality" even the significance they had previously seemed to have?
Does it yield the enrichment and increase of power of ordinary things which the
results of physical science afford when applied in every-day affairs? Or does it
become a mystery that these ordinary things should be what they are; and are
philosophic concepts left to dwell in separation in some technical realm of their
own? (Dewey, 1925/1994, pp. 9-10)
Clearly, Dewey's metaphysics entwines epistemological considerations and makes
possible an empirically realist philosophy that retains the wisdom that comes by way of
the recognition of the radical contingency that is all of our lives.
We shall see how this holds up as we move to an exploration of Richard Rorty's
brand of pragmatism. I will maintain that the majority of what makes both Dewey's and
Rorty's pragmatisms pragmatic is their strong antiepistemological and antimetaphysical
stances-anti, that is, in the sense necessary to a thoroughgoing pragmatism that has
turned sharply against absolutist conceptions of Truth. But clearly, as I hope I have
shown, Dewey's reconstructive impulse mitigates against total and complete
abandonment, whereas Rorty is far less patient. Yet, it may tum out that the differences
between the two pragmatists are not as severe as many expositors of their works have
maintained. It may be merely a linguistic peculiarity that one says it this way while the
other says it that way and aclose look at their respective ways of stating their pragmatic
positions may indicate that they are saying more or less the same thing-differently. The
way I propose to make this option a practical and viable one will entail indicating the
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plausibility that Rorty's linguistified pragmatism is indeed experiential through and
through, that the so-called "linguistic tum" never could make much sense as a tum away
from experience, even if it was a tum away from a preference for talking about
experience. There is a great deal at stake, especially for Rorty's philosophy, if my hunch
is correct. In the next chapter, however, I tum to an introductory overview of Rorty' s
pragmatism, taking my lead from his own autobiographical account. In the following
chapter after that, I will stick with Rorty and use his particular (hard) tum against
absolutist conceptions of Truth as more or less an expression of pragmatism's tum
generally and as being in line with Dewey's tum specifically. I am interested in
articulating the mood that such a turning has generated, and so Rorty will stand in as my
effective voice for other pragmatists old and new.
CHAPTER THREE: THE NEO-PRAGMATISM OF RICHARD RORTY
In the previous chapter I have provided a brief survey of Dewey's interpretation
of the scientific legacy within the Western philosophical tradition and philosophy's role
therein-his (and pragmatism's) epistemological and metaphysical inheritance. I also
indicated the ways in which Dewey's pragmatic philosophy turned against many of the
central epistemological and metaphysical premises bolstering that tradition while
maintaining a pragmatic and reconstructive desire to rework certain elements of that
tradition to fit what Dewey saw as the major sea-changes occurring all around him,
changes highlighting the growing (and existentially weighty) awareness of the
"unrelieved contingency" of the world and our station in it. Clearly, Dewey's pragmatic
reworking of metaphysics, necessitated by the recognition of a general philosophical shift
from a classical to a Cartesian and finally to a Darwinian worldview, was itself a result of
his radical critique of the epistemological tradition, which provided the space for his
thoroughly experiential core focus. This further entailed, as a result of that focus new, yet
still empirically valid methods for inquiry. I have been able only to hint at Dewey's fully
fleshed theory of inquiry (itself a fully fleshed theory of practice)! via my focus on his
pragmatic epistemological and metaphysical reforming of the Western tradition. In
turning to Richard Rorty' s strong antiepistemological and antimetaphysical version of
pragmatism, I will highlight the extent to which his version is working within a Deweyan
pragmatic framework as well as at counterpurposes to it. But first I would like to begin,
by way of introduction to ~orty' s pragmatism, with an overview and analysis of his only
autobiographical work, "Trotsky and The Wild Orchids" written in 1993. The clues
offered in this personal statement by Rorty are, on the whole, enlightening for his overall
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philosophical project. I shall then progress in the next chapter to an explicit analysis of
his strong antiepistemological and antimetaphysical position.
Rorty on Reality and Justice
It was perhaps necessary that by the 1990s Richard Rorty should publish an
autobiographical piece. He was by then receiving varied and often hostile criticism from
all points along the political and philosophical spectrum-enough, anyway, to warrant
some kind of a more personal response. The result of that effort was his autobiographical
"Trotsky and The Wild Orchids" (1999b) wherein Rorty sought to clarify for his largely
disgruntled readership that he did indeed have reasons (or motivations) for writing the
way he did and espousing the positions he supported, philosophical and otherwise.
Rorty was born in 1931 to parents who were "Trotskyites," a tag given them by
the Daily Worker, and one that they "more or less accepted" after having abandoned the
American Communist Party in 1932. His father was actively involved with the Dewey
Commission of Inquiry into the Moscow Trials, and he was nearly able to accompany
Dewey to Mexico to act in a public relations capacity for the Commission that Dewey
chaired. Rorty was an only child and by the age of 12 was showing all the signs of
preteen precociousness. With a reading repertoire that would make today's Game Boy
generation's heads spin, Rorty was well on his way at that ripe young age of starting to
work out what would become central philosophical issues in his later adult life. In a way,
adulthood came early for Rorty, not necessarily because of the fact that by the age of 15
he had enrolled into the University of Chicago, but more likely because of the playground
bullies who drove him there to begin with. At any rate, by age 12 Rorty knew "that all
decent people were, if not Trotskyites, at least socialists" (Rorty, 1999b, p. 6). Working
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during the winter of his 12th year as an unpaid office boy delivering drafts of press
releases on behalf the Workers' Defense League (where his parents worked), Rorty was
early on to become well versed in the leftist documents that he was charged with
delivering, learning from what he read therein "that the point of being human was to
spend one's life fighting social injustice" (Rorty, p. 6). So in terms of Rorty's formative
development we learn that a concern for social justice played a vital role.
Another important formative feature in the young Rorty had nothing to do with
social justice per se (though in the light of his advanced philosophical work we might
come to question this assumption) and everything to do with what he refers to as "private,
weird, snobbish, incommunicable interests" (Rorty, p. 6). When he was not on the
subway reading leftist literature about the necessity of liberating the weak from the strong
(or physically experiencing such a necessity on the playground), he was engaged in more
Romantic pursuits consisting primarily of a fascination with the wild orchids that grew in
the mountains of northwest New Jersey. He had at that time no idea why they were so
important to him, but he was aware that they were significant of something different from
his other, more political exposures, sensing in fact that this "orchidaceous" preoccupation
was "socially useless." And yet he had read and reread a nineteenth century book on the
botany of orchids that grew in the eastern U.S., and had located 17 of the 40 species that
grew there-no small feat. These "Wordsworthian moments," as he referred to them, in
the woods around Flatbrookville offered the young Rorty what he referred to as
"something numinous, something of ineffable importance" (Rorty, p. 8); (bearing a
striking tonal resemblance to Wordsworth's own "Lines: Composed a Few Miles Above
Tintern Abbey," in which he writes of "a sense sublime/Of something far more deeply
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interfused,,).2 By age 15 when Rorty headed off to the University of Chicago, he had the
inklings of a project in mind-··namely finding a way to (borrowing Yeats's phrase) "hold
reality and justice in a single vision." "Reality" for Rorty here indicated those
Wordsworthian moments of private ineffable bliss while "justice" indicated his leftist
upbringing and his yearning to publicly do his part to help, generally speaking, save the
poor and weak oppressed from the rich and powerful bullies. Another way of putting this
is to say that Rorty was interested in holding both his private and public interests in a
single vision. Surely, a solid university education steeped in philosophy would show the
way. That Rorty would, after years of philosophical study find no plausible way of
uniting reality and justice into a single vision becomes central to his pragmatism and all
his mature work, as we shall see later.
At the University of Chicago in 1946 there had occurred a sharp tum against the
"quaint" progressivist pragmatism of John Dewey (who up to that point was widely
considered to be America's philosopher), and Rorty's teachers, who included Mortimer
Adler and Richard McKeon, as well as "awesomely learned refugees from Hitler" like
Leo Strauss, all thought and taught that Dewey was not deep enough or weighty enough a
thinker to handle the evils of Nazism. They all were of the academic disposition that
to say, as Dewey did, that 'growth itself is the only moral end', left one without a
criterion for growth, and thus with no way to refute Hitler's suggestion that
Germany had 'grown' under his rule ....Only an appeal to something eternal,
t
absolute, and good - like the God of St. Thomas, or 'nature of human beings'
described by Aristotle - would permit one to answer the Nazis, to justify one's
choice of social democracy over fascism." (Rorty, 1999b, p. 8)
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Influenced by this take on his own pragmatic inheritance, Rorty would spend the next 5
years moving away from the philosophically progressivist leanings of his parents, instead
trying "very much to be some kind of Platonist." He determined that becoming a good
philosopher meant getting to the "top of Plato's 'divided line' - the place 'beyond
hypotheses' where the full sunshine of Truth irradiates the purified soul of the wise and
good: an Elysian field dotted with immaterial orchids" (Rorty, p. 9). We are moved, then,
to the center of Rorty' searly philosophical yearnings-his first Platonic yearnings for
certainty (where many a great philosopher has started off on what Rorty would later come
to consider a futile journey). As it turned out, Rorty was unable to hold on to any serious
convictions about achieving his goal of holding reality and justice in a single vision by
following Plato. He simply could not see how one could achieve "noncircular
justifications" and thus defensible certainty in arguing for one's most cherished
philosophical convictions. As Rorty states:
The more philosophers I read, the clearer it seemed that each of them could carry
their views back to first principles which were incompatible with the first
principles of their opponents, and that none of them ever got to that fabled place
'beyond hypotheses.' (p. 10)
It was dawning for Rorty that there was no neutral standpoint from which to evaluate
alternative philosophers' "first principles," and so the "whole Socratic-Platonic idea of
replacing passion by reason, seemed not to make much sense" (Rorty, p. 10). Shifting
away from the Platonic quest for certainty, Rorty still felt optimistic that he could defend
philosophical truth (which could effectively unite his reality and justice distinctions) by
looking to the test of coherence, which entailed avoiding contradictions. As soon as he
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realized, however, that the best way to avoid a contradiction was to make a distinction (St
Thomas's classic advice) and thereby "wriggle out of [any] dialectical comer" you might
find yourself backed into, philosophy became merely a game of exhibiting one's talents
in this regard, a talent, as Rorty points out, for "redescription" (Rorty, p. 10). That is, if
you could just redescribe the terrain "in such a way that the terms used by your opponent
would seem irrelevant, or question-begging, or jejune," then you would effectively win
(Rorty, p. 10). Rorty quickly realized that good philosophers were good at this kind of
gamesmanship, and as such, he realized he was a very good philosopher indeed. But, at
the same time, it was not a skill (though perhaps an important skill for a professional
philosopher) that seemed to be able to deliver him any further down the road of achieving
his sought-after goal. At this point Rorty found himself thoroughly disillusioned.
It was in this disillusioned state that Rorty left Chicago to pursue a Ph.D. at Yale,
and he did so wondering what philosophy could be good for, if anything. He soon
discovered Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit and Proust's Rembrance ofThings Past (a
novel, he says, that effectively took the place of his beloved orchids), and in these books
Rorty was reenergized with a sense that philosophy could still be useful. Both Hegel and
Proust shared, in their own ways, a radical sense of "irreducible temporality," and, as
such, were strong anti-Platonists, which Rorty knew he must also be. The otherworldly
yearning for Platonic certainty had proved a sham, but there was this lived-in world, and
suddenly the "skill" of out-redescribing your philosophical opponent could be put to use
in redescribing also your philosophical predecessors. Hegel's historicist notion that the
best that philosophy could do was to "hold its own time in thought" might just prove
good enough to make philosophy a socially useful enterprise after all, in spite of Hegel's
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Absolute Spirit supposedly hanging over all history. Rorty thought that the strong
historicist parts of Hegel's philosophy and Proust's novel opened up the kind of space
necessary for weaving the "conceptual fabric of a freer, better, more just society" (Rorty,
1999b, p. 11). At any rate, philosophy was now rejuvenated for Rorty. Hegel and Proust
seemed each to be able "to weave everything they encountered into a narrative without
asking that that narrative have a moral, and without asking how that narrative would
appear under the aspect of eternity" (Rorty, p. 11). This was a complete about-face for
Rorty and represented the return of that pragmatism respected by his parents, as well as
his strong tum against Platonism that would evolve over the next 20 years.
Over the ensuing 20 years Rorty slowly returned to Dewey, who was no longer
the soft, irrelevant philosopher peddled by Adler, McKeon, and others, but rather a
serious philosopher who had learned all there was to learn from Hegel about giving up on
the quests for eternity and certainty, but who had also "immuniz[ed] himself against
pantheism by taking Darwin seriously" (Rorty, 1999b, p. 12).3 Rorty came to read
Continental philosophers as well, particularly Derrida, who led him back to a serious
reading of Heidegger. Wittgenstein was also a source of inspiration for Rorty, and it
struck him just how much Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein resembled one another
when it came to their criticisms of the Cartesian tradition with its mind-body problem.
This led to the writing of Rorty's (1979) classic and controversial book Philosophy and
the Mirror ofNature. There, Rorty worked out a great number of philosophical issues he
had been thinking about (the mind-body problem, philosophy of language problems about
truth and meaning, the contributions of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, etc.). The
book was not well received by philosophers, particularly analytic philosophers, as many
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viewed it as an attack on their profession. Certainly, it was in many ways just such an
attack, but that has a great deal to do with Rorty's strong anti-Platonism and strong
Pragmatism, as well as with what Rorty saw as the internal self-devaluating of analytic
philosophy (it had been busy, with eloquence and grace, undermining itself via the logic
of its own instruments for the better half of the twentieth century).4 But in terms of
Rorty's long sought-after goal, what he originally went to university to fulfill, this book
did little if anything to advance the desired unification of reality and justice. Indeed,
Rorty had decided that such a desire was in fact a mistake, infected as it was with a
Platonic longing. Religion represented the only sort of "nonargumentative faith" that
might do the trick, but Rorty was a devout secularist. What had originally been a desire to
unite now became a desire to separate, and his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
(1989) was written to say something about "what intellectual life might be like if one
could manage to give up the Platonic attempt to hold reality and justice in a single vision"
(Rorty, 1999b, p. 13). This then becomes the central theme of "Trotsky and Wild
Orchids"-the movement away from a unified vision toward the necessity of the
separation of the public and the private spheres, the political from the philosophical and
idiosyncratic.
To return, then, to what motivated Rorty to write this autobiographical piece, it
would appear that the at times harsh criticisms arising from both the left and the right in
response to Rorty's writings up to that point were not the primary reason. Rorty actually
considered this a more or less healthy sign that he was in fact in good shape. Certainly,
such criticisms would not have been enough to warrant an autobiographical response
(Rorty I think was, like Dewey, probably uncomfortable with the task). An admirable
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aspect of Rorty' s body of work is the way he handles his critics with grace and patience,
responding in tum to most of his serious critics (who more typically are from the left than
from the right) with well thought out and well crafted responses.5 His graciousness in this
regard puts him in league with his hero John Dewey, who was also very responsive to his
critics. In this sense Rorty is every bit a good conversationalist and a good scholar. What
in fact necessitates in him an autobiographical response is a growing chorus that he is just
in this business to be frivolous (not, after all, an impossibility in these so-called
postmodem times). Rorty is indeed candid when he writes that it hurts that there are those
who think he will "say anything to get a gasp, that [he is] just amusing [himself] by
contradicting everybody else" (Rorty, 1999b, p. 5). Why, then, does Rorty not just ignore
this particular line of criticism? Why does he feel compelled to respond to and get
personal about what any close reader of his works must recognize as itself a frivolous
accusation (though perhaps not frivolously made)? I think, in part anyway, that Rorty has,
contrary to his early yearnings for unity, always advocated circumventing those
numerous philosophical dead ends (the pursuit of absolute truth, the search for
unassailable epistemological foundations, etc.) that are more or less wastes of energy, and
one would have to say, from Rorty's perspective, frivolous pursuits. So, when the charge
of frivolity is leveled against Rorty himself, it must sting a bit. On the more generous
side, I think he feels compelled to respond autobiographically because he must recognize
that when you shake up people's worlds, when you confront them with their own musty,
antiquated purposes and propose better ways, none of which, by the way, can be
objectively grounded or adhered to in light of rational first principles, well, people tend to
get pretty edgy. And those on the right get edgier then those on the left. This is because
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(to put the matter very simply) the right is traditionally conservative while the left is
progressive. But even on the left, there is plenty of edginess, because they think this
poetically revolutionary stance must have a concomitant revolutionary political stance,
and for Rorty it simply does not! His sharp separation of philosophical from political
matters (an expression of his broad separation of the public from the private spheres)
throws curves at his readership left, right, and center, and garners his status as an elusive
thinker. For example, Rorty tells us that some postmodernists "who initially took [his]
enthusiasm for Derrida to mean that I must be on their political side decided, after
discovering that my politics were pretty much those of Hubert Humphrey, that I must
have sold out" (Rorty, p. 18).
So there is an elusive quality to Rorty's works, or at least there is to those who are
accustomed to reading others' positions as needing to be based in strong arguments,
which Rorty's, again, are not. Arising out of Rorty' s "redescriptive" philosophy, the
traditional argumentative approach is substantially weakened, and by way of that, so too
is the very conception of philosophy. Rorty is not against argument per se, and if an
argument proves fruitful in gaining agreement or solidarity with an interlocutor, then he
will argue. But this kind of philosophical argumentation that Rorty advocates involves
what he would consider rather mundane cases, quibbles within an already entrenched and
more or less accepted vocabulary. Really interesting philosophy, which for Rorty is
always revolutionary philosophy (keeping in mind that the same does not apply to
politics), does not and should not rely on argumentation as a method of persuasion.
Interesting philosophy "outflanks" old descriptions via redescription (keeping in mind the
lesson he learned early on in university) by throwing something radically new out there to
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an unsuspecting audience. An audience expecting a solid knockdown argument is an
audience (or so Rorty would "argue") who is really just looking for a variation on a
theme, and nothing starkly new. This is an important point for Rorty. When you provide
arguments, you risk becoming trapped in the very language game you're trying to move
beyond. As he says in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989):
On the view of philosophy which I am offering, philosophers should not be asked
for arguments against, for example, the correspondence theory of truth or the idea
of the "intrinsic nature of reality." The trouble with arguments against the use of a
familiar and time-honored vocabulary is that they are expected to be phrased in
that very vocabulary. They are expected to show that central elements in that
vocabulary are "inconsistent in their own terms" or that they "deconstruct
themselves." But that can never be shown. Any argument to the effect that our
familiar use of a familiar term is incoherent, or empty, or confused, or vague, or
"merely metaphorical" is bound to be inconclusive and question-
begging....Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of
a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched
vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary
which vaguely promises great things. (pp. 8-9)
One starts to get a sense of why certain "traditionally" trained philosophers get edgy.
This is no less than a radical repositioning of what philosophical inquiry should be and
what philosophy (if it can still be called that) might yet be good for. Philosophy, now as a
vehicle of poetic self-creation, moves sharply from objectivist to historicist understanding
and from scientific to literary modes of discourse. Yet, and this is important, Rorty is a
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philosopher. Only he does not consider himself a philosopher in a philosophical culture,
but rather a philosopher in a literary culture.6 Culture has moved on, and philosophy is
now one "literary" mode among others (like literature, science, history, biology, physics,
and every other traditionally inscribed discipline one wishes to consider). The
philosophical and educational ramifications of this will become more explicit later, but
for now I want to stick to his autobiographical piece in order to begin developing more
explicitly the tensive relationship between his notions of "reality" and "justice"-in other
words, his distinction (can it be called a dualism?) of the public and private spheres.
This autobiographical account can be divided roughly in two halves-the
public/political half and the private/philosophical half. In terms of the public/political part
of Rorty' s account, the self-professed "ironist" (now an appropriate literary accoutrement
for a philosopher) has gotten him into trouble with the intellectual world by offending,
first, leftists who think his laid-back ironic liberalism is little more than a form of
academic escapism while acting simultaneously as an apology for continued strands of
American imperialism, based in "an odious ethos of 'liberal individualism'" (Rorty,
1999b, p. 4). Rorty's response to these leftist critics, promoters as he calls them, of the
"America Sucks Sweepstakes," is that he actually is advocating on behalf of a different
kind of America, the other America that Whitman and Dewey saw "as opening a prospect
on illimitable democratic vistas," and that in spite of "present atrocities and vices, and
despite its continuing eagerness to elect fools and knaves to high office-is a good
example of the best kind of society so far invented" (Rorty, p. 4).
Critics from the right charge him with not basing his democratic aspirations in
anything solid, for not having, that is, "Objectively Good" and "Rational First
73
Principles." As a philosopher, these critics charge, he owes it "to tell the young that their
society is not just one of the better ones so far contrived, but one which embodies Truth
and Reason" (Rorty, 1999b, pp. 4-5). This left/right polarity amongst Rorty's critics he
further refines down to a culture war between "progressivist" and "orthodox" camps. He
clearly aligns himself on the progressivist side:
I see the 'orthodox' (the people who think that hounding gays out of the military
promotes traditional family values) as the same honest, decent, blinkered,
disastrous people who voted for Hitler in 1933. I see the 'progressivists' as
defining the only America I care about. (Rorty, p. 17)
This is the culture war that Rorty labels as being "important." The stakes, indeed, are
high for Rorty's America in this battle, because for all of America's faults, Rorty
nonetheless thinks that its progressive movements over time (for example, the Bill of
Rights, female suffrage, the New Deal, Brown v. Board ofEducation, the building of
community colleges, civil rights legislation, the feminist movement, and the gay rights
movement) indicate a trajectory of increasing tolerance and equality that is well worth
continuing along. It is also important, because as an indication of his public/private split,
such "progressive" movements are not and should not be made the expressive outcomes
of "objectively good" and "rationale first principles." Politically, then, Rorty is an
advocate of progress without principles, and thus progress without philosophy inasmuch
as establishing unassailable foundational principles (read as moral laws) has been a
longstanding philosophicai preoccupation.7 If philosophy is to have anything whatsoever
to do with progress in the future, it will not be under the misplaced tutelage of
philosophical first (or last) principles. Still, this is a trickier point than it may at first
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appear and will involve a brief analysis that moves away briefly (though not in spirit)
from his autobiographical sketch.
Rorty is not dictating the end of all metaphysical speculation (which is the
particular branch of philosophy concerned with discovering first and last principles of all
kinds), or all traditional (epistemological and metaphysical) philosophical
preoccupations. He may not explicitly engage in such pursuits himself, nor may his
pragmatism endorse such pursuits as being of any value (he is in fact quite consistently
outspoken against them), but he is not saying anything to the effect of "ban all such
pursuits from here on in" or "philosophy as we know it must, at all costs, come to an
end." All such philosophical speculators and their speculations can now, as they ever
have, take the stage and compete with other vocabularies, other language games, for
future social utility, and if in some future time certain competitors fade from the stage
and disappear, so be it (even if this includes Rorty himself). It will not, however, be due
to the better argument, as has been suggested above. It is pointless to argue against the
metaphysicians' lofty speculations (Rorty can even accept them on occasion as a kind of
spiritual salve). Better just to let them be in time and see how they fare. In a pragmatic
literary culture, ideas come and go, only because in such a culture, temporality
necessitates a horizontal spread of competing discourses (an integral component learned
from Hegel and Proust, and it might be added, missed in his reading of Dewey) rather-
than what was in traditional cultures more vertical quests for changeless transcendence or
absolute foundational depth. On the now horizontal plane, the antonym of appearance
(say, on some stage of competing discourses) cannot properly be understood as reality, a
central and persistent dualism (even still) of the hierarchical philosophical culture, but
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rather, simply, disappearance, indicating temporality's spread.8 Therefore, it is important
to note that Rorty's politics on this "important" side is democratic through and through.
But it is democracy explicitly temporalized (as perhaps it must ever be, no more and no
less, than something ever more about to be). It is a decisive shift, well exemplified by the
early pragmatists every bit as much as Rorty's contemporary pragmatism, to a future
orientation that turns against the possible stagnations and dogmatisms of traditional
vertical assessments. This brings us to the other, less important, culture war and back to
"Trotsky and The Wild Orchids."
The other culture war that Rorty thinks is "not very important," what he calls a
"tiny, upmarket cultural war," is in-house and is waged between progressivists. He lumps
the so-called "postmodernists" on the one side and left-wing Democratic "pragmatists"
like himself on the other. It is a battle waged primarily in Humanities departments in
universities and the stakes that count also are political and involve the viability of modem
liberalism (note, Rorty has little by way of opposition to postmodernists
philosophically-he says they are for the most part right philosophically, but wrong
politically). It seems that the political upshot for many philosophical postmodernists
necessitates revolution against liberalism with all its baby "isms"-"humanism,"
"individualism," and "technologism." Liberalism with its place in the Enlightenment
project is, from the strong postmodernist position, fatally flawed and needs replacement.
This politicized neo-Marxist branch of postmodernism arising out of a deconstructive
impulse Rorty thinks gives away far too much, or at least would potentially do so, in its
revolutionary zeal. He says 'Deweyans' like himself are "sentimentally patriotic about
America-willing to grant that it could slide into fascism at any time, but proud of its
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past and guardedly hopeful about its future" (Rorty, 1999b, p. 17). He is willing to keep
what was and still is good in socialism, but, alas, welfare capitalism appears the best
America has come up with thus far, and tinkering reform is politically more practical
(and less dangerous supposedly) than out-and-out revolution. Rorty might just be right on
this point, as any honest look at the twentieth century's ideological body count must
indicate. Whether such staggering numbers are actually due to revolutionary impulses or
the lack thereof is, perhaps, a debatable point. But I think Rorty' s moderate
conservativism in this regard arises out of genuine horror rather than frivolity and is, as
such, defensible. Rorty is of the strong conviction that good philosophical intentions have
often led to barbaric results when married to politics. If he is right in this (and its difficult
to see how he is not), then his conservatism is not a contradiction but actually part of his
thoroughly progressive outlook and consonant with his broader philosophical work.
At this point it might be good to recap a bit. Rorty originally hoped to unite
"reality" and "justice" in a single vision. These two components representing his sense of
purpose were a part of his own acculturation, divided between the public/political
inheritance from his parents and their social(ist) milieu and the private/idiosyncratic
inheritance derived largely from nature and his solitude within it. Such a hope drove him
to university and the study of philosophy at a young age. Over the course of his
university education right up through the PhD Rorty came to learn that the hope of
uniting reality and justice was a futile (and even dangerous) dream. What necessitated
this turnabout for Rorty came primarily from his inability to reconcile Plato's
otherworldly aspirations (indubitable context-free justification for one's belief/s leading
to certain knowledge) with what went on in this world. Reality and justice became for
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Rorty a necessary public/private distinction, a necessity born out of his own dawning
awareness that philosophy and philosophers could be of no use "if you want confirmation
that the things you love with all your heart are central to the structure of the universe, or
that your sense of moral responsibility is 'rational' and 'objective' rather than just a result
of how your were brought up" (Rorty, 1999b, p.20). So what are some important
implications of this turnabout for Rorty's work? I shall now put forth some themes that
are relevant to my larger project but that for my aims here shall serve introductory
purposes.
What of Philosophy in a Public and Private World
Philosophy, itself, comes to take on a distinctively different public and private
shape. Publicly, philosophy is useful because it is important to expose the younger
generations to what has been written before them, some of the "great" ideas that have
been played out and contested on the human stage throughout history, and great only
because they made the stage. For Rorty, such are historical narratives and are important
as narratives rather than as a series of ever-progressing (and therefore increasingly
accurate) theoretical instruction. Publicly, philosophy has an important historical and
educational role to play because as narrative history, philosophy can be used for primarily
inspirational rather than didactic or instructional purposes. Rorty is clear that "ideas do,
indeed, have consequences." As he says of his own education in "Trotsky and The Wild
Orchids" (1999b):
t
If I had not read all those books, I might never have been able to stop looking for
what Derrida calls 'a full presence beyond the reach of play' , for a luminous, self-
justifying, self-sufficient synoptic vision. (p. 20)
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What we infer from this in terms of public philosophy's utility is that it should continue
to be read by the young but that we should stop continuing the effort to co-opt the
younger generations into the useless idea that philosophy's longwinded preoccupation
with establishing absolute epistemological and metaphysical certainty or "rightness" is
the best path to stay on. Doing so sucks the life out of the inspirational value that can be
had (as a literary virtue) from works of all kinds, wherein the "kind" of work it is is
secondary to the inspirational impact it might have. Rorty is trying to abandon the notion
that there have to be absolute criteria (the development of which has been philosophy's
traditional charge) lending various works their instructional merit. Contrary to charges
that Rorty is a rampant moral relativist, he never hesitates to make distinctions between
right and wrong or true and false. He simply refuses, as any pragmatist does, to ground
any given judgment of right or wrong, of true or false, in any kind of absolutist
foundation that consists of indubitable and context-free justification. This is a result of
pragmatism's taking seriously (as part of its Hegelian inheritance) our temporalized
status in this world, and the notion that any judgment of right or wrong or true or false is
good for a time and a time only (in some cases perhaps a very long time) and is subject to
changing in some unforeseen and unforeseeable future. However, absolutes aside, this is
not to say that there may be better and worse ways of thinking about epistemological and
metaphysical philosophy that preclude their abandonment outright. This is where, as we
shall see in the next chapter, Rorty gets into trouble, not only with orthodox conservatives
but with his fellow progres~ivist pragmatists as well. For taking inspiration from the
literary critic Harold Bloom, and as a part of his own talent for redescription, Rorty
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endorses what Bloom calls "strong" or "creative misreading" of one's predecessors. This
has had a marked impact on Rorty's reading of Dewey,
At any rate, the necessary tum to the recognition of temporality is a tum also for
philosophy by Rorty's lights, inasmuch as the future (though unforeseen and
unforeseeable) nonetheless establishes our human imaginations as having revolutionary
poetic potential (as witnessed by the move from instruction to inspiration as a leading
motivation). That is to say, this is where the private philosophical sphere comes to life.
We do not give up on the future simply because we cannot have clean, clear, and accurate
visions of it as if in a crystal ball. This is moral relativism that even pragmatists would
charge because of its nihilism of the future tense. So if historically philosophy has an
important public role, we would not be off the mark to say that such an importance is
rather conservative on the whole for Rorty. Again, it is important to stress that such is a
conservatism endorsed for philosophy's political role only and not an indication that
Rorty is as a capital "C" conservative all around. It is the conservatism of liberal
education, conserving, that is, what has in the past made it onto the stage of competing
ideas and continuing to conserve future texts yet to be written that might also have such
success. Such conservatism in the end serves a thoroughly progressive function for Rorty.
But it is the thinnest strand of liberal education that makes such conservation important,
for all "great" ideas are parts of our narrative history, retaining inspirational significance.
Should they cease to inspire, then they will disappear, and for all intents and purposes,
the criteria of greatness (a problematic notion for pragmatists to begin with) will be a
moot point. But that is always for the future to determine. For now, we continue to
expose the young to these historical narratives in order to determine the waxing or
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waning of their inspirational force, while at the same time resisting the temptation to
indoctrinate younger generations into particular theoretical strangleholds. It is to
conserve the play of presence of ideas that have generated attention over the years, to see
how some survived for longer or shorter periods, and how they died and even yet are
dying. And it is, after all, how they die that is central for Rorty.
In a bit of confusion necessitated by his public/private split, we need to see
Rorty's use of "death" (read as death of ideas or vocabularies) as consisting of two
different entailments Gust when we thought death was an absolute we could still hold on
to). For death in Rorty's dichotomous universe can still mean a certain kind of life. A
"dead metaphor" for example, central to Rorty's (Davidsonian) aesthetics (which will be
explored in detail later), is the death of certain revolutionary private creations into a
certain stable public utility. What is stable, then, in Rorty's parlance is for all intents and
purposes, dead-but dead in the publicly utilizable sense. It is in the private sphere that
stability represents a real form of poetic death. Death is always the result of life, and
every career (read as moving at full speed, rushed) has and needs its full stop. I am
reminded of James's notion of "flights" and "perchings" and Dewey's recognition of life
as both precarious and stable. Precariousness or flight is ushered in by novelty and, for
Rorty, this is the preferred state, the most creative state, only then followed by a possible
desire that whatever new purpose(s) arise might become normalized into stable, even
routine action. The death of a metaphor, then, is a kind of public success that is
nonetheless relatively unexciting for those who are of a poetic/creative temperament, for
while such individuals need the sense of normalcy brought on by stable conditions, they
will almost immediately feel compelled to create new private poetic revolutions. For
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stability is at once a time for appreciating, even savoring, what is stable and imagining (in
the more creative/poetic sense) new and, hopefully, better futures. Stability cannot be
equated with absolute stasis, for there is always movement during even the most stable
periods. It is stable, perhaps even habitual, action. Rorty shares, I would say, this spirit
with Dewey, though each tends to place his emphases on different sides of the
poetic/stable (read private/public) distinction. I will eventually make the case that in spite
of differences of emphasis between Dewey and Rorty, such are not differences of kind-
that there is plenty in cornmon between their pragmatisms (more than many critics have
given credit for-perhaps itself due to misplaced emphasis).
How are we to tell what Democracy demands more of-conservative stability or
revolutionary poetic novelty, authority or autonomy? Perhaps equal measures of both are
needed, but what I hope to indicate as this work progresses is that Rorty always prefers
the later options as a necessity of the private sphere, and the former as necessary in
degrees for a publicly progressive society. In terms of his philosophical disposition and
what for him is of most interest philosophically, it is clearly the sphere of poetic
autonomy that Rorty emphasizes. That is, philosophy is a potentially poetic (and
poeticizing) activity and works toward accepting the openness of the future and thereby
accepting the possibility of making it better than the present or the past. What is entailed,
however, by philosophy as a potentially poeticizing force of culture, as a particular
vocabulary of making as opposed to finding or representing, is that it must do battle (the
important culture war for Rorty) with other cultural forces-philosophical and political-
that habitually demand absolutist justifications via decontextualized and ahistorical
imperatives. So philosophy is never severed from culture through sheer acts of novel
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creation. It battles in the here and now with real cultural forces in order to keep alive the
very possibility that the future might be something wonderfully different and hopefully
better than what is or has been. The fight really is to be able to redescribe what is taken
for granted, to question assumptions, not by providing knock-down arguments that in the
end beat around the same bush, but by putting out starkly new metaphors that are
nonetheless derived literally from older vocabularies. This is why the progressive
function of philosophy is important to Rorty in a way that the conservative function is
not. A poeticized philosophy attempts to produce new utopian vocabularies which mayor
may not inspire people and which mayor may not be taken up and normalized in the
public sphere. This is philosophical energy well spent. On the other hand, philosophy that
busies itself trying to conserve past modes by way of providing unassailable
rationalizations and foundations for those modes is energy not well spent. Rorty's point
in making this distinction is that so long as new poetic advances are being generated
within a culture of ever-widening democratic vistas, then the politics (calling always for
concrete policies and programs) will take care of the public sphere, conserving what
needs to be conserved and getting rid of what is useless or destructive to further progress.
Politics can make use of philosophy, in other words, only because politics now looks
differentin a poeticized culture that resonates in a more fitting way with its own
democratic aspirations. The literary (poetic) aspects of a culture run ahead of the
political, but at the same time depend on the acculturating forces (political and otherwise)
that provide the material for such poetic advance.
What is of most interest to Rorty, generally speaking, and what reduces
philosophy to one of many competing vocabularies, are the dynamics that either lend to
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or work against a free and open democratic society. There is a contrast, then, in Rorty's
work between two speeds of progress-between revolutionary private self-creation that is
restless, almost frenetic in its desire for novelty, and a more piecemeal progress in the
public sphere that appreciates notions of conservation and tinkering political reform. One
might think of the pace of poetic creation and recreation as being like the second hand on
a clock, while political reform is more like the minute hand or even the hour hand.
Reform in the political sphere is often slow and barely perceptible, but there is movement
nonetheless. And often it is appreciated retrospectively in a "my, where has the time
gone?" sort of way and the hope is that such retrospective insight is of beneficial change.
Such slow change allows for a culture to take stock from time to time of its own progress
in a way that is not overly shocking (though sometimes still it might be). Reform can
occur even as the surrounding milieu has the feel of stability. This is not to say that from
time to time shocks within a seemingly "normal" milieu do not occur. The union
movements in the past to protect workers' rights to dignified working conditions and
livable wages (ever still under attack), the equal rights movement of African Americans
and women just to achieve the status of human, have all generated shocks to the system,
even violent revolutionary and counter revolutionary conflict. But of importance, such
shocks are not typically the result of de-contextual philosophical quests. They are
political movements to make absences present, and have nothing in back of them save the
pragmatic desire to be afforded the same respect and dignity worthy of any free citizen
who lives and participates ~n a democratic society.
Political revolutions can still occur, then, when in the slow, normalized course of
events there arises some level of consciousness of grievous flaws in the normalized flow
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of a society. At this point the normal is superseded by a dawning sense that hidden in the
texture of the normal is some sort of dogmatic blindness that needs to be addressed. Such
awareness arises as a result of our day-to-day contact with the dynamic pragmata of lived
life rather than intuitional insight based on some lofty philosophical truth or theory. The
kinds of political revolutions generated by such philosophical speculations are, as I have
stated above, dangerous to the degree that they tend to exchange one dogmatically blind
and totalizing system for another. So we get a sense that revolution is not merely the
property of the private sphere, though we must ever protect that sphere's right to generate
as many novel and potentially revolutionary metaphors as can be created. Whether such
creations take hold in the political/public sphere, whether they generate political
revolution or slowly become piecemeal additions to a new sense of normalcy or stability,
will all depend on how they gel with and shape the existing pragmatic context. This is
why even revolutionary impulses that become a part of the previously normal pragmatic
context will still need time to work things out, and this is best done through a course of
tinkering reforms within the real and dynamic pragmata of the situation. We should not
expect, even from our revolutionary impulses, that everything be changed in a root-and-
branch way. Total change is usually the yearning of one or another totalizing system.
Tinkering reforms can still make good use of revolutionary impulses even as there is
retained a practical sense of conservation.
Democracy, in the absence of what C.S. Peirce called the "irritation of doubt,"
will tend toward becoming some sort of totalizing system. The Socratic notion that often
when we think we know, we in fact know less than we think, and that wisdom comes in
part from knowing how little we know, lends to the idea that "opening a prospect on
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illimitable democratic vistas" is a tum to the future and away from dogmatic
entrenchments in the past. It is an overly simplified reading to say that Rorty's
pragmatism (or Dewey's for that matter) turns away from the past altogether. There is no
such thing as novelty ex nihilo as I have been suggesting above. We are acculturated
human beings, and there is no turning that would eradicate all the subtle nuances of our
acculturation. But acculturation itself indicates temporality and change as real
components of living. As Rorty says in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991a),
no description of how things are from a God's-eye point of view, no skyhook
provided by some contemporary or yet-to-be-developed science, is going to free
us from the contingency of having been acculturated as we were. Our
acculturation is what makes certain options live, or momentous, or forced, while
leaving others dead, or trivial, or optional. We can only hope to transcend our
acculturation if our culture contains ... splits which supply toeholds for new
initiatives. Without such splits - without tensions which make people listen to
unfamiliar ideas in the hope of finding means of overcoming those tensions -
there is no such hope. (pp. 13-14)
This brings us back to Rorty's gradual loss of interest in holding "reality" and "justice" in
a single vision, and his subsequent public/private split. Such splits we now know "supply
toeholds for new initiatives." The distinction is not a dualism, as such, but rather a
method of protecting what is different-and valuable because different-in each sphere.
Poetic self-creation is the leading edge of culture, but there is always a surplus of material
in back of it, fuelling it, and impelling it forward to be new. The private sphere is to be
protected because that is where individuals do their creative thing and offer up new
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possibilities for potential public allegiance (in the best case scenario anyway). But that is
not the reason creative individuals create. They are not driven by potential public
solidarity. They look for, or more properly, they create splits that can become potential
toeholds within the existing culture for new initiatives. They create in order to put
something new out there that is different and potentially better than anything that was
ever there before. As such novelty settles through the cracks and fissures of a culture and
plays out in multifarious ways into the future, it may become a focus of public solidarity
or it may not. Rorty's central point, I think, is to protect the sphere of poetic self-creation
so that potentially new and ever renewing and widening solidarity between individuals
and cultures is possible.
I tum now to a more explicit understanding of what, for Rorty, gets in the way of
this sort of progressive movement. This I will locate in his strong pragmatic tum against
absolutist conceptions of Truth. As his pragmatism thereby turns against most of the
staple concerns of the philosophical tradition, he seeks to humble philosophy's yearnings
and pragmatize them by making philosophy merely one of many competing discourses
that can potentially help us move productively and humanely into the future. The
foregoing has, I think, served my introductory purposes. It needs to be said, however, that
what I have written thus far is not unproblematic. Rorty's public/private split is far from
straightforward, and the critical problems posed therein are real and consequential for his
pragmatism. A comparison to Dewey is hugely difficult, because there is so much to
compare. By focusing in the next chapter on Rorty's pragmatic tum against absolutist
conceptions of Truth, I will open up the largest terrain of commonality between him and
Dewey. While I will focus pretty much exclusively on Rorty, his negative critique of
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Truth stands in proxy for the larger pragmatic tradition and speaks for it. That is to say, I
cannot find any great difference between Rorty and Dewey in their respective turns
against absolutist Truth conceptions, even though each provides different articulations.
Neither, as we shall see, abandons truth outright. That would make them severe
antirationalists, which they are not. To put it rather simply, both Rorty and Dewey are
much aligned in articulating what they are against (philosophically). Where their
respective pragmatisms diverge is in how they articulate their future projections. Dewey
is a philosophical reconstructionist while Rorty is a poetic (or literary) nominalist. Yet, as
we shall see in Chapters Five and Six, both end up articulating primarily aesthetic
pragmatic positions in their latest works. The implications of this for their respective
positions and any major differences that may be there will be explored at that point. For
now, I tum to Rorty's strong attack against absolutist conceptions of Truth in order to
place what is most radical about the pragmatic movement as a whole. My eventual end-
point hopes to elucidate a largely favorable comparison between the two philosophers
that places each as outstanding spokesmen for Democracy along an aesthetic trajectory of
the American pragmatic tradition.
CHAPTER FOUR: RICHARD RORTY: TRUTH, NIHILISM, AND HOPE
Housed within Rorty's tum against absolutist conceptions of Truth is his strong
antiepistemological and antimetaphysical position, what was referred to more generally
in the previous chapter as his strong anti-Platonism. This may represent the least
interesting facet of his overall philosophical project. Albeit a necessary and important
component of his work, it represents the largely negative critique he needs to put forth in
order to clear the ground for his more optimistic and poeticized utopian prospects (though
as we shall see it is never simply a matter of clearing away one thing and replacing it with
another). At the same time, from a thoroughly pragmatic perspective, this negative
critique has become a necessary, even central element of much of his work, if only
because his antiepistemological and antimetaphysical stance has generated the most
heated responses from his fellow philosophers. A great deal of his writing, then, has been
the sort of gracious writing that I referred to in the last chapter-writing that is
responsive to his critics. And because of that graciousness, a great deal of his writing is in
fact philosophical to the core, albeit put forth largely as a negative critique of traditional
philosophy. When one reads Rorty, in spite of his proclaimed literary affiliations, there is
always the feel (at the very least) that one is reading a philosopher. Philosophy, as a large
discipline-based enterprise, is not so easily circumvented if you have something to say
about traditional philosophical matters, good or bad. That being said, we should not
underestimate the amount of subtlety (and play) in the way Rorty uses what he is against
in order to insinuate what he is for (end-of-philosophy rhetoric notwithstanding). Much
of his success in this regard (if he is indeed successful) has to do with his turning
traditional philosophical matters into historical narratives.
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We need to keep in mind that Rorty employs a very particular model of
deconstruction (taken from the best part of Derrida' s thinking) that is in no way
methodological, but temporal. That is, Rorty denies hierarchical status to all those binary
oppositions (reality/appearance, object/subject, world/language, being/nonbeing,
literal/metaphorical, logical/rhetorical) that have effectively fueled the Western
philosophical tradition with its aggressive epistemological and metaphysical yearnings.
For each binary relation in the above listing, Rorty wants us to be aware that the tradition
has hierarchically privileged the former concepts in each grouping and that now in these
so-called postmodern times there are no good reasons for doing so. He escapes the
methodological entrapments of deconstruction that he tells us even Derrida was prone to,
by historicizing the whole philosophical game-granting past hierarchical
epistemological and metaphysical projects narrative, rather than substantive status. That
is to say, the whole notion of hierarchical privileging is itself turned into a historical
narrative, thereby opening the space for Rorty' s preferred method of circumvention. To
reiterate, this is his strategy of using redescription in order to move around, rather than
through, entrenched vocabularies.
It is, problematically, as David Hall (1994) tells us, a method that leads
inexorably to circumlocution. That is, Rorty's historical narratives become (literally)
narratives because of his nominalism. And Rorty's default nominalism leads him, in the
process of circumventing what he refers to as the "useless lumber that blocks our
highways of thought" to circumlocutions that, as Hall points out, are "personal, self-
encapsulating stories which permit Rorty to avoid having to meet a conversant on his
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terms" (p. 234). Hall also makes an important critical point in regard to Rorty's so-called
historicism:
I believe Rorty ought to reconsider his claim to be a historicist. For one of the
consequences of allowing himself greater sympathy with the poet than the
philosopher, is that his narratives are more like epics or novels than histories. It is
far better... to take full responsibility for one's literary pretensions than to mask
them by claims to historicist practice. (p. 63)
Taking such responsibility may have spared Rorty only slightly the burden of having to
meet a conversant on his or her terms. It is potentially problematic for Rorty's notion of
solidarity in the public sphere, to say the least. To fellow philosophers it can be
downright irksome. Arbitrarily changing the topic of a given conversation can come
across as flippant to those who are otherwise trying to engage you in serious dialogue or
debate. But, to be fair, Rorty's poetic energies are put forth in order to change what is
talked about rather than just how something is talked about and are directed at
philosopher-talk specifically. Such a poetic mode is not intended to imply a standard of
conversability in the more mundane daily public sphere. Rorty is circumventing (or
circumlocuting) certain philosophical ways of talking, and if that is annoying to certain
philosophers who want to keep beating around the same old philosophical bushes, then
Rorty is not apologetic. What is it, then, that Rorty wants to move beyond or get past?
Truth and Knowledge
Rorty has placed himself quite self-consciously within a particular stream of
American thought dating back to the poetic articulations of Ralph Waldo Emerson and
Walt Whitman as well as to the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John
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Dewey. This is Rorty's espoused American pragmatic lineage and one in which he takes
a great deal of pride in extending (Rorty is also the self-professed heir of Kant, Hegel,
and Nietzsche-that Continental influence will be explored in the next section below).
Rorty (1999c) articulates the central message of pragmatism that has caused so much
controversy amongst philosophers:
Pragmatists - both classical and 'neo-'- do not believe that there is a way things
really are. So they want to replace the appearance-reality distinction by that
between descriptions of the world and of ourselves which are less useful and
those which are more useful. When the question 'useful for what?' is pressed,
they have nothing to say except 'useful to create a better future'. When they are
asked, 'Better by what criterion?', they have no detailed answer, any more than
the first mammals could specify in what respects they were better than the dying
dinosaurs. Pragmatists can only say something as vague as: Better in the sense of
containing more of what we consider good and less of what we consider bad.
When asked, 'And what exactly do you consider good?', pragmatists can only say
with Whitman, 'variety and freedom', or, with Dewey, 'growth'. 'Growth itself,'
Dewey said, 'is the only moral end.' (pp. 27-28)
What inspires Rorty about the pragmatic tradition and the poetic modernism he ascribes
to it is its wholesale tum to the future. He self-consciously places himself in a tradition
that has power less in virtue of its being a tradition and more in virtue of its necessity of
continuous extension and flexibility. Concepts such as "reality," "reason," and (human)
"nature," bandied about by philosophers as absolutist skyhooks for the human lot to take
hold of, start to lose their luster and appeal. They become the encumbering deadweight of
92
the past, and though Rorty will not provide an argument for their complicity in feudalism
and slavery (to name a few unsavory past actions), it is hard to imagine such
philosophical absolutes as being totally absent from those now pernicious elements of
America's history.
What we get from the past, good and bad, is what we get. It is less important than
what can be hoped for the future by way of a newly enlivened and flexible pluralism.
Rorty (1999c) quotes from Whitman's Democratic Vistas with approbation:
America, filling the present with greatest deeds and problems, cheerfully
accepting the past, including feudalism (as indeed, the present is but the legitimate
birth of the past, including feudalism) counts, as I reckon, for her justification and
success, (for who, as yet, dare claim success?) almost entirely on the future ....For
our New World I consider far less important for what it has done, or what it is,
than for results to come. (p. 27)
Accordingly, Rorty's faith, like Dewey's and Whitman's before him, comports
well with democracy-but democracy understood less as a substantive thing and more as
open possibilities fuelled by hopefulness. Democracy is the story always about to be
written, always about to be acted out. Quoting Whitman again, Rorty (1998a) says:
"Democracy is a great word, whose history... remains unwritten, because that history has
yet to be enacted" (p. 19). Democracy is a great word because it is not an "it," rather
something always about to be. The sheer futurity of democracy so understood makes
contingency, openness, freedom, and hope its cardinal virtues. In comparing this
"Whitmanesque Americanism" to classical and "neo"- pragmatist philosophy, Rorty
(1999c) says that the crucial link,
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is a willingness to refer all questions of ultimate justification to the future, to the
substance of things hoped for. If there is anything distinctive about pragmatism it
is that it substitutes the notion of a better human future for the notions of 'reality' ,
'reason' and 'nature'. One may say of pragmatism what Novalis said of
Romanticism, that it is 'the apotheosis of the future. (p. 27)
Of course, one might reasonably say that democracy certainly has had a history
since Whitman coined the above sentiments-a history of the people electing buffoons to
office more often than not, of the people's penchant for greed and material extravagance,
of an unbridled massification of the people via consumerism driven by an equally
unbridled and often unruly "free" market, etc., etc. One could say these things and
provide good evidence for joining in what Rorty earlier called the "America Sucks
Sweepstakes." Rorty, once again, is not about to provide rationalizations or arguments
against such things in order to show their falsity. Democracy as a series of artifacts,
events, policy decisions etc. is historically substantive. Rorty knows something of the
history of democracy since Whitman and Dewey proclaimed their inspiring narratives.
Bad things are a part of the great American democratic story; of that there is no doubt.
But a tum to the future, and a tum to the hopefulness made relevant by such a turning, is,
for Rorty, the very default mode of keeping democracy alive. Anyway, there are no
reasonable grounds for assigning to the past a comprehensive evil in spite of its atrocities.
Yet, even such noble democratic impulses, necessitating a pragmatic tum to the future,
are not without trouble. Philosophically, a tum to the future is, for Rorty, a tum away
from traditionally acceptable notions of knowledge and truth.
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In a recent essay called "Philosophy as a Transitional Genre," Rorty (2004) says
this about truth:
Questions such as "Does truth exist?" or "Do you believe in truth?" seem fatuous
and pointless. Everybody knows that the difference between true and false beliefs
is as important as that between nourishing and poisonous foods. Moreover, one of
the principal achievements of recent analytic philosophy is to have shown that the
ability to wield the concept of "true belief' is a necessary condition for being a
user of language, and thus for being a rational agent. (pp. 5-6)
The point Rorty is making here is apparently a commonsensical one-his way of
countering the invariable charge of relativism brought against his particular conception of
truth. To take a position against certain philosophical conceptions of truth is not to be
divested of any ability whatsoever to make judgments about true and false beliefs. The
more serious charge against Rorty's position, as we shall see below, is not relativism per
se, but antirationalism. 1 The last sentence in the above quotation about "true beliefs" is
meant as a response to such antirationalist charges. Whether or not Rorty is successful in
so defending himself will become clearer as we progress.
When it comes to establishing his pragmatic position on Truth, Rorty in fact
distinguishes two different conceptions of truth-the "everyday" and the "redemptive."
The above quoted passage reflects Rorty's retention of an everyday understanding of
truth, but Rorty is quick to point out that when people ask the kinds of questions stated
above, what he calls "fatuous and pointless" questions, they do so under the pretense of
the more-than-everyday implications they assume to be buried in truth talk. In our time,
asking such questions as these comes to "play the role once played by the question 'Do
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you believe in God, or are you one of those dangerous atheists?'" (Rorty, 2004, p. 6).
When philosophers, especially, ask these truth questions looking for their more-than-
everyday answers, they are really inquiring about a potentially indubitable stability
governed by epistemological and metaphysical criteria. Such criteria offer up the
possibility of accurate reflection of and correspondence to a reality otherwise hidden
behind a veil of appearances. They ask, in effect, if there is "a natural terminus to inquiry,
a way things really are, and that understanding what that way is will tell us what to do
with ourselves" (Rorty, p. 6). Redemptive truth, then, tries to get more mileage out of the
notion of "truth" than Rorty thinks we ever require in the everyday sphere. It is
philosophy's preoccupation to find "a set of beliefs that would end, once and for all, the
process of reflection on what to do with ourselves" (Rorty, p. 7). And furthermore, it
stresses "the need to fit everything - every thing, person, event, idea, and poem - into a
single context, a context that will somehow reveal itself as natural, destined, and unique"
(Rorty, p. 7).
It is important to point out that in the couplet "redemptive truth" Rorty is not
assigning each term equal negative status. Capital "T" truth is the real villain and drags
an otherwise noble yearning for redemption along with it. I will return to Rorty's attack
against "Truth," but it is first necessary to clarify what he means by the word
"redemptive." To put the point rather matter-of-factly, redemption is something
intellectuals worry about. Redemption, as Rorty uses it, means something pretty much the
same that Heidegger meant when he talked about the hope for "authenticity" (though
Rorty is more forward looking and Heidegger more backward looking) or what Harold
Bloom meant when he talked about the intellectual's yearning for "autonomy.,,2 To
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reiterate, it is the intellectuals who yearn for Heideggerian authenticity, or Bloomian
autonomy, or what Rorty otherwise wants to call "redemption." As he says:
Most human beings, even those who have the requisite money and leisure, are not
intellectuals. If they read books it is not because they seek redemption but either
because they wish to be entertained or distracted, or because they want to become
better able to carry out some antecedent purpose. They do not read books to find
out what purposes to have. The intellectuals do. (Rorty, 2004, p. 8)
Rorty is here equating the intellectuals as being of a certain "literary" disposition. This is
important to note, because the whole point of "Philosophy as a Transitional Genre" is to
show that the human yearning for redemption has a deep history that has passed through
a number of important stages since the Renaissance.
The first stage sought redemption from God, the second stage sought redemption
from philosophy (or Truth), and the third stage, which is the present stage, seeks
redemption from literature. As we are now in (or still in the process of moving into) a
literary culture, both religion and philosophy now appear as literary genres and are, as
such, optional. Rorty's main target is the second stage-the stage of philosophical
"redemptive truth"-a stage that by Rorty's lights began during the Renaissance as a
reactionary humanism against the prevalent monotheism of Christianity. For the past 200
years or so (since the Enlightenment), Rorty tells us we have been witnessing a gradual
shift away from that philosophical culture toward a literary culture, a culture that has
itself since the time of Kant and Hegel slowly lost faith in the notion that redemption can
come from acquiring a set of "true beliefs." Given this gradual, but inexorable loss of
faith in "Truth" by those with more literary penchants, all of the genres come to take on a
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different hue. Monotheistic religion now becomes a less pernicious "literary" option for
Rorty (in spite of its tendency to be a conversation-stopper at dinner parties), because
comparable to a literary culture, the notion of true belief is not central. That is,
"monotheistic religion offers hope for redemption through entering into a new relation to
a supremely powerful nonhuman person. Beliefin the articles ofa creed may be only
incidental to such a relationship" [italics added] (Rorty, 2004, p. 8). Literary culture, on
the other hand, "offers redemption through making the acquaintance of as great a variety
of human beings as possible" (Rofty, p. 8). The intellectual reads lots and lots of books in
order to do this. Again, true belief is of little importance. But "redemptive truth"
represents philosophy's particular yearning, and here true beliefs are of the essence.
To be redeemed by traditional philosophy is to acquire a set of cognitive or
rational beliefs "that represent things in the one way they really are" (Rofty, 2004, p. 8).
Philosophy thus becomes an infecting agent when combined with an otherwise harmless
noncognitive faith, be it faith in the power of a superhuman deity or faith in the power of
literature. For example, pure religious faith is about possible communion with a
beneficent nonhuman person. However, when "the God of the philosophers has begun to
replace the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob [only then] is correct belief [italics added]
thought to be essential to salvation" (Rofty, p. 10). At this point an otherwise
noncognitive redemptive faith in God becomes mediated by a philosophical creed (for
any creed is a statement of beliefs and principles, and to that extent is philosophical).
Rorty tells us that philosophers are able to grant a sense and urgency to the otherwise
fatuous question, "Do you believe in truth?" by reformulating the question into the more
philosophically expedient:
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'Do you think that there is a single set of beliefs that can serve a redemptive role
in the lives of all human beings, that can be rationally justified to all human
beings under optimal communicative conditions, and that will thus form the
natural terminus of inquiry?' To answer yes to this reformulated question is to
take philosophy as the guide of life. It is to agree with Socrates that there is a set
of beliefs that is both susceptible of rational justification and such as to take
rightful precedence over every other consideration in determining what to do with
one's life. The premise of philosophy is that there is a way things really are - a
way humanity and the rest of the universe are and always will be, independent of
any merely contingent human needs and interests. Knowledge of this way is
redemptive. It can therefore replace religion. The striving for Truth can take the
place of the search for God. (Rorty, p. 11)
So philosophy arrives in medias res, taking up its station between redemptive religion
and redemptive literature, particularly in its modem manifestations since Descartes'
philosophy first concerned itself with the potential redemptive power of Truth via
creedal-like and rational argumentation. We humans, in other words, have thought that
we could somehow through sheer theoretical finesse, come into vital and definitive
contact with the absolute, thus making it to serve us even as we so willingly serve it.
Rorty is making the point that there is not much special we can say about the absolute.
God as an absolute is just that-absolute. So is Truth. When we decide to philosophize
about such absolutes, try, thal is, to argue their relevance for our day-to-day ethical
comportment in the world rather than just leaving them be as the everything/nothing
words they are, we find ourselves never quite able to get past what Rorty in Truth and
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Progress (1998b) calls the "tiresomely ineffable" quality of such philosophical
argumentation. Continuing, he says: "[Donald] Davidson has helped us realize that the
very absoluteness oftruth is a good reason for thinking "true" indefinable andfor
thinking that no theory of the nature of truth is possible" (p. 3). The hope for redemption
coming via a set of philosophical beliefs and principles that somehow corral and manage
the absolute and make it known or knowable is, from Rorty's negative critical position
the now stale pipe dream of philosophy.
Redemptive truth, then, is the principal target of Rorty' s negative critique of the
philosophical tradition. The hope of redemption coming from truth is what bolsters
philosophy's various epistemological and metaphysical quests for certainty. Those
pursuits which in their epistemological yearning try to show the knowledge status of
some belief or set of beliefs go awry at that very point the beliefs are turned to human
definitional purposes. For all such beliefs are now relative to such human purposes, and
human purposes are always conditioned by time and place. To try to argue from some
conditional time and place to some unconditional primary absolute is, for Rorty, asking
for unnecessary trouble. This is because "Truth" as an absolute concept is ineffable and
noncognitive. There is no rationalizing it or arguing it into a cognitive shape that
guarantees immunity from skeptical doubt and dogmatism and that would thereby
guarantee retention of "Truth's" own special internal nature. The only remaining cash
value for truth as a concept is in the mundane, everyday sense hinted at above.
For Rorty truth is always "justified" truth, and justification is the temporally
bound language of human purposes. Therefore, true beliefcan no longer be distinguished
fromjustiJied belief In effect all the wind is taken out of capital "T" truth's sails, for a
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true belief is always a justified true belief, and in this sense "justified true belief'
becomes a redundancy better read merely as "justified belief." Nothing is lost when the
word "true" is dropped. But a radical sense of futurity is gained. If philosophy's yearning
has been to find the ever-elusive correspondence between our words and our world-
those indubitably accurate reflections caught by the human mind through a veil of false
appearances-then our present tum to a literary culture is a tum away from all those
binary oppositions that prop up philosophy's Truth-seeking delusions of grandeur. Such
delusions are the product of seventeenth and eighteenth century conceptions of mind and
knowledge-conceptions that support the notion that a robust enough theory of truth will
grant us access to accurate and indubitable foundations for knowledge.
In Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature (1979), Rorty tells us how philosophy's
preoccupation with pictorial representations has been problematic:
It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which
determine most of our philosophical convictions. The picture which holds
traditional philosophy together is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing
various representations - some accurate, some not - and capable of being studied
by pure, nonempirical methods. Without the notion of the mind as mirror, the
notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested
itself. (p. 12)
Moving past such representationalism is a move past "Truth" toward justification,
wherein anything deemed true is merely "true" for this or that situation, "true" for this or
that time and place-it is truth as a tool for getting something done, coming to some
agreement with others, rather than as an object (or a noun) of admiration. And the merit
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of any given justification is always the "contribution [it makes] to the existence of a more
complex and interesting species somewhere in the future" (Rorty, 1999b, p. 27). Keep the
word "truth" if you wish, Rorty would say, but recognize that it is no more than a dead
metaphor now, a compliment we pay to those propositions that have achieved wide
acceptance within and across a community. Keeping the word truth, in other words, no
longer can induce us to think we are somehow also keeping the world if by keeping the
world we assume we are keeping a one-to-one representational correspondence between
some antecedent truth of the world and what we say about it. As Rorty (1989) says:
"Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own -
unaided by the describing activities of human beings - cannot" (p. 5).3 When acceptance
or solidarity is achieved within a community, this entails nothing grander than the fact of
such acceptance. There is no deeper, more profound contact with reality, there is no
gradual moving closer to the world's own story. The world does not have its own story-
it is always under our human descriptions. It is holistically our world-stories, and the
world cannot independently tell us which stories we must tell if we are to successfully
gain access to the real "nature of things." This is not an uncontroversial position that
Rorty's pragmatism endorses. Its thorough linguistification of the universe runs the risk
of linguistic idealism. This controversy will be explored in more detail in the next
chapter. For now we need to ask, how does Rorty stave off the charges of relativism that
invariably rise like so many legions against such a position? Literary culture or not, Truth
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still has a powerful sway over us. Important is that the death of capital "T" truth is not the
death of truth-talk per see
Reinforcing his own method of redescription, Rorty does not believe that the
denial of the world's own story or nature's nature automatically necessitates a pervasive
relativism or linguistic idealism on the part of those doing the denying. Ever since Dewey
and James started attacking absolutist theories of knowledge and truth, pragmatists have
been under fire from fellow philosophers in particular for confusing, as Rorty (1999c)
says, "truth, which is absolute and eternal, with justification, which is transitory because
relative [italics added] to an audience" (p. 32). This is the simplest form of relativism that
applies to Dewey and Rorty, and as pragmatists they happily accept it. But Rorty knows,
as Dewey did before him, that most charges of relativism are not of this simple,
straightforward sort, though they may arise out of it. If we recall in the previous chapter
the charges from scholars like Hutchins, Adler, McKeon, and Leo Strauss against Dewey,
that his pragmatism represented a kind of relativism not up to the weighty task of
providing absolutist arguments for "why it would be better to be dead than to be a Nazi"
then we can get a flavour for the kind of moral relativism that critics charge Rorty with
espousing. This is weighty to be sure, and far less easy to be light-minded about. Before
looking at how Rorty responds to this real challenge, hinted at already in his
poetic/narrative approach, I need to make it utterly clear why this is indeed a serious
challenge to begin with.
, Truth, Knowledge, and Nihilism
It cannot be underestimated, nor is it unproblematic, Rorty's (and pragmatism's)
aggressive tum to the future. As temporally embodied creatures able to recognize our
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status as such, we can be inspired by an as "yet to be enacted" (democratic) future-by
the open possibilities of sheer hopefulness. Yet, this is not as straightforward as it might
appear. I asked above, how does Rorty stave off charges of relativism? The question is
relevant and needs to be asked given Rorty's (and Dewey's) pragmatic conception of
truth. I have attempted to show, or at least I have implied that Rorty's conception of truth
is commensurable with classical pragmatist (particularly Dewey's) conceptions. In terms
of the theory of truth put forward in Dewey's pragmatism, it is arguable that there is
hardly a difference between Dewey's and Rorty's truth conceptions (though Rorty would
be impatient about calling it a theory of truth). At least there is hardly a difference
between the two when it comes to their respective turns against traditional philosophical
preoccupations with attaining absolutist epistemological and metaphysical certainty.
As negative analyses of shopworn philosophical preoccupations, both sound the
same chord. The world's own story along with the deep philosophical wish that we
humans, through sheer theoretical prowess, might be able to attain the requisite God's-
eye or Archimedean point of view to read that story has fallen into disarray. There is no
world's own story that can effectively be accessed so as to provide the criteria for
establishing accurate knowledge as opposed to mere opinion or belief. Philosophers have
long thought that they could describe such criteria and therein access a language not their
own-the language of the "thing-in-itself' or a fully transparent world's-own language
(traditionally via the mathematico-mechanicallanguage of physics). It has been
epistemology's dream, as \;Ve saw in Chapter Two, for the absolute necessity of
antecedent existences that we reflect accurately in our mind's eye, thus offering up an
indubitably accurate correspondence to what is there to begin with. Dewey shows it to be
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a pipe dream when he posits knowledge as an outcome of embodied existential inquiry
rather than an already objective antecedent existence just waiting in some pristine state to
be received. The implication, of course, is Dewey's synonym, or more accurately,
replacement, for knowledge-namely "warranted assertion.,,4 With the loss of antecedent
objective knowledge, so too do we lose our concept of foundational truth for which such
objective knowledge is accurate and representative. Absolutist Truth becomes otiose.
Rorty, as I have shown, is every bit as aggressive in his pragmatic denial of Truth. There
is no point, as I have stated, in being light-minded about the matter. It is a serious
challenge that pragmatists pose.
It would be easy to say that it merely is a problem for those who speculate in
matters philosophical, in effect, recapitulating the unnecessary separation of philosophy
from life. In the real everyday world, we all know, of course, that our knowledge is true,
don't we? When I say I know something-for example, that there is a picture of my wife
and children in front of me on the desk at which I'm writing-I am in effect attributing
truth-correspondence to such knowing. To assign truth correspondence in this regard is to
make a judgment that something has factual status in the absence of my thinking or
saying anything about it. I need not be committed to a psych hospital for assuming the
picture is still there when I am not in the room; that is, not saying anything or thinking
anything about it. This also means that the picture is not made true by my saying it is
there or by otherwise thinking about it. Rather, saying and thinking about it seems to
commit me to some concept of truth independent of such saying and thinking. As Luntley
(1995) points out, some concept of truth is necessary for making a judgment at all:
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The concept of truth is a necessary precondition for the very act of judgment. In
making a judgment, we lay ourselves hostage to a notion of that which would
show us wrong in our judgment. If we judge something to be the case we must
have an idea of what would force us to retract our judgment, the state of affairs
that would make our judgment false. (p. 28)
The very act of making a judgment, then, is to acknowledge some notion of independent
truth. But what can an independent truth be, other than a certain stubbornness we grant to
sensations. Everything after that is under a description of some sort and thus is of greater
or lesser interest for us.
I can have a debate about whether that is actually a picture of my wife and
children sitting on my desk, but if my interlocutor either has never seen my wife or
children before, or has no idea what a picture is, then there will not be much to debate
about the facts. The independence of the facts in this case is never a pure independence
only because the facts are facts by virtue of being already implicated in my experiential
matrix of meaningfulness. The very concept of independence is therefore relative to our
interests. Certain nonlinguistic independent facts can retain the status of facts in the most
commonsensical, and for Rorty, causal manner, but such always exist at varying interest
levels for us. The molecular airy structure of the desk I am writing on is a fact that is of
far less interest to me than is the solid object that successfully supports the weight of my
computer and the picture of my wife and children. For a scientist studying the molecular
make-up of solid structures" his or her interest might be just the opposite. Questions of
truth and falsity are generally far less important in these commonsensical situations of
factuality. If the scientist says my taken-for-granted solid desk is really mostly air and
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backs this up with research evidence, then I can be completely satisfied that the truth of
the desk's solidity, for me, exists in that minute percentage of stuff that makes it solid for
me. Our desk-interests are merely different-the scientist has a physical interest that is
different from my everyday use interest. Should either of us start to argue back and forth
over whose view is more accurate, more right, then the issue has effectively devolved
into a singularly unpragmatic contest of egos, often mistakenly taken as an epistemic
contest over real truth.
At any rate, objectivity is always a question of relatability, and that is all that
matters to us. Objectivity, absent any relation, is neither here nor there. What lies on the
other side of language is nothing meaningful for Rorty until it impacts our web of
interests, needs, and desires. The status of that which is nonlinguistic may be retained as
something more than nothing, but only to the extent of its having a thoroughly
uninteresting causal status that mayor may not induce some sort of interest for us in the
future. In situations of noncognitive contact with the world, though such situations are of
potential causal significance, questions of better and worse are not (yet) at issue. That is,
the world as an externality has no immediate epistemic significance. On the other side of
language there is nothing meaningful. As Rorty (1982) says:
I want to claim that 'the world' is either the purely vacuous nothing or the
ineffable cause of sense and goal of intellect, or else a name for the objects that
inquiry at the moment is leaving alone: those planks in the boat which are at the
moment not being moved about. It seems to me that epistemology since Kant has
shuffled between these two meanings of the terms 'world,' just as moral
philosophy since Plato has shuffled back and forth between 'the Good' as a name
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for an ineffable touchstone of inquiry which might lead to the rejection of all our
present moral views, and as a name for the ideally coherent synthesis of as many
of those views as possible. This equivocation seems to me essential to the position
of those philosophers who see 'realism' or 'the correspondence theory of truth' as
controversial or exciting theses. (p. 15)
The independence of a fact acquires meaning only to the extent that it acquires a truth-
value, be it the kind of largely unthinking values we assign to the more mundane, taken-
for-granted causal beliefs in our lives or the more complex values we assign to our
conscious moral contemplations. Rorty (1991a) uses the notion of causality very exactly
- the world, whatever it is for us at any given moment, can "cause us to hold beliefs, but
it cannot suggest beliefs for us to hold" [emphasis added] (p. 83). This notion of causality
allows Rorty to bypass (or perhaps move between) the two problems of realism and
idealism in philosophy. That is, he refuses to grant the external world an intrinsic nature
that we can somehow know as it-is-in-itself, while at the same time repudiating that the
things we say about the world bring that world into existence. He grants priority to
neither of these realist or idealist traps:
The way in which a blank takes on the form of the die which stamps it has no
analogy to the relation between the truth of a sentence and the event which the
sentence is about. When the die hits the blank something causal happens, but as
many facts are brought into the world as there are languages for describing that
causal transaction..'..To say that we must have respect for facts is just to say that
we must, if we are to playa certain language game, play by the rules. To say that
we must have respect for unmediated causal forces is pointless. It is like saying
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that the blank must have respect for the impressed die. The blank has no choice,
nor do we. (Rorty, 1991a, p. 81)
Truth is thus an eventful tool for deciding what is better or worse in some given
situation in which "better" and "worse" are at issue. To give up on the notion of Truth as
an object that one might love as one loves another person is not to abandon every
conceivable notion of truth. As Rorty (1997) says in his Spinoza lecture:
"Nobody, not even the most far-out post-modernist, believes that there is no
difference between the statements we call true and those we call false. Like
everybody else, post-modernists recognize that some beliefs are more reliable
tools than others, and that agreement on which tools to use is essential for social
cooperation" (p. 23).
The most Sophomoric charges of relativism-charges arising out of the position
that the absence of some absolute transcendent Truth leads invariably to amoral positions
that suppose "everybody has a right to his or her opinion" or "any belief is as good as
any other"-are exposed quite sternly for the red herrings they really are.
Where things really get difficult is not in the myriad commonsense judgments we
make about simple truths/facts (~.e., how many apples are in the bowl, who's in the
picture on my desk, etc.). Following the path of logos (reason and rationality), there are
certain communal/cultural standards that apply in these kinds of cases, a simple realism
I'll call it. The problem becomes more apparent in the territory of moral judgments or
judgments of artistic taste, ,what, more often than not, is the territory of pathos (of
emotion, taste, and imagination). If I say abortion is wrong at all times and in all cases, or
that the thing you are killing yourself laughing about is not at all funny, then it is far from
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simple what the fact of the matter is independent of what I or you say or think. The
problem is that our everyday, garden-variety, knowledge-attributing activities, many of
which are commonsensical enough in terms of logos get so taken for granted, that we
become insouciant about our knowledge ascriptions in areas that are more pathos driven.
In the everyday world we make a huge assumption (so the pragmatists and the
postmodemists have told us) that knowledge is merely a humble matter of having beliefs
that are true and that we hold such beliefs in virtue of their being true. We assume the
obviousness of it without thought. The pragmatism of Dewey and Rorty indicate that
garden varieties of "true belief' are necessary for allowing us to get by in our
environment, offering just enough stability to give us bearings in our constant movement
into new, and hopefully better, futures. What is far from obvious for both is the necessity
of some antecedent (and absolute) truth-foundation that would render "[holding] such
beliefs in virtue of their being true" meaningful. The movement from simple truth
ascriptions to capital "T" Truth ascriptions is often a seamless one. But, absent absolute
foundations on the capital "T" Truth side, a true belief's accuracy in virtue of some
separate Truth realm that is antecedent to and utterly de-contextualized from our human
environs is rendered meaningless. Pragmatists offer a thoroughly temporal and earth-
bound realism in this sense. But, both Dewey and Rorty avoid the trap of inverse
theoretical speculation, that is, playing the same old language game, by turning, as I have
said, to the future rather than to arguments that inadvertently end up sustaining the
antecedent.s It is, to reiterqte, what Rorty is advocating above when he talks about
redescription and circumvention. Indeed, turning to the future becomes a way of keeping
theory at bay, a way of starting off fresh, so to speak, when the layers of theoretical
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sophistication have made it difficult to actually access what we otherwise misleadingly
take for granted as the everyday. Quite often what we take for granted cognitively as
being the everyday comes to feel different to us nonetheless-a vague sense of alienation
quietly infuses the taken-for-grantedness of many situations. In other words, Pathos
makes tension for the taken-for-grantedness of logos. And yet, more often than not this
hardly makes a dent in our everyday confidence that we are in touch with the world as it
is, even as we feel a vague sense of disconnect or alienation from it. Being in touch with
the world, it needs to be stressed, is different than being in touch with the world's own
story. It is the recognition of this vital difference that has been so troublesome (especially
to philosophers).
What I have been setting up here is what has come to be called the "postmodern
predicament," though it is hardly the so-called postmodemists who first described it.6
Classical pragmatists, in a roughly commensurate line with Continental modernist
philosophers (Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein), all sons in one way or another of
Kant and Hegel, who were sons of Descartes and Plato before them, understood well the
implications of what only now we call the postmodern predicament. This predicament is
not the academic invention of philosophers, though philosophers have never been
particularly shy when it comes to writing about such predicaments. Michael Luntley
(1995) notes, I think correctly: "The problem is not an academic problem. It is a problem
that arises from reflection upon our ordinary concept of knowledge" (p. 99). The
implications of this are en9fffiOUS if one considers that it is not merely the highbrow
theoretical abstractions of philosophers that are being reflected upon in a
metaphilosophical way. It is our everyday knowledge assumptions, what we take for
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granted as our accurate truth-telling habits that are problematic upon reflection. It is a
pragmatic problem through and through. Philosophers like Dewey and Rorty, and
Nietzsche and Hegel before them, have radically challenged the sanctity and the security
of the supposed foundations supporting our knowledge. It is important that they have
done so not by showing what is lacking, but rather in showing what is in excess. That is,
they have recognized that far from there being merely one truth context, or one
explanatory framework, or one language game for establishing the indubitability of our
knowledge, there are many-indeed, a great many. It is this very pluralism that wreaks
havoc on the notion of Truth. If one hopes to decipher the true from the false, then one
can no longer justifiably hope to find the one unassailable criterion for doing so. What
this has led to, quite inexorably, is the next (seemingly) short step into the paradox of
nihilism, or what may be an even more pernicious state, what Luntley calls
antirationalism.
The exposure of the lack of Truth-foundations for our knowledge is one thing.
Luntley (1995) likens it to our being put in a state of "stumbling like so many drunks in a
dark alley late at night" (p. 100). Yet many drunks still find their way home. The full
postmodern predicament (aka the antirationalist predicament) follows from the
potentially greatest hazard of a pluralism of competing explanatory frameworks that
opens up in virtue of exposing the above mentioned lack-that there is no longer any
home to head for, nothing around which we ought to stake our beliefs. I quote Luntley at
length here so as to convey the full and serious weight of the anti-rationalist possibility:
But, the proliferation of competing explanatory frameworks does not dent our
confidence - it shatters it. There seems to be little room to escape the problems
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we have now distinguished. In particular, how can we avoid the total loss of truth
and rationality without returning to the discredited idea that the language of
physics constitutes the transparent language of the cosmic register [nature's own
story]? That is to say, how can we avoid the full-blown postmodernist
predicament except by denying that there are alternatives to the physicalist
description of our experience of the world?
It may be the case that it is beyond the limits of philosophy to provide a
criterion for knowledge that would solve the lack-of-foundations problem, but
matters are truly desperate if it is beyond the limits of philosophy to address
satisfactorily the full-blown postmodernist predicament. If we cannot answer that,
a kind of nihilism is all we are left with. We will have no grounds for criticizing
those who speak in other tongues, those who adopt competing explanatory
frameworks. We will have no scope to criticise so-called para-scientists and they
will have no basis on which to criticise the status quo. We will have no resources
to criticise fundamentalists wherever they occur, nor they to criticise the liberals
who tolerate blasphemy of one kind or another. We will have no grounds to
criticise those who grow rich offering deep-breathing cures for life-threatening
and wasting diseases like AIDS. And such people will have no scope to criticise
received medical science and show what it misses out and why. We will be beset
by anarchy and chaos. We will have no notion at all of what we ought to believe.
We will have only ttIe traditions of belief into which we are born, those traditions
that feel comfortable and familiar. If we ask whether they are right or not, we will
get no answer. That silence is the silence of anti-rationalism. It is a profound
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nihilism. It is a silence that is now insinuating itself into the general consciousness
in these postmodem times. (pp. 100-101)
There is no denying the weight of the moral burden Luntley so starkly presents us with.
Though Luntley is citing this only as a possibility, he nonetheless takes it seriously as a
potential threat.7 The threat of antirationalism is just the starkest rendering of the paradox
of nihilism that has insinuated its way quite inevitably into our modem consciousness. Is
this a charge against Rorty (or against Dewey) that could carry any weight? If nihilism is
an inevitable part of our modem consciousness, that is, a reflection of the contingent state
of our multifarious valuations in a pluralistic world, then can it even be looked at as a
charge as such? If antirationalism is a charge that arises against those who say in toto that
there is no such thing as truth or knowledge, can it be charged equally against those who
have given up only on theorizing about truth and knowledge, who have, in effect,
changed their philosophical focus, as Rorty has, to more literary concerns? Surely the two
are different. We've already noted Rorty's response to simplistic charges of relativism
above. But is there more than meets the eye here? Is Luntley's dire possibility of
antirationalism describing anything different than just that simple kind of relativism that
Rorty's particular understanding of causality has already denied? In what follows,
nihilism should be understood as a tension of pathos rather than logos. The philosophical
notion of nihilism is associated with a kind of hyper-consciousness about the collapsed
status of previously inscrutable and absolute values. It makes not a lick of difference to
the status of our simple trut.h concepts, which we must always have (and make). Pathos,
in this sense, is always driven by a desire for truthfulness in one's day-to-day
comportments in the world, and that such comportment is deeply meaningful. Never does
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Rorty or any other pragmatist argue for arbitrariness as a wished-for state of conduct. But
nor do they argue for allegiance to absolutes as the only alternative.
Nihilism is a word that has received a great amount of attention, especially in
Continental philosophy. But American pragmatists have not shied away from such a
tragedy-soaked concept either. If anything, one of the great differences between the mood
of much Continental theorizing about nihilism and its American counterpart is the
positive spin that the American pragmatists (broadly speaking, of course) give it.
Drawing on the work of James Edwards (1997), I propose that there is a sense of what he
calls "normal nihilism" that is accepted by pragmatists. This is not to say that so-called
normal nihilism is a basis for pragmatic optimism. That would be a mistake. It is just
something intellectuals can no longer ignore-so pervasive a part of modem
consciousness it has become. I stress that this consciousness is that of "intellectuals"-
those who, as we recall, read lots and lots of books by great philosophers and great
literary figures, both living and dead, an'd who in virtue of such reading cannot help but
be some sort of "normal nihilist." Read Nietzsche once and your life changes even if you
deny everything he says. The same, of course, can be said of Dewey and indeed Rorty
himself. This is the power, as Rorty would have it, of reading.
As such, the history of nihilism indicates that it is a philosophical concept of some
complexity. It can be attributed in its modem use to Imanuel Kant's critique of
metaphysics in his third critique (Critique of the Power ofJudgement). As Critchley
(2001) tells us, there Kant "achieves the remarkable feat of showing both the cognitive
meaninglessness of the traditional claims of speculative, dogmatic metaphysics, while
establishing the regulative moral necessity for the primacy of practical reason (that is, the
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concept of freedom)" (p. 76). Kant, in effect, leaves us with an intractable problem by
introducing the concept of human freedom operant within a natural universe governed by
mechanistic laws of causality that are otherwise fundamentally irreconcilable with the
causal principles of freedom as such. This is Kant's attempt to meet the skeptical
challenge that he sees inevitably arising in the wake of what we might call the great
Cartesian failure-that is, the failure of the Cartesian ego to effectively represent the
reality that exists outside of it. By trying to meet the challenge of skepticism left him by
Descartes, Kant comes halfway by arguing, as Edwards (1997) tells us, "that human
experience, and thus human knowledge, is partially constituted by the structures and
operations of the ego-subject itself' (p. 33). The problem of representationalism leading
inexorably to the problem of nihilism is bequeathed to us by Kant (along with the
plethora of irreconcilable dualisms that so arise) when he insists that along with the ego-
subject's creative freedom comes the necessity that such freedom must be anchored in the
ineffable Ding-an-sich (or thing-in-itself). I will stick to Edwards' analysis here as he
very effectively traces the problem of representationalism leading to the problem of
nihilism and the way that the problem of nihilism need not necessarily be an intractable
and utterly dire problem. What Edwards comes to call "normal nihilism" also bears a
rich, though not uncontroversial, connection to Rorty's notion of "irony," which I will
explore in more detail below. At this point, following Edwards's analysis provides a
more felicitous historical line for what we now refer to as the "postmodern predicament,"
highlighting some real dangers, but not necessarily leading inevitably to the most
dangerous state of antirationalism, the possibility of which fuels the dire prognostication
outlined above by Luntley (1995). It also indicates the way in which Rorty takes
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seriously the Continental influence on the American/pragmatic story he is telling. In so
far as that story has Truth as its central target, a failure to grapple with the nihilism that
invariably ensues is a failure to grasp the dynamics of a pragmatic culture and at least a
component of its mood.
For Edwards (1997), the problem of representationalism arises from Kant's thing-
in-itself projected as the necessary transcendental sky-hook for all human creativity. The
problem, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, is like that of a wheel that, when turned, turns
nothing else. It cannot be a part of the mechanism. The Kantian thing-in-itself thus
performs no real function. Much like Dewey's and Rorty's denial of Truth, one can do
away with the thing-in-itself with no discernible epistemological loss. As Edwards says:
"Objective reality - that opaque and resistant stuff assumed to stand over against the
receptive ego and to be spontaneously reflected in its consciousness - has become a will-
0' -the-wisp" (p. 34). In epistemic practice, all we are left with is the representations
themselves. Following Nietzsche, Edwards says that this "breaks the back of the
metaphor of representation altogether." He continues:
If there are only representations, and representations of representations, and
representations of representations of representations, then there are no
representations: the sense of the metaphor itself depends upon the possibility of
comparing the representation to what is represented. When that possibility of
comparison is void, as it now so obviously seems to be, then the image of
representation has 'leased to function. The wheel one has been so furiously
turning is now found to be unconnected to any real mechanism. The Cartesian
account of mind and knowledge has collapsed under its own weight. (p. 34)
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The collapse of representationalist theories is responded to thoroughly by Nietzsche, and
the legacy of that response is an integral element of Rorty' s understanding of the
pragmatic tradition, or at least a part of the light in which he wants that tradition to be
cast. As he says in his introduction to Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991b): "The
context in which my essays put post-Nietzschean philosophy is, predictably enough,
pragmatism" (p. 2). To ignore Nietzsche's influence on the general trajectory of
philosophy on both sides of the ocean is to ignore a great deal of the history that has
generated what many think of as merely the product of contemporaneity-namely, the
malaise and confusion brought on by the so-called postmodem predicament.
Edwards (1997) is instructive (with an obvious influence from Rorty) in showing
us that Nietzsche was the first to posit that it was not spontaneous representation that
reflected our status as conscious beings with minds, but rather our powers of
interpretation. Interpretation is the "willful imposition of structure and meaning on
something - a text, a set of events, a sequence of sense-experiences - that demands it"
(Edwards, p. 34). Flying in the face of the Cartesian notion of the human mind as passive
receptacle, Nietzsche cleared the way for the notion that we alone are reality's willful
creators. We can see the influence on Rorty in these passages from Nietzsche's The Will
to Power:
"Interpretation," the introduction of meaning - not "explanation." ...There are no
facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relatively most
enduring is - our opinions. (cited in Edwards, p. 34)
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A "thing-in-itself' is just as perverse as a "sense-in-itself," a "meaning-in-itself."
There are no "facts-in-themselves," for a sense must always be projected into
them before there can be "facts."
The question "what is that?" is an imposition of meaning from some other
viewpoint. "Essence," the "essential nature," is something perspective and already
presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it always lies "what is that for me?"
(for us, for all that lives, etc.). (cited in Edwards, p. 35)
We can see why for Dewey and Rorty, there is no sense left in the notion of absolute
Truth standing in accurate correspondence to an indubitable reality, nor to the idea that
our knowledge is a structuring of such truths. Writing in an apparently contradictory
prose that indicates his influence on Rorty's own ironic sensibility, Nietzsche says that:
"truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life [namely, us] could not
live. The value for life is ultimately decisive" (cited in Edwards, p. 35). Of course, the
whole notion of error here is emptied if error is judged in relation to a belief's
correspondence to an absolute, acontextual fact. Everything is in error under such a
Platonic/CartesianlKantian picture, but nonetheless our human proclivity to judge things
as true is reflective of a judgment we cannot stop making so long as we live. The trick, in
this post-Nietzschean context, and the one emphasized by Rorty, is to make such
judgments in a nonrepresentational way. Every set of true beliefs about our world (our
knowledge), for Nietzsche, is no more than (linguistic) coping under an interpretation
that, for the time being, wqrks for us and suits our needs. This bears a connection to
Rorty's notion that truth is just "a compliment we pay to those propositions that have
achieved wide acceptance within and across a community." The idea that we impose
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truthfulness and meaningfulness on the world indicates the interpretive shift in our status
from passive receivers to willful creators. We can justify such willful imposition, not by a
passive and accurate correspondence to some antecedent objective fact (or value), but
only to the usefulness such creative imposition offers for an improved future. What we
create are values based on our needs and interests. Theory, too, is brought down from the
clouds becoming what Edwards refers to as "the (unconscious) codification of practice,
practice shaped by interests, needs, and desires" (p. 36).
Theory as a codification of practice wherein practice is the state of multifarious
human contexts of interests, needs, and desires is itself a sharp tum to the future and
informs the pragmatic tradition profoundly. It indicates that life is in dynamic flux and
that what Nietzsche calls "the will to power" is the very necessity, life's necessity, for
actively seeking novel ways to live. Again, it is not merely fitting oneself progressively to
an a priori and absolutely stable Truth, but creating new truths (or interpretations) by
which to live. Of course, divesting Truth of its numinous otherworldly comforts is not an
eradication of the notion of truth from the universe. For Nietzsche, it is only to assign
truth a value status that bespeaks the necessity of our practical comportment within
contexts for which our interests, needs, and desires are relevant. Truth has shifted from
having a theoretical/representational status to having a practical/interpretive status. Yet,
within contexts of interpretation we recognize truth as that necessary error without which
we cannot live. In a usage very close to Rorty's concept of "final vocabulary," which will
be explored in more detail ,below, Nietzsche establishes that our human comportment in
the world, that is, our incessant will to power, furnishes those values that lend structural
integrity to any given interpretation. As Edwards (1997) says: "Values are those
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fundamental structures of interpretation required and furnished (posited) by the will to
power for its own preservation and enhancement; they function ... as the basic filters
through which raw experience is passed, thereby being modulated into a coherent and
livable world" (p. 37). Without such value structures (or vocabularies) human life would
be in perpetual chaos. Values thus need to be understood, says Edwards, as those social
practices, those "ground-level interpretations," that "fundamentally constitute and
characterize a particular form of life ... upon which other interpretations are erected to
form the edifice of a culture" (p. 37). The problem, of course, is that those values
constructed by our will to power, by the necessity of our relentless desire for novel modes
of life, must themselves be understood as contingent artifacts-good, perhaps, for a time,
but not so infinitely. Of course, there is no knock-down argument one can make for this,
other than to refer to past precedent. As it stands, though, Truth as value is effectively
devalued or rather it is always in a process ofdevaluating itself. Clearly, it is denuded of
any representational or mirroring status and thus of any authoritative or indubitable
ground for our now temporary (because temporally bound) knowledge.
All previously absolute values are devalued in this way-they devalue
themselves. This applies no less to the Cartesian ego-subject, that last bastion of
substantial selfuood. For while Descartes, in the wake of seventeenth century scientific
and epistemological revolutions, was able, as Edwards (1997) notes, to undermine "the
Idealist forms of Western religiousness he had inherited, Nietzsche has in tum shattered
the Cartesian worldview." ;He has done so, Edwards (1997) continues,
first of all by ridiculing the philosophical metaphor of mind-as-representation and
thus insinuating that the Cartesian ego-subject must be will, not receptivity (i.e., a
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force of interpretation, not a medium of mirroring); and second - a more radical
attack - by undercutting the philosophical idea of the grounding, centered ego
itself, showing it too to be only a unifying interpretation of multifarious
experience (i.e., a value, not a Ding-an-Sich). (p. 41)
The entire Western tradition's allegiance to one or another form of the "metaphysics of
presence" is now put into question with the collapse of the last Cartesian ground of
substantial self-presence. This leads us straight to Nietzsche's oft-quoted definition of
nihilism from The Will To Power: "What does nihilism mean?" he asks: "That the highest
values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking: 'why?' finds no answer" (cited in
Edwards, p. 41). We need to be clear about what this entails for us mere human beings.
Recapitulating Rorty's historically varied paths to redemption outlined above we now are
in a position to outline the full weight of Nietzsche's influence.
Nihilism is a state wherein our highest values "devaluate themselves." Nietzsche's
use of the reflexive verb here is meant to indicate that it is not through our powers of
critical analysis that such values devaluate. Rather it is an internal element of their own
development that they do so. Such devaluation, when put alongside Nietzsche's most
famous saying, "God is dead," scrawled, as Critchley (2001) tells us, "on the former
Berlin Wall and on toilet walls the world over," starts to become (for some) ominously
clear. Critchley continues:
This does not mean that God has somehow popped his clogs, quietly slipped out
the back door of they universe without telling anyone, or that some other God has
taken his place. Rather, it means 'we have killed him' . It is we humans who are
culpable for the death of God. Nihilism is the breakdown of the order of meaning,
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where all that was posited as a transcendent source of value in pre-Kantian
metaphysics becomes null and void, where there are no cognitive skyhooks upon
which to hang a meaning for life. (p. 80)
In many ways, the Christian moral tradition, whatever of power remains for it to feed
noncognitive forms of faith, has committed suicide through its very internal will to
truthfulness. That is to say, to the extent that the Christian tradition has taken upon itself
the necessity of philosophical cognitive standards of rationality, it has killed itself. In its
search for transcendent truths, it is led quite inexorably to science, and thus fatally to a
search of its own metaphysics. The paradox of nihilism, then, is just this: "the will for a
moral interpretation or valuation of the world now appears to be a will to untruth"
(Critchley, p. 81). Yet our belief in a world of truth is, as we have noted above, a
necessary error we must commit in order to live. The most ominous import of Nietzsche's
prognostication of nihilism lies less in what is negated-the myriad of Truth candidates,
religious and philosophical-and more in the very tum to the future, because now we
must endure what (supposedly) we cannot, a world of sheer becoming. For Nietzsche,
this is a dire, if inevitable state. He writes in The Will to Power:
But as soon as man finds out how that world is fabricated solely from
psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of
nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world and
forbids itself any belief in a true world. Having reached this standpoint, one
grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, forbids oneself every kind of
clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities - but cannot endure this
world though one does not want to deny it. (cited in Critchley, p. 81)
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It is this dire analysis that sets the tone and the mood of much Continental theorizing.
Nihilism is the more or less natural consequence of the Christian and philosophical
tradition's self-negation. For Nietzsche, the more or less natural state of nihilism is
expressed in our more or less natural reaction that all existence must be meaningless. It is
this particular Nietzschean "interpretation" that sets the course, as I have said, for most of
the somber-sounding Continental philosophy that Rorty is influenced by. So why isn't
Rorty a somber-sounding philosopher?
Normal Nihilism to Irony
There's no denying that the entire American pragmatic tradition shares a common
trajectory with Nietzsche. Pragmatism's common trajectory with Nietzsche's thought is
based in the sheer similarity of the message that was passed on to Americans by James
and Dewey that Nietzsche had passed on to his fellow Europeans. Of importance, it is the
negation side of the message that both traditions share and that Rorty has so vitally
tapped into across the largely artificial boundaries that have otherwise barred productive
communication between these two wings of the Western tradition. The message is
pervasive in Dewey as well, because he was as aware as any Continental thinker of the
tenor of his times, the trajectory of the post-Enlightenment impulse. In terms of the
antiepistemological and antimetaphysical stances of both traditions, as well as the
philosophy of language that came about because of those stances, they are virtually
unanimous in their rejections. Absolutist Truth candidates fare no better on either side of
the ocean-philosophically speaking. The choice of moods that one takes as a result of
such vast undermining (keeping in mind that values self-devaluate) is decisive in terms of
locating the important difference between the Pragmatic and Continental traditions.
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As a pragmatist, Rorty is fully cognizant of what the two traditions have in
common-namely their shared anti-Cartesianism, their shared antirepresentationalism,
and their shared antiessentialism. The refusal to grant to our knowledge the kind of
transcendent truth status that would somehow indicate our cognitive grasp of and
correspondence to an indubitable reality, the refusal, that is, to accept the picture of our
minds as mirrors of reality, leads to the self-devaluation of those values that otherwise
have perpetuated that fantasy. From there, there is nothing essential to tap into, no thing-
in-itself. Everything encountered-'every thing, person, event, idea, and poem'-is a
nexus in a web of relations. There are no unrelated pragmata, or at least none that mean
anything to us. That this has led to a deflation of what philosophy is good for goes
without saying, but it is primarily a deflation of those antecedent purposes (admittedly,
no small deflation) that have traditionally rationalized the discipline. To deny philosophy
any future purposes whatsoever runs against the grain of Rorty's (and Dewey's)
poeticism and represents the kind of simple-minded relativism they reject outright. Who's
to say what philosophy might become, what directions it might take? That is a question of
and for the imagination first and foremost. But whatever philosophy does become, it must
now be recognized as an activity in which the very values that traditionally fueled its
trajectory are devalued. Whatever it will become must now find its energizing source
from the very fact of becoming-a tum to the future, in other words, that is self-
conscious all the way down. This self-consciousness is the recognition of the contingency
of the universe and our pla,ce in it as well as the recognition that even our final
vocabularies, those vocabularies (like Nietzsche's "will to power") that give us our sense
of being a part of a stable culture, are not intrinsically inflexible. It is this heightened self-
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consciousness (which I shall expand on presently) that puts us in a state of what Edwards
(1997) (drawing on a facet of Nietzsche's thinking), calls "normal nihilism" and what
Rorty calls "irony." It is not without its difficulties and dangers, to be sure, but nor is it
automatically a source of despair. This potential for hopeful melioration within a state of
heightened self-conscious awareness, be it referred to as "irony" or "normal nihilism,"
signals the cardinal difference between the moods in the Pragmatic and Continental
traditions.
In outlining what he means by "normal nihilism" Edwards (1997) strikes a chord
with Rorty's notion of "irony." The point of Edw':lrds' s project, it must be noted, is to
defend some form of religiosity in the wake of the self-immolation of our highest
(Christian) values. That such devaluation (as outlined above) is equally, and necessarily,
applicable to philosophy is an indication of the tense relationship between religion and
philosophy. As already pointed out by Rorty, redemption from either has not been
successful, if only because of their odd admixture. Religious faith enters perilous
philosophical waters, indeed, turns into philosophy, when it becomes thinkable that one
might hope to ground one's faith in rational principles, arguments, as well as one or
another form of absolutist truth-criterion. The way that such ambitions have turned in
upon themselves via a paradoxical drive to untruth signals the pervasive mood of nihilism
that has filtered into the fabric of our consciousness in these late modem times. As
Edwards says "nihilism is the way the world comes to us, the way its sounds itself out in
us; it is the way we comP9rt ourselves to what we are given. We are all now nihilists
[emphasis added] (p. 46). To the extent that Nietzsche posited nihilism as a (more or less)
"normal" condition, Edwards is careful to separate the sense of normalcy associated with
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nihilism out from the more pathological interpretations it is often given. He is thoroughly
pragmatic in his articulation.
"Nihilism" is often understood as one of two things-it is a pathological condition
of individual or society, what Edwards (1997) refers to as "a paralyzing state
compounded of pessimism, apathy, weariness, loss of all conviction, 'recession of the
power of the spirit'" or it is understood as a philosophical synonym for sociopathy; the
individual who is "altogether without a controlling conscience; a brute who coolly does
whatever he wishes" (p. 46). Edwards notes that although Nietzsche sometimes uses the
term in these ways, it is not the most compelling of uses, and moreover, something
important may be lost by so using it. This leads to the sense of "normal nihilism" that
Edwards is outlining:
To be a nihilist is not (necessarily) either to be hopeless and inert (like the
catatonic) or to operate brutally and without effective restraint (like Ted Bundy or
the Nazi Gauleiter); on the contrary, all of us now are nihilists, even those among
us who are most energetic and most scrupulous. To say that we are normal
nihilists is just to say that our lives are constituted by self-devaluating values.
What makes these values values is that we normally recognize, as our ancestors
normally did not, their reality as pragmatically posited filters through which
experience must be passed to become manageable; what makes them self-
devaluating is that we also recognize - and only with their help, of course - their
contingency, their ~ubjection to history understood as the Mendelian evolution of
life-forms. (p. 46)
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The way Edwards accounts for "normal nihilism" lines up nicely with Rorty's account of
"irony," though it needs to be said there is an important and subtle public/private
difference between their respective intentions.
I think both Edwards and Rorty understand "normal nihilism" as a "public" or
"global" condition. When Edwards (1997) says 'we are all now nihilists' he is not
proclaiming that we all now have hyper-consciousness of the fact, that we are all
redemptive intellectuals (in Rorty's sense) who have read Nietzsche and others and have
adjusted our ways accordingly. Both would agree, if I am reading them correctly, that
self-consciousness of this condition of normal nihilism is the intellectuals' self-
consciousness only, and it is always a creative on-the-move self-consciousness at that.
Clearly, the tum to the future-to some kind of 'becoming'-is in this regard decisive,
and signals a difference between Edwards' and Rorty's sense of hopefulness as a result of
such a tum. Edwards has some trepidation about the possible public manifestations of
normal nihilism. Such a condition seeps into the cracks and fissures of a culture and finds
expression regardless of whether or not the public is self-consciously (read ironically)
aware of the condition. Indeed, the less self-consciousness there is the more dangerous or
potentially demeaning such a condition can be. This is Edwards's source of fear and
trembling-that one or the other outcome might occur as a result of our normal nihilism.
The first is that such nihilism will become expressive of what Edwards calls "a kind of
runaway humanism" (p. 52). He explains this fear as such:
Confronted with th~ possibility... that we continually create new and better forms
of human life, we can easily fall into an overwhelming restlessness. Life for the
sake of life (the Nietzschean dream) becomes change for the sake of change.
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Nothing except fatigue and our failures of imagination limit our capacity to
fashion ourselves and our world anew, in accordance with whatever purposes we
uncover in ourselves. But novelty palls before the ever newer; the half-lives of our
enthusiasms become shorter and shorter. And pretty soon we are feeding our
habits by eating the earth (and ourselves) in bigger and bigger bites ....Our
humanism - our sense of limitless inner and outer space to be filled with new
selves, new worlds, new pleasures, new values - can thus leave us (and the
planet) helpless before our well-confirmed predilections to addiction and to
boredom. (pp. 52-53)
Clearly, such a possible prognostication resonates all too well in these late modem times.
This is Edwards's fear of the frenetically paced shopping mall of values, where any
source of stability is uprooted at the very moment of its instantiation. It is a world of
mania and perpetually unfulfilled desires where "memory too easily becomes nostalgia;
the past becomes kitsch" (Edwards, p. 53). It represents a frenetic eventfulness wherein
"event is obscured by later event, [and] when the past disappears in such forgetting (or
into kitschy and commodified memorial), the present can thin out into a jittery mania for
pure difference. One becomes Emerson's traveler who says, 'Anywhere but here'"
(Edwards, p. 53).
The second and antithetical fear that Edwards (1997) expresses involves what he
calls "the triumph of the normal" (p. 53). This is a strong conservative reaction to the fear
brought on by "limitless multiplicity." What Edwards foresees (is he really even looking
ahead in either case?), and what is just as scary, is what I will call (in a more Deweyan
vein) the fear of massification, and what Edwards calls "the triumph of fundamentalism."
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That is, he is fearful of what becomes of the world when many choose to blindly or "even
joyfully plunge... into some well-defined social and cultural role, letting it define who
[they are] and will be" (p. 53). What Edwards sees as a possibility looks thus:
One speaks as "they" speak; one acts as "anyone" would act. One becomes
thereby, and enthusiastically, a socially constructed cipher, wearing the right
clothes, working at the right job, seeing the right movies, having the right
responses to them, doing what is expected by "them" of "anyone." One is a model
of good behavior; even one's vices are those that "anyone" might have.
Sometimes it is not enough just that one find this sort of comfort for oneself; no, it
must be enforced on others as well. One's own hold on normality is threatened by
anything abnormal. Errancy must be condemned and attacked. One can allow to
stand only what "they" - the good Christians, the true revolutionaries, the tenured
professors of the Ivy League, those who have read Bataille - approve of. (pp. 53-
54)
In the first instance, then, we have the public denigrated by frenetic and unquenchable
private desires. In this second instance we have the private sinking under the oppressive
weight of a conforming blind normalcy. Either extreme represents a frightening prospect
for Edwards, and why should they not? What is quite remarkable is that both Edwards
and Rorty occupy the same void, have turned against the same antiquated metaphysics
with its misplaced comforts-have turned, that is, to the necessity of contingency.
Edwards even quotes a phrase he heard Rorty once speak: "The meaning of human life is
the creation of new vocabularies" (p. 55). Edwards cites the phrase, not so much in
approbation of what Rorty says, but in a kind of knowing resignation to it. The
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decisiveness of Edwards's next words indicate a merging (for him) of painfulness and
power. In the light of Rorty' s words, Edwards says:
To be sure, there is no way back, short of intellectual and spiritual suicide. The
price to be paid for the stunning certainty of some new god stepping out from
behind a billboard is far too high. At risk would be more than just our most
cherished (and most hard-won) forms of intellectual life; such a revelation would
leave us defenseless against our own well-documented need for ravishment ....No
doubt it's better for us to be normal nihilists, those who in our effective, though
also restless and brittle, coping can hold at bay any need to be "saved," than to
repopulate the earth with divinities and their demands for obedient submission. (p.
55)
There is no denying, the mall of perpetually on-the-run human values frightens Edwards,
but as he here makes clear, there are worse things to be feared.
The repetition of the word "intellectual" is also telling. Reiterating a sentiment
that is prevalent in Rorty's works, as we have already articulated above is that
intellectuals are on to something that others are not, at least not consciously. For surely,
Luntley's (1995) and now Edwards's (1997) dire possibilities arising out of our so-called
'normal nihilism' are not dire possibilities that any reasonably (and ironically) self-
conscious intellectual would perpetuate. Surely not! Learned intellectuals who have read
all the big books (and such individuals are not solely housed in universities, though many
are) have witnessed the grt1at deconstruction, understand the dire possibilities of the
Western trajectory, but, and this is important, know the future is theirs. And with great
(creative) power, so comes great responsibility. Is this just another form of self-flattery or
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elitism? Well, it can be, but if the burden of responsibility that rests heavy on the
shoulders of our culture's intellectuals is a thoroughly democratic burden, then it can
plausibly be interpreted as entailing the nobler burden of creating the freedom and space
for more people to become intellectuals. The hoped-for state is that of a better future
wherein more and more of us have evolved past some of our longstanding petty
indulgences, our dangerous comportments with each other and the planet we inhabit-
have, in other words, become better sorts of persons. Rorty calls these sorts of persons
"liberal ironists." It is in the end an educational project of utmost importance, but for now
we need to chart the tum to hopefulness necessitated by the very condition of normal
nihilism (or irony) that is all our lot, whether we are conscious of it or not.
It may still seem strange, even paradoxical, trying to articulate a "tum to
hopefulness necessitated by the very condition of normal nihilism," but it is my hope that
with the aid of Critchley (2001) and Edwards (1997) I have managed to convey a
workable alternative to the otherwise common association of nihilism with one or another
form of individual or social pathology. It is a form of optimism finally that has no need
for more than temporary comforts, has no need, that is, for either transcendent or radical
absolutes. As David Hall (1994) says of Rorty: "Like Nietzsche, Rorty is a Benign
Nihilist. And that nihilism expresses itself directly in Rorty's provincialism,
ethnocentrism, and heroism. It also shapes his attitudes towards poetry and prophesy-
issues central to his narrativist posture" (p. 170). All this being said, there is an inkling of
an irritation here, is there 110t? What I highlighted in the previous chapter by way of
articulating Rorty's public/private distinction starts to come to a head in the form of the
"Benign Nihilist" as liberal ironist.
132
As a Canadian, I see Rorty as a strange amalgam of politics. In Canada we have
enshrined a multiparty system made up of the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the
New Democratic Party (NDP), and the Parti Quebecois (PQ). It is remarkably refreshing,
even as it is baffling that Rorty for all intents and purposes, is an NDP/PQ in private, a
Conservative in public (that is, he shows concern for notions of conservation), and that
this amalgam makes him some form of Liberal overall. Fascinating indeed! Perhaps it is
even pragmatic the way such divisions collapse and coalesce in Rorty's writings. At any
rate, it will not pay to be too political about Rorty the philosopher but nor will it pay to be
too nonpolitical either. There are substantial issues at stake in Rorty's liberal ironism. I
have chosen to articulate Rorty's liberal ironism principally through Edwards, reading of
Nietzsche and the particular Western trajectory of what Edwards prefers to call "normal
nihilism." I think it is a rich historical entry into what Rorty means by liberal irony. For
Rorty (1989), borrowing from Judith Shklar, liberals are "people who think that cruelty is
the worst thing we do" (p. xv). What Rorty means by 'ironist' resonates most with the
condition of "normal nihilism:"
I use "ironist" to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his
or her most central beliefs - someone sufficiently historicist and nominalist to
have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back to
something beyond the reach of time and chance. (p. xv)
And so:
Liberal ironists are ,people who include among these ungroundable desires their
own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings
by other human beings may cease. (p. xv)
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I introduced earlier Rorty' s notion of a "final vocabulary" as bearing a resemblance to
Nietzsche's notion of "values" or "value structures" that filter our 'will to power'-our
'will to power,' in Edwards (1997) words, signaling "life... avidly seeking novel ways to
preserve and enhance itself' (p.36). I need now to clarify just what Rorty means with the
notion of "final vocabulary," especially as it pertains to his notion of "irony." It is also an
entry point, taken up in the next chapter, for Rorty's thoroughly "linguistic tum"
philosophy as compared to Dewey's 'experiential' philosophy.
For Rorty, all human beings, inasmuch as they are meaningful entities, are
sentential to the core. What Nietzsche referred to as "values" or "value structures" Rorty
translates into "words" or "sentence structures," while at the same time maintaining the
same necessity as Nietzsche of having to order an otherwise chaotic and fluxive universe
(that Rorty's translation, like Nietzsche's, fails fully to escape metaphysics will be taken
up in the next chapter). In this sense, what Rorty calls our "final vocabulary" is more than
some sentence or set of sentences wielded for getting something done at some given time.
It is more like the grand narrative of one's acculturation. It is comparable to Nietzsche's
"value structures" or "structures of interpretation," highlighted above-what Edwards
(1997) refers to as "organized applications of force." This is how Edwards explains the
. Nietzschean side (with an influence from Heidegger):
Interpretations, one might say, are social practices, relatively determinate patterns
of comportment that persist over time so as to constitute human beings and their
world in a stable al1d predictable fashion. Values are those basic social practices
that most fundamentally constitute and characterize a particular form of life;
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values are those ground-level interpretations - patterns of comportment - upon
which other interpretations are erected to form the edifice of a culture. (p. 37)
Here is how Rorty (1989) explains 'final vocabulary':
All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their
actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which we formulate
praise for our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects, our
deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes. They are the words in which we tell,
sometimes prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives. I
shall call these words a person's "final vocabulary." (p. 73)
As I have said, these are comparable passages, but they are not the same. The Edwards
passage articulates what might be referred to as a public or cultural common sense.
Rorty's passage, on the other hand, operates at the level of the private individual, though
it certainly does not preclude the possibility of many individuals sharing similar "final
vocabularies" so as to constitute a kind of public common sense. But I suspect Rorty
would be uncomfortable with Edwards' notion of "ground-level interpretations" even
though he alternatively calls them "patterns of comportment." My guess is that, for Rorty,
there would be too much "givenness" in this passage and not enough "takenness." The
thorough linguistification of Nietzschean "value structures" by Rorty signals another
important element that Rorty takes from Nietzsche's larger project against capital "T"
Truth.
Rorty (1989) cites with approbation Nietzsche's statement that "truth is a mobile
army of metaphors" (p. 27). This is not only the linguistification of truth, but the
linguistification of the whole process of self-creation, at least for those ironic enough
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individuals who hopefully will become better able to cope with what Harold Bloom calls
the "strong poet's anxiety of influence" (cited in Rorty, 1989, p. 24). This cuts to the
pervasive restlessness that is at the heart of Rorty's ironism. The "strong poet" or the
"ironist" is never satisfied to be merely a product of his or her enculturation. His or her
behavioral repertoire is not a substantive "given," sitting ever in one or another pristine
state waiting to be grasped, explained, or otherwise packaged. Like Truth is not out there
waiting, pristinely, to be discovered, so the "words in which we tell ... the story of our
lives" are not in there so waiting.
Yet, the motivations that drive even the ironist's stories about him or herself have
causal significance, they must have, for we can never speak, write, or create ex nihilo.
The "strong poet's anxiety of influence," then, is just the fear among those we call
ironists of discovering that they are merely copies or replicas of something or someone
who is already there or who has already been. In traditional cultures or strong
conservative traditions, we might say that this is not so much a fear as it is a wished-for
state. But this would be misleading given the way Rorty views both language and the self
as thoroughly contingent artifacts. That is to say, there is nothing stopping us, pace
Nietzsche, from tracing our behavior backwards to discover the causes in back of who
and what we are. But what we discover is, quite paradoxically, that we are not really
discovering any thing per see Discovery is not the issue. Any causal tracing is actually
itself an act of self-knowledge and thus self-creation. The tracing of causes is actually the
creating of new metaphors., As Rorty (1989) says:
The process of coming to know oneself, confronting one's contingency, tracking
one's causes home, is identical with the process of inventing a new language-
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that is, of thinking up some new metaphors. For any literal description of one's
individuality, which is to say any use of an inherited language-game for this
purpose, will necessarily fail. One will not have traced that idiosyncrasy home but
will merely have managed to see it as not idiosyncratic after all, as a specimen
reiterating a type, a copy or replica of something which has already been
identified. To fail as a poet - and thus, for Nietzsche, to fail as a human being - is
to accept somebody else's description of oneself....So the only way to trace home
the causes of one's being as one is would be to tell a story about one's causes in a
new language. (pp. 27-28)
Self-knowledge is self-creation. Anything less would be mere mimicry and therefore
would entail no growth. Human beings are not mere photocopy machines. For Rorty, the
past is linked causally to the future only in terms of the possibility for self-creation, and
hopefully, therein, some sort of improved state or condition. In many ways, then, the past
and the future are made, not found.
It is noted by Fishman and McCarthy (1998) that John Dewey once responded to
a student's query about the role of emotion in thinking by saying: "Knowledge is a small
cup of water floating on a sea of emotion" (p. 21). So too does Rorty understand the role
of causality in shaping our self-knowledge. What Dewey calls the "sea of emotion"
Rorty, indicating his own Freudian influence, calls the "blind impress" that all behavings
bear. There is no defining or providing prior justification for a given "final vocabulary."
As Malachowski (2002) correctly notes: "The fact that final vocabularies have no prior
justification is not a sign that there is something deeply wrong with such sets of words.
Indeed, given their value to their owners, we should not expect them to depend on
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anything more fundamental (otherwise the chances are that would have already been
incorporated as a better linguistic terminus)" (p. 117). Any articulation of the "blind
impress," then, is not a discovering of some antecedent purity, but rather a new
articulation, a new metaphor or set of metaphors. This is where the real excitement is-at
the edge of the ever renewing, the ever novel. There is no meaningful nonlinguistic cause
that can be antecedently defined (though the universe is chock-full of nonlinguistic
causes). There is only some present articulation, some present new vocabulary cutting
into the future. It is thoroughly pragmatic on Rorty's part to be concerned with
consequences as such. Language is not a medium between self and world; it has no
intrinsic purposes. It can only chart contingencies. As Rorty (1989) says:
For all we know, or should care, Aristotle's metaphorical use of ousia, Saint
Paul's metaphorical use of agape, and Newton's metaphorical use of gravitas,
were the results of cosmic rays scrambling the fine structure of some crucial
neurons in their respective brains. Or, more plausibly, they were the result of
some odd episodes in infancy - some obsessional kinks left in these brains by
idiosyncratic traumata. It hardly matters how the trick was done. The results were
marvelous. There had never been such things before. (p. 17)
The ironist thus fully embraces the contingent status of his or her vocabularies, and as a
good liberal, eschews all forms of cruelty. But as an ironist he or she will be unable to
provide any kind of "non-circular theoretical backup for the belief that cruelty is
horrible" (Rorty, p. xv). T4e ironist, finally, fulfills these three conditions:
(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently
uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as
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final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument
phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these
doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that
her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not
herself. (Rorty, 1989, p. 73)
I have made the long, slow tum from absolutist conceptions of Truth to
contingency and language, from past (blindly held) allegiances to future possibilities. The
tum against Truth as an absolute is a thoroughly pragmatic tum and charts a trajectory
important to both Dewey and Rorty. Indeed, pragmatism generally has followed such a
trajectory-a trajectory that, in Walt Whitman's words cited earlier, "counts ... for [its]
justification and success ... almost entirely upon the future." I have used Rorty as proxy
for the pragmatic tradition generally and for Dewey in particular in order to highlight the
pragmatic tum against absolutist conceptions of Truth, central to a thoroughgoing
pragmatism with its antifoundationalist and antiessentialist affiliations. This is no doubt
heresy to some hard-line pragmatists (most often hard-line Deweyans), but I can see no
radical difference in Rorty's voicing of this central critical theme from other such
pragmatic renderings, including Dewey's. The intrepid turning to the future is itself a
kind of faith in truthfulness that comes by way of turning against absolutist conceptions
of Truth. The Enlightenment flame that still dimly flickers has lighted a path that has
witnessed our highest (absolutist) values, devaluing themselves inexorably via the
momentum of their own lo,gical trajectory. Pragmatism was born on this trajectory and
has articulated perhaps the single most important inversion: The modem imagination
once disciplined by Truth (some God or some rational philosophical absolutist
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conditioning source) has now itself become the disciplinarian. Truthfulness, a drive that
we cannot existentially forgo, at the risk of falling into chaos, must now be disciplined by
imagination.9 The normal nihilism that imbues our present late modem trajectory can be
faced courageously only by the discipline of imagination, but an imagination tethered by
a fidelity to one's enculturation. The future is never born ex nihilo, it is always the result
of conditions entailing some element of propriety-the propriety of getting it right, of
imagining well, of being genuine and offering a sincere account. These are some bright
(though imperfect) lights of our Western enlightenment enculturation, parts of what
makes us us. This is why the charge that pragmatists abandon truth altogether is a silly
one. The intrepid explorer (or the responsible scholar) is always experimenting, always
trying for new and better ways of doing things, always searching for better modes of
communication. It is never a matter of riding roughshod over past modes, but nor is it a
matter of blind or unthinking allegiance. Dogmatism is the enemy of novelty and growth.
Truthfulness is thus a part of the eros of living well, disciplined by the ameliorative hope
brought on by our ability to always imagine a different and hopefully better future. Such
a tum to the future, then, is finally an aesthetic tum, the substance of which infuses the
very best elements of Dewey's and Rorty's respective pragmatisms.
The next two chapters take up their respective aesthetic stances, with a particular
focus on Dewey's experiential account and Rorty's linguistic account. That Rorty's
"linguistic tum" represents a sharp tum against Dewey's experiential philosophy raises
some significant and interesting problems, the resolution of which could pay dividends
for determining who among them has the superior resources for carrying the pragmatic
tradition along into the new millennium. Of course, the notion of "superior resources"
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must prove problematic for Rorty, who will deny such resources any antecedent
meaningfulness. Superior resources will be deemed superior, if at all, only by some as yet
unwritten future account. As we shall see in what follows, a notion of "superior
resources" can be retained in Dewey's philosophy by way of his embodied organic
naturalism, which, while recognizing flux and contingency as real components of lived
life, nonetheless has room for empirical learning and progress. The problems that arise
between the two might also be more modest, with the difference between the two not
adding up to much that would otherwise place either of their pragmatisms in jeopardy of
burning out. There is an important qualitative dimension to both of their aesthetical
positions-Dewey's experiential and Rorty's linguistic. What I hope to show is that this
qualitative dimension represents the real starting point (and thus the only real practical
starting point) for each of their respective philosophical/aesthetic positions. The trick will
be showing how Rorty is able to divest language of meaningful, cognitive content (via his
notion of metaphor) in such a way that it resonates very well with Dewey's own
qualitative starting point, what he calls the "indeterminate situation." I tum first to
Dewey's aesthetics and his radical realignment of art as experience.
CHAPTER FIVE: DEWEY'S AESTHETIC PRAGMATISM
But it was not a choice
Between excluding things. It was not a choice
Between, but of. He chose to include the things
That in each other are included, the whole,
The complicate, the amassing harmony.
-Wallace Stevens!
If, as I hinted at the end of the last chapter, the tum to the future in the pragmatic
tradition is also a tum to more aestheticized forms of culture, then we must ask, what do
such aesthetic modes look like? Clearly, many important Deweyan scholars argue that
Dewey's entire philosophical project culminates in an aesthetic pragmatic framework.2
That Rorty's own "literary" pretensions, looked at briefly already, signal an aestheticized
bent in his larger philosophy is also clear. That there is (or appears to be) a trenchant
contest between these two aestheticized modes of pragmatism has been captured in much
of the literature, particularly as it pertains to Rorty's aggressive "linguistic tum" against
the staple Deweyan category of "experience.,,3 Given Dewey's attachment to
"experience" as an eminently useful philosophical category, it is apparent that Rorty has
little patience for what many consider the most important element of Dewey's work. This
leads to a kind of bewilderment that anything is even left of Dewey for Rorty to attach his
well-known heroic attributions.
The debate is at heart a metaphysical debate, the tenor of which has implications
for their respective aesthetic positions. Rorty sees Dewey's adherence to an experiential
pragmatism as unnecessarily encumbered in old-style metaphysics, the debates around
which pragmatism has otherwise struggled hard to dissolve. There certainly are some
elements of Dewey's experiential wanderings that do look suspicious in this regard,
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particularly his distinction between the "primary" and "secondary" dimensions of
experience, looked at briefly at the end of Chapter Two. Within the primary dimension of
experience Dewey lodges his famous nondiscursive, noncognitive foundation for all
eventual epistemic outcomes, what he terms the "pervasive quality." This has been
rendered a problematic dimension of Dewey's metaphysics by some astute Deweyan
scholars.4 I will take up such criticisms in the next chapter, where I tum to Rorty's own
aesthetic pragmatism entailing within it a critique of certain Deweyan themes, not the
least of which is against Dewey's notion of qualitative immediacy or indeterminacy. I
then hope to show that against Rorty's own intentions, he cannot finally do without that
very qualitative dimension that Dewey posits as necessary. Qualitative immediacy, I hope
to show, is a necessary starting point for any aesthetic trajectory. For now I tum to
Dewey's aesthetic pragmatism in order to bring fully to life the experiential implications
that were being developed in Chapter Two.
Dewey's writings on art and aesthetics have, since the time of their publication,
received somewhat modest attention in comparison to the coverage given other important
areas of his philosophy. In recent years, however, there has been a gradual recognition
that Dewey's writings on art and aesthetics, written later in his career, exhibit a deeper
and more comprehensive synthesizing of the major themes that had been developing
throughout his entire philosophy. Failure to come to terms with Dewey's writing on art
and aesthetics is, in many ways, a failure to come to fuller terms with the deeper
implications of his entire philosophy. It is my contention, therefore, that Dewey's
writings on art and aesthetics provide the most thoroughgoing and mature rendering of
the major themes that preoccupied his entire philosophical project. Experience is the
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major theme running throughout Dewey's work, and it is my focus here. The many
aspects of his philosophical project are difficult to grasp unless his reconstruction of
experience is understood. Attempting to overcome the gulf between theory and practice
begun in Greek philosophy and continued throughout much of the history of Western
philosophy, Dewey (1925/1994) comes to a bold conclusion. I quote once again in full
the passage from chapter 9 of Experience and Nature:
But if modem tendencies are justified in putting art and creation first, then the
implications of this position should be avowed and carried through. It would then
be seen that science is an art, that art is practice, and that the only distinction
worth drawing is not between practice and theory, but between those modes of
practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and
those which are full of enjoyed meanings. When this perception dawns, it will be
a commonplace that art - the mode of activity that is charged with meanings
capable of immediately enjoyed possession - is the complete culmination of
nature, and that "science" is properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events
to this happy issue. Thus would disappear the separations that trouble present
thinking: division of everything into nature and experience, of experience into
practice and theory, art and science, of art into useful and fine, menial and free.
(p.290)
No doubt, this passage still sounds radical today. A cursory look at how and why it is
radical is the intention behind this dissertation.
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Art and The Commons
In his writings on art and aesthetics, Dewey seeks to bring art back into the fold of
the sociocultural and the sociotemporal, making aesthetic experience less elite and
escapist and more applicable to everyday life experiences. The origin and destiny of
aesthetic experience and artistic works is, for Dewey, the commons. The task, for Dewey
(1934/1980), "is to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of
experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, sufferings that are
universally recognized to constitute experience" (p. 3). It is not Dewey's intention that
everybody will, upon following this road, rise to the level of fine artist (he has room for
the unique qualities, insights, and even the genius of particular artists and their work). He
is saying, however, that the creative process and expressive potential so vividly expressed
in fine works of art-the complex movement from some vision (end-in-view) through
that vision's manipulation in production toward an aesthetic outcome (consummation)-
is a process exemplary of how we intelligently experience and shape our world.
We all have an ongoing aesthetic hunger. This hunger is not easily diminished by
faulty personal and social bearings. Understanding that experience's embodied movement
in time constitutes us as the shapers of our world and that our world is a canvas of
unlimited possibility, we may begin to appreciate more fully the aesthetic possibilities of
an ameliorative stance to the day-to-day problems we face. For when that which is
considered cultivated or refined is also remote and disconnected from common life, then
"esthetic hunger is likely to seek the cheap and the vulgar" (Dewey, 1934/1980, p. 6).
When this occurs experience is degraded and the problems of our world are left to whim
and chance or, conversely, fanaticism, and tyranny.
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It is, therefore, no mere coincidence that his most mature work deals with art and
aesthetics. It is there that Dewey found the subject matter most amenable to the deepest
implications of his own democratic vision. Art as Experience is the strongest title he gave
to any work. Art, when aesthetically charged, is representative of "experience in its
integrity." Continuing, Dewey (1934/1980) says:
Had not the term "pure" been so often abused in philosophic literature, had it not
been so often employed to suggest that there is something alloyed, impure, in the
very nature of experience and to denote something beyond experience, we might
say that esthetic experience is pure experience. For it is experience freed from the
forces that impede and confuse its development as experience; freed, that is, from
factors that subordinate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond
itself. To esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what
experience is. (p.274)
Dewey's point is a particularly modernist one-artful conduct as leading to
aesthetic experience is representative primarily of the kind of beings we are potentially in
the world as well as the kind of world we are beings in. The organic relation between
humans and their environment is a transactional affair, and one in which both become
equally productive in manifesting the ongoing struggle to endow our world with meaning
and value. This begins at an immediate or felt level, and art, at its best, demonstrates this
pervasive organicism when it culminates to a level of aesthetic experience, aesthetic
experience representing th~ fullness of experience. It represents a culmination or a
consummatory phase in which the organism finds a new posture toward the world,
helping to fortify the aesthetic against the anaesthetic.
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As a way of deepening my own analysis, I now tum to Dewey's use of the terms
"pervasive quality" and "situation." Understanding these terms as he applies them is
fundamental to arriving at a less myopic and more complex understanding of what
Dewey means by aesthetic experience.
Dewey and Qualitative Situations
Amidst our "undergoing" and "doing" in day-to-day life, our thinking seems to
have become severed from the more qualitative dimensions of our experience, what
Kaufman-Osborn (1991) calls the "pragmata" of our lifeworld, and thus what we undergo
and do tends to be aimless, disconnected, and arbitrary. Rather than any real relation of
undergoing and doing from some felt and embodied connection to primary experience,
we are tugged and pulled by bloodless abstractions which step in with false promises of
meaning and fulfillment.
Central to Dewey's theory of art and aesthetic experience is his thinking on
pervasive quality. Without an understanding of pervasive quality as the fundamental
feature of any experience, consummatory experience or an experience as Dewey
alternately calls it, is not properly intelligible. Pervasive quality is a very difficult concept
to tease out, because its ineffable features are not easily amenable to description. For any
description or attempt at definition is already a step removed from the essential "isness"
of qualitative experience. One might wonder, then, if we can say anything at all about the
pervasive quality of any given experience. Well, in a sense, we cannot. We cannot, that
is, say anything of its imm~diacy, for its immediacy is something had or felt, wholly
prereflective and thus prediscursive. It is that quality of immediate experience which is
irreducible and indescribable. Yet, if this were the be-all-and-end-all of experience, we
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would find ourselves in no vital connection to our environment, receiving no more than a
meaningless barrage of sensory impressions. We can and inevitably must say something
out of the pervasive quality that flows in and through experience, but what we say is a
reflection of how we have defined, discriminated, and situated ourselves in relation to
any particular experience. Language mediates our experience, but the way in which we
situate ourselves can be productive of a deeper connection to life-experience or it can
remain merely surface and thus stunted. We must be careful not to conflate what we
come to know about an experience with the experience in its immediacy. When we do
this we diminish that experience, the qualitative dimensions of which fundamentally
shape and give logical force to our knowledge as an achievement.
It is this problem that has plagued much of modern philosophy, and its most
prominent manifestation is to be found in modem science. There has been the tendency to
ignore or reduce to soft irrelevancy the qualitative dimensions of experience. In this,
philosophers and scientists have insisted on a fundamental split between subject and
object, wherein the subjective mind somehow has access to a correspondent knowledge
of a wholly independent realm of epistemic objects. They have equated, in other words,
knowledge of the experience with the experience itself and have thus confused having an
experience with knowing it. With Dewey's more inclusive understanding of experience,
he writes:
Many modern thinkers, influenced by the notion that knowledge is the only mode
of experience that grasps things, assuming the ubiquity of cognition, and noting
that immediacy or qualitative existence has no place in authentic science, have
asserted that qualities are always and only states of consciousness. It is a
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reasonable belief that there would be no such thing as "consciousness" if events
did not have a phase of brute and unconditioned "isness," of being just what they
irreducibly are.... And also without immediate qualities those relations with
which science deals would have no footing in existence, and thought would have
nothing beyond itself to chew upon or dig into. Without a basis in qualitative
events, the characteristic subject-matter of knowledge would be algebraic ghosts,
relations that do not relate. (Dewey, 1925/1994, pp. 74-74)
Immediate experience, then, is a quality that inheres neither exclusively in external
objects nor exclusively in the contemplating mind of isolated subjects. It is rather the
experience as "felt" or "had" by way of our transaction with the environment. Saying
that there is an immediate quality within experience is not to undermine the possibility or
relevance of any kind of mediation. At this point I wish only to emphasize that the
pervasive quality of any given experience, as it is felt or had, represents the initial phase
of absorption between the organism and its environment. This is the primary phase of
experience. The context of the initial or primary phase is noncognitive and it is
controlling. Alexander (1992) cites Dewey's notion that the noncognitive quality of the
context is "the vast, vague continuum ... this taken-for-granted whole" (p. 352). As he
goes on to add, "the word 'experience' is ... a notation of an inexpressible as that which
decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not because it is so
remote and transcendent, but because it is so immediately engrossing and matter of
course" (p. 352). The orga:oism is caught up in what Mathur (1992) refers to as the
immediate "doing-and-undergoing" within "an active and dynamic field of integrated
participation" (p. 368).
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This active and dynamic field of participation is what Dewey (1930b/1960) calls a
"situation" or its "context." The immediate existence of quality is entirely prereflective,
but importantly it "is the background, the point of departure, the regulative principle of
all thinking" (p. 198). It is the pervasive quality that defines and unifies each situation as
that unique situation. As Dewey (1934/1980) writes:
An experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture
of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a single quality that
pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts.
This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these terms name
distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse about an experience,
we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. (p. 37)
Each unique situation is made up of both primary and secondary qualities, but the
primary fused quality that makes the situation that particular situation is what originally
binds the organism to its surrounding environment. The organism has not as yet reflected
upon the situation but is in the position to do so, as the primary situation is the necessary
and controlling guide to reflection also referred to as the secondary phase of experience.
We begin to sense, then, the rhythm within experience as any given experience
moves through its successive but wholly interdependent phases. Dewey here envisions a
more organic reintegration of the primary and secondary phases of experience in which
he attacks the absolutist epistemology of traditional philosophic inquiry that has
unfortunately turned the pr:imary and secondary dimensions of experience into an
irreconcilable dualism. It is these epistemological absolutes that have little room for the
ineffable rhythm and quality of day-to-day life, which, we must remember, represents the
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primary source for drawing epistemological conclusions to begin with. When the primary
dimensions of experience are denied or ignored, lived experience becomes stunted, not
quite whole. We wittingly or unwittingly fail to take experience in its complex fullness
when our knowledge and action, reflective outcomes from the pool of prereflective
primary experience, fail to get referred back to that primary ground for testing.
Conclusions or ends that fail to return to the primary qualitative ground of experience for
testing remain the conclusions of a nonempirical mode of analysis. The potentially more
empirical outcomes of organic secondary reflection are thus cut short in the name of
indubitable truth, and the sterile dualism between primary and secondary experience is
reenforced. The possibility of grounded intelligent action is checked by the overarching
desire for absolute epistemological certainty. Those who hunger after indubitable
epistemic certainty neglect the recognition that "the situation controls the terms of
thought; for they are its distinctions, and applicability to it is the ultimate test of their
validity" (Dewey, 1930b/1960, p. 181). The primary qualitative situation, Dewey
(1934/1980) goes so far as to say, is the very condition of our sanity:
The undefined pervasive quality of an experience is that which binds together all
the defined elements, the objects of which we are focally aware, making them
whole. The best evidence that such is the case is our constant sense of things as
belonging or not belonging, of relevancy, a sense which is immediate. It cannot be
a product of reflection, even though it requires reflection to find out whether some
particular consider~tion is pertinent to what we are doing or thinking. For unless
the sense were immediate, we should have no guide to our reflection. The sense of
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an extensive and underlying whole is the context of every experience and it is the
essence of sanity. (p. 194).
Potentially artful conduct, therefore, inheres in the organic and dynamic movement of
experience as it passes through various phases toward consummation, toward something
that can properly be called a fully embodied experience. What carries us through these
various phases might properly be called the materials of our experience.
The Materials of Artful Conduct: Habit, Sense, and Imagination
Every situation inheres in a degree of precognitive meaningfulness, and this
meaningfulness is, as Kaufman-Osborn (1991) puts it, the result of "accustomed patterns
of culturally transmitted interpretive response, of habits that emerge out of the
noncognitive intercourse between agents and the world in which they are heirs" (p. 190).
Every artist uses materials. We typically think of them as brush, paint, and
canvas, or as instruments to be played upon, or as marble to be sculpted, but when
experience itself is conceived as art then we need to be aware of alternative materials of a
more psychological and phenomenological nature. For the transaction between organism
and environment that issues experience forward in more or less refined ways depends on
drawing from those materials of habit, sense, and imagination. My focus here is not
intended to be exhaustive, of course, but these three materials, as I am calling them, are
nonetheless centrally important. This, of course, is not intended as an exhaustive list of
the so-called materials of experience, but they are some of the centrally important ones.
Through them we may corne closer to grasping something of the consummatory power of
aesthetic experience, for if our movement in the world (conduct) can inhere through
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higher degrees of artfulness, then the aesthetic achievements that come on the heels of art
give heightened meaning and value to that movement.
Often, we hear the claim that we are creatures of habit. But how often do we stop
to think about what this means? Of course, stopping and thinking about habits, in many
situations, is entirely counterproductive. Habits, under most stable conditions, embody
the pervasive quality that infuses situations and as such are part of the taken-for-granted
whole that we feel as this or that particular situation. Habits exercise a certain mechanical
power in our lives precisely because, under a great many conditions, we do not have to
think about them. As Dewey (1922) says: "If each act has to be consciously searched for
at the moment and intentionally performed, execution is painful and the product is
clumsy and halting" (p. 51).
In other words, our habits are not self-consciously realized, nor are they
intellectually scrutinized. Rather, habits form the background of a situation, providing the
taken-far-granted field of meanings, "serving not as external means of identification, but
rather as atmospheric media whose entrance into the constitution of every situation
provides the ill-defined yet meaningful field upon which specific phenomena are brought
before focal consciousness" (Kaufman-Osborn, 1991, p. 190). In a later essay, Dewey
(1931/1960) draws the analogy of a picture or a painting in which the "spatial
background covers all the contemporary setting within which a course of thinking
emerges." He continues:
That which is look~d into, consciously scrutinized, has, like a picture, a
foreground, middle distance, and a background - and as in some paintings the
latter shades off into unlimited space.... This contextual setting is vague, but it is
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no mere fringe. It has a solidity and stability not found in the focal material of
thinking. The latter denotes the part of the road upon which the spotlight is
thrown. The spatial context is the ground through which the road runs and for the
sake of which the road exists. (pp. 100-101)
The habits that constitute the background colour and saturate the foreground,
providing the subconscious intelligibility of what is presently in conscious focus. It is part
of the noncognitive pervasive quality of the situation. Now, under conventional,
untroubled conditions these habits carry us smoothly along. We feel a sense of
situatedness without necessarily "knowing" it, for habit, when untroubled, "is too
thoroughly implicated in its medium to surveyor analyze it" (Kaufamn-Osbom, 1991, p.
192). Habits thus supply a spatio-temporallocational power that act as precognitive
guides to everyday experience. Kaufman-Osborn puts the point nicely when he states that
in addition to furnishing a ground for the recognizability of conventional
phenomena within everyday life, habits are dynamic potentialities that are vitally
present even when not immediately engaged. As patterned dispositions to action
whose incorporation of the past navigates each moment into the future and so
insures that conduct's unfolding in time is something other than a meaningless
juxtaposition of isolated reactions to discrete situations, habits' constellation
constitutes our effective desires and furnishes us with our practical capacities. As
such, the term "habit" does the work more often done by that of "will." (p. 191)
The smooth flow of habits" under stable conditions, is powerful because it is through
them that we come to in-habit our world. They are the effective background and
mechanism of stable bearing and meaning in our lives. Yet, if life experience was
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perpetually stable, then all situations would be untroubled, and habit would be equated
with a state of eternal constancy.
Under such impossible conditions, habit as constancy would be continuous with a
state of either absolute inertia or perfect automatism, and we would have reached the
pinnacle of our growth. Its logical expression in human terms would be sleep or death,
for being awake would be inconceivable as there would no longer be any necessity to
think. The very idea of experience and its aesthetic possibilities would thus also be
inconceivable because of the absolute absence of tension. For it is only through tension
that experience is propelled forward, that life moves.
Although a great many of our habits have staying power, that is, their projective
meaningfulness proves adequate to many of the untroubled situations of day-to-day
living, nonetheless habits cannot prove indefinitely stable. Those habits that do achieve
what we might call a working constancy, nonetheless have a very practical import. They
offer sufficient inertia so that, if we are willing to take advantage, we can engage in
higher order thinking. For we need to recognize that we are prone to habits of thinking,
and these habits can be routine or they can be artful. It is important to emphasize that the
habit-laden meaningfulness of any present untroubled situation is itself a result. It is the
cumulative effect of some past occasion of thinking, some past tensional situation that
has managed to locate a present stable bearing. Habit, if it is intelligently formed, is
representative of a deep adjustment of the organism to its environment. This adjustment,
if it is intelligently fashion~d and adopted, might properly be deemed aesthetic. Master
musicians often exhibit a fluid virtuosity in their playing wherein mechanical habit has
become fused with thought and feeling. A masterful technician does not perform as a
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matter of mere automatism. To do so would make for a mechanical performance. If habits
are intelligently formed, they are alive and flexible within the organism's ongoing
adjusting to the world. Habit is art when it embodies thought and feeling as its mode of
adjustment The opposite of habit thus conceived is not thought, but deadening routine.
It is only at those moments of instability, when our habitual world threatens to
come apart, that we are incited to grow and develop, when we must think, take stock, and
become conscious of our dynamic relation to the environment It is at this point of tension
that life incites us to potentially artful conduct, when we might become the crafters a new
stability. At this moment of tension, there is a newly released impulse, insisting on some
redirection and requalification of old habit Indeed this is when habit, previously not
explicitly conscious, is exposed as subject to temporal movement. We can refer to
something as an old habit only because our movement in time has manifested a disruption
or tensional break that necessitates a new adjustment Getting to a new point where a
situation makes sense represents the crucial phase in the organism's transaction with its
environment, wherein the process of making sense can potentially become aesthetically
charged, making conscious experience itself more artfuL This making sense is
intelligence at work. "Sense" is a very important and rich term for Dewey. As he says,
'sense' covers a wide range of contents: the sensory, the sensational, the sensitive,
the sensible, and the sentimental, along with the sensuous .... but sense, as
meaning so directly embodied in experience as to be its own illuminated meaning,
is the only signific~tion that expresses the function of sense organs when they are
carried to full realization. (Dewey, 1934/1980, p. 22)
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Sense, therefore, is integral to that experiential phase when the organism, having fallen
out with its environment because of some tensional rupture in the situation, begins to
consciously focus on the relations that make up that situation. The organism, through
tension, has come to a stage of reflection on and within the situation. It is important to
note that this reflective phase of experience has its own quality, but it is different in kind
from the original pervasive quality that binds the organism to the primary objects of its
environment. This original quality is vague and indefinite, whereas sense via reflection
has a recognized reference; "it is the qualitative characteristic of something, not just a
submerged unidentified quality or tone" (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 213). What sense now
picks out is the relation between the primary and secondary qualities of objects within the
environment as the situation becomes consciously focused within the thinking subject.
Dewey understands "sense" as an active/dynamic capacity wherein, as a focal
point of consciousness, it both illuminates a situated moment and also opens the body to
the world in exploratory and receptive intensity. As Dewey (1934/1980) explains:
"Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of
energy" (p. 53). If we recall the analogy of a painting in "Context and Thought," we
remember that a situational field has a foreground, a middle distance, and a background.
It is the foreground in which we locate that part of the road that is illuminated by the
shining light of sense. Yet, we remember also that the pervasive qualitative context is that
through which the road runs and "for the sake of which the road exists." Sense, therefore,
signifies the organism' s e~bodied movement in the light of a troubled situation, wherein
the body itself becomes a lived meaning, moving in a spatial and temporal drama where
body and mind become unified in heightened sensitivity to the possibilities of where the
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road might lead. In other words, if making sense is to result in some kind of aesthetic
value, then imagination must be viewed as integral.
When an otherwise stable situation becomes tensional, when new impulses are
released, old habits are immediately brought to conscious attention, new paths of action
explored. This exploration is what deliberation is about. It is, as Dewey (1922) says, "a
dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action" (p.
132). Activity in this sense does not cease in order that reflection may take the fore.
Rather, "activity is turned from execution into intraorganic channels, resulting in
dramatic rehearsal" (Dewey, p. 133). Aspects of impulse and habit are put in various
combinations, experimental trials so to speak, in order to determine what an action would
be like if it were entered upon. Thinking at this point is wholly hypothetical. It is the
safety mechanism of imaginative deliberation that thought "runs ahead and foresees
outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and
disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out.
An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable" (Dewey, p. 133).
The interpenetration of subject and object releases potential avenues of overt
activity via the imagination. For even imaginative rehearsal achieves its content and
meaning only when its activity involves a process of trying out various avenues of
potentially fruitful conduct: "In imagination as in fact we know a road only by what we
see as we travel on it" (Dewey, 1922, p. 134). The subject, rehearsing the possibilities of
some future overt conduct" partakes of experience's objects in imagination. Objects
object to the movement, thus necessitating activity's new direction, or they do not, thus
providing activity's point of rest. There is, essentially, no difference between this process
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as it occurs in the imagination and as it might take place in overt activity. It is equally
dynamic and organic. The only thing that makes imaginative rehearsal more sensible is
that the consequences of going down any chosen road are not overtly real, although they
implicate any real choice that might be made as a result. When a choice is really made, it
is "not the emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the emergence of a unified
preference out of competing preferences" (Dewey, p. 134). Choice comes at the moment
when imagination envisions the objective consequence of an action and deems that
consequence fruitful and just. Overt action is released. All deliberation therefore is a
search for the best action, its "office is to facilitate stimulation" (Dewey, p. 134). If a
choice be a reasonable choice, then the human subject travels a road of intelligent
conduct, and experience is given new direction, new depth, and new meaning.
This cognitive dynamic highlights the creative capacity of the human imagination.
The quality of meaning and value in our lives is funded by our ability to imagine
possibility. The radical import of Dewey's aesthetic thinking is that imagined possibilities
or ideals represent the capacity to mediate and improve upon observed actualities. It is
not a separate faculty that works autonomously, independent of experience's embodied
temporal movement. The quality of working imagination is a universal quality of
wholeness and unity, but that quality gets its life-energy from the local act, the observed
and limited here and now. The temporal drama enacted in imagination is a virtual
expansion and refinement that utilizes what is in order to manifest what might be. The
observed here and now beGomes stunted to the degree that the organism fails to recognize
the universal quality of extension that impels the imagination's ongoing relation to a vital
present, which is itself a manifestation of past experience. Imagination becomes pure
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fancy when it becomes disconnected from the energizing capacity of the here and now,
forging for itself castles in the air. Imagination projects ideal possibilities and therefore
reflects the creative and expanding capacity of human intelligence. It is in this sense that
imagination provides the infusing stuff of aesthetic experience.
The object of thought stimulates a unification and harmonization of competing
tendencies in which each competing tendency is reduced to a component in a reformed
action exhibiting a transformed quality. Human conduct thus draws from a profound
reservoir of preparatory competence. The competence of conduct's unfolding in time is a
matter of embodied deliberation leading to intelligent and humane outcomes. For Dewey
(1922) it is a human wonder:
Nothing is more extraordinary than the delicacy, promptness and ingenuity with
which deliberation is capable of making eliminations and recombinations in
projecting the course of a possible activity. To every shade of imagined
circumstance there is a vibrating response; and to every complex situation a
sensitiveness as to its integrity, a feeling of whether it does justice to all facts, or
overrides some to the advantage of others. Decision is reasonable when
deliberation is so conducted. There may be error in the result, but it comes from
lack of data not from ineptitude in handling them. (p. 135)
Reasonable conduct thus comes by way of a vital harmonization of competing desires
(impulses, habits), and the age-old dualism between reason and desire collapses.
Traditional philosophical t~inking has pitted desire against reason, when in the light of
artful conduct the fact is they are tightly interrelated. Reason is, as Dewey (1922)
maintains, "a quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than a thing
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opposed to desire" (p. 135). Reason, rather than being an antecedent, bloodless
abstraction, actually gains its vital energy through passion. Deliberation's science, its
experimental mode, is at the same time deliberation's art as reason becomes fully
implicated in the passionate phase of activity. Rationality is what remains when we make
a reasonable choice, and choice is reasonable when it results in reasonable conduct.
Rationality is the effect of complex processes that involve the thinking, feeling human
subject. It is not, as traditionally understood, the antecedent base of all thought and
feeling. This is a radical aspect of Dewey's thinking and shows that the cultivation of
intelligence is art. Art's outcome, the result of conduct's manifestation through cultivated
intelligence, is reason, and reason itself becomes the dynamic realization of experience's
consummatory potential. Life's art is achieved through our embodied transaction with our
environment in which both organism and environment coalesce in crafting experience's
deeper possibilities. Artful conduct is the manifestation of experience in its integrity, and
its outcome is properly called aesthetic.
The dynamic relation then between past meaning (habit) and future expectation
(imagination) is what gives direction to the present, gives it its sense. To the degree that
the organism's senses are alive to this transactive movement in time, the experience
becomes one of "heightened vitality." It is during such moments of "heightened vitality"
that experience is consciously manifest, and to the extent that the experience becomes
aesthetically charged, such represents the richer depths of meaning and value that are
sensed within and through ~he experience. At this point an experience becomes truly
consummatory. Temporal quality pervades every situation, and sense lights its way.
Heightened sensitivity is sensitivity to the relational meanings consciously becoming
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manifest within a moving situation, wherein the original pervasive felt quality becomes
enriched by and infuses the consciousness of temporal movement. As Stuhr (1997) points
out, "the quality is active and regulative - that is, intrinsically inclusive of its future
transformation or negation" (p. 196). As a situation is transformed from a state of
disequilibrium into one of equilibrium, where the organism intelligently develops a new
posture to the world, it is the original state of disequilibrium (a problematic or tensional
situation) that is both the quality condition and the quality control of the situation's
movement toward consummatory close. It is through tension and resistance, then, that we
come to sense life's quality and rhythm, that we get a "feel" for life. As Dewey
(1934/1980) says: "Friction is as necessary to generate esthetic energy as it is to supply
the energy that drives machinery" (p. 339). Rather than mere intellectual relations, life's
qualitative dimensions give consummatory moments their poignancy, and make possible
the aesthetic within experience. As Dewey states:
That which distinguishes an experience as esthetic is conversion of resistance and
tensions, of excitations that in themselves are temptations to diversion, into a
movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close. (p. 56)
Art Works
In determining why art is important to life, it is no understatement to consider
with Dewey that art, to a great degree, is life. Our temporal and embodied transactions
with and within our environment may not under a great many social and cultural
conditions manifest art' s p~tential, but this is not an inevitable and inherent condition of
our living in the world. Social and cultural conditions press externally on individual
experience, and to the degree that these external pressures emanate from some vital
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connection to the conditions of their own development, so the potential baseness or
fineness of what experience might become hangs in the balance.
What I have attempted to show thus far is that art is "prefigured in the very
processes of living" (Dewey, 1934/1980, p. 24). Art signifies our capacity to grow and
develop, and growth and development are what occur in any medium of tension and
recovery. The human organism is born, and its subsequent growth and development are
the accumulating result of its transactions with its surroundings. As with the individual,
so too are social and cultural developments the accumulating result of transactions
between organism and environment. In capturing something of the "psychology" of artful
conduct-the potentially artful movement of habit, sense, and imagination-I have
attempted to convey the complexity of our embodied status within our environment and
within time. I have attempted to capture something of the depth implicit in this statement
by Dewey (1934/1980): "Art celebrates with peculiar intensity the moments in which the
past re-enforces the present and in which the future is a quickening of what now is" (p.
18). Art works much like the human organism works in its daily doings and undergoings.
Whether art's working manifests what can justifiably be called a work of art, that is,
something exhibiting aesthetic, consummatory, and expressive refinement, depends on
the degree to which art's working arises from an enhancement of experience as it is lived
in connection with its surroundings. In this sense, if art is not working it is merely a
product, static and dumb.
As I have been hint!ng, we need to look at the word "works," not as a noun but
rather as a verb. For art is a working movement, and its culmination in an aesthetically
charged work does not bring art's working to a close. If the final work is something
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having depth and substance, then it will continue to work within the community. The
substance of a work of art is to be found in what it communicates within a community. If
an artwork exhibits fineness of form, then we have determined something of how the
work communicates within a community. Completion of a work by the artist is like a new
birth within the community, as that work is dependent on ongoing communal engagement
for its survival. It becomes expressive, and its continued expressiveness is the sign of its
continued constructive possibility, its continued working.
Art is simply a refined expression or language exhibiting experience's aesthetic
capacity, manifesting our temporal movement as being capable of greater depths of
meaning. This profounder wellspring of meaning implicates human beings in a world of
ongoing potential development in which we partake of our material surroundings and in
doing so extend our expressive nature in socially significant and meaningful ways. As
Dewey (1934/1980) says:
The material out of which a work of art is composed belongs to the common
world rather than to the self, and yet there is self-expression in art because the self
assimilates that material in a distinctive way to reissue it into the public world in a
form that builds a new object. (p. 107)
The artwork fails to communicate something new, or for that matter, anything at all,
when it is consigned to a collector's vault where, at most, it can be only potentially
expressive.
Although art museq.ms are considered "public" venues, Dewey tends to view them
more as public mausoleums. The modem history of the development of museums is, for
Dewey, too thoroughly implicated in the capitalist creation of "nouveaux riches" who
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tend to denigrate art's potential by exhibiting it not as a refined expression of common
experience out of which it is born, but rather as a refined symbol of their cultural and
economic status. Dewey (1934/1980) tells us: "Generally speaking, the typical collector
is the typical capitalist" (p. 8). Art thus gets severed from its place in the life of the
community and takes on all the accoutrements of acquisitiveness and "high" status. They
become "specimens of fine art and nothing else" (Dewey, p. 9).
It was not that Dewey had an utter distaste for museums. He was, after all,
gainfully employed for a time at a museum at the Bames Foundation. What did worry
Dewey about the museum conception of culture was that it tended to create and reenforce
"a chasm between ordinary and aesthetic experience" (Dewey, 193411980, p. 10). As
Alexander (1998) points out, there are two standing and interrelated temptations (not
inevitabilities) when we participate in the museum's conception of fineness:
First we are tempted to isolate our museum experiences from other experiences in
life at large. Thus, we fail to see how the works we encounter in museums (or
their equivalents for other artforms, such as concert halls or classrooms) have
actually grown from those common conditions in life which we share with the
artists who made those works. Having done this, we may make a second mistake.
In believing that aesthetic experience belongs to a segregated realm, we fail to see
how the artists' success in making expressively meaningful, intrinsically fulfilling
objects from the raw material of life can be applied across the whole spectrum of
human existence. Tpe great moral to be learned from the arts for Dewey is that
when ideals cease to be confined to a realm separatedfrom our daily, practical
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experience, they can become powerful forces in teaching us to make the materials
ofour lives filled with meaning. [italics in original] (pp. 5-6)
In attempting to steal art back to the commons, we may more properly conceive of the
ways art is potentially expressive and how this expressiveness is vitally connected to
common life experience.
Of all modes of human inquiry art most exemplifies the human capacity to elevate
life's expressive potential. Our temporal embodiment within nature signifies life's
rhythmic movement. The very idea, therefore, of order, balance, and harmony can make
sense only as life's rhythm is engaged and expressed. The more intelligent this
engagement and expression, the more life's artful potential is realized. The aesthetic in
experience is the result of experience's differentiation out of an otherwise
undifferentiated stream of impressions. The aesthetic marks an experience as an
experience only because "the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment" (Dewey,
p. 35). Life's rhythm thus gains consummatory potential as its expressive capacity is
realized through the organism's "dynamic organization" of the materials at its disposal
(Dewey, 1934/1980, p. 55). The quality of our growth within life's rhythmic movement is
thus a matter of intelligent conduct. Our "undergoing" within this rhythm signals us as
vulnerable to suffering. We are open to the precariousness that attends and is an
integrated part of any rhythmic development. Our "doing" signals our ability to channel
what we undergo into a newly refined integration. Life's rhythm is thus complemented by
the degree of order we are ~ble to establish with and within our environment. Order itself
is developmental. However, achieving the aesthetic out of this rhythmic movement is
something more than just an intellectual achievement. It is the embodied realization of
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harmony. The "material of reflection is incorporated into the objects as their meaning"
(Dewey, p. 15). The aesthetic thus results from a movement from disturbance to
harmony, and that moment of harmonization is "that of intensest life" (Dewey, p. 17).
The expressive potential, therefore, of a work of art is realized through this
rhythmic development, and for this realization to achieve deepened aesthetic value and
meaning it must inhere in a higher degree of conscious refinement and control. This
refinement and control are saved from the haphazard only as it is an intensified
transaction between organism and the encompassing materials of experience. As Dewey
(1934/1980) says: "The expressiveness of the object is the report and celebration of the
complete fusion of what we undergo and what our activity of attentive perception brings
into what we receive by means of the senses" (p. 103). Expressive art is exemplary of an
intensification and amplification of this transactional dynamic, and it brings subject and
object into refined relation. For Dewey:
The moments when the creature is both most alive and most composed and
concentrated are those of fullest intercourse with the environment, in which
sensuous material and relations are most completely merged. Art would not
amplify experience if it withdrew the self into the self nor would the experience
that results from such retirement be expressive. (p. 103)
The expressiveness of a work of art is thus exemplary of life's artful potential as levels of
aesthetic consummation become realizable by virtue of the spatio-temporal dynamics that
give life its rhythm. Howeyer, artworks are not merely static achievements. They provide
the fuel for enhanced communication, and thus the social importance of art comes to the
fore.
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In Experience and Nature Dewey (1925/1994) explicitly makes the point when he
says "that a genuinely esthetic object is not exclusively consummatory but is causally
productive as well. A consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to
the dust and ashes of boredom" (p. 296). Staving off this all-too-common ennui is art's
power. As I have already highlighted, the power of any aesthetic consummation can be
fully achieved only as it recognizes the part played by the ineffable, the immediate. But
life's art, the fullness of its consummations, is also a fullness born out of and into new
possibilities. Our temporal status has us constantly "on the go," so to speak. Being on the
go, of course, can be frenetic and arbitrary; but this occurs only when "doing" becomes
disconnected from "undergoing." The implications for communication are enormous.
When "doing" is elevated for its own sake, we tend towards a chaotic and frenetic pace.
A cursory look at contemporary society shows this all too clearly. However, when
"undergoing" is taken up for its own sake, separated from any resultant activity, it tends
towards mere contemplation and imaginative fancy, with no real embodiment in action.
Dewey (1934/1980) reminds us that "an experience has pattern and structure, because it
is not just doing and undergoing in alternation, but consists of them in
relationship....This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objective of all
intelligence" (p. 44).
It is this relationship that leads also to the fine art of communication. To get at
communication's finer potential we need a better understanding of Dewey's
instrumentalism, for it is through his instrumental understanding of art that the relation of
consummation and productivity gains its communicative potential. Bringing the
instrumental into a discussion of art and aesthetics may seem odd if not downright
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disturbing to those of a strong aesthetic bent. We are accustomed to thinking about the
instrumental in the strong scientific sense, with its use of hard tools for the achievement
of narrow ends. Dewey (1925/1994) reminds us that "the sciences were born of the arts"
(p. 107). If art rested only in what immediately is, and failed to pay attention to what is
made possible out of what is immediately enjoyed or suffered, art would never have
become an "intellectual" achievement. For the instrumental in art is its character of
intellectual meaning, and as such, involves art "in transforming purely immediate
qualities of local things into generic relationships" (Dewey, p. 108). Art as "the greatest
intellectual achievement in the history of humanity" is singly important to our
understanding of science, itself an intellectual achievement of fine art (Dewey,
1934/1980, p. 25). It is in this sense that the relation of the consummatory and the
instrumental is the heartbeat of communication.
When communication occurs between two or more parties, there is always a
change to all involved-there are consequences. The communicative effect of art is just
what it is, an effect. It is not necessarily a moral/instrumental intention on the part of the
artist. The way art communicates is the effect it has on those who partake of it. The art
object is thus invariably caught up in its consequences for further reflection,
communication's art. When the implications of this are taken up within the community at
large, we begin to get a sense of art's vital educational role in expressing what Dewey
calls "the collective individuality" of any given culture (Dewey, 1934/1980, p. 330). As
he says:
The level and style of the arts of literature, poetry, ceremony, amusement, and
recreation which obtain in a community, furnishing the staple objects of
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enjoyment in that community, do more than all else to determine the current
direction of ideas and endeavors in the community. They supply the meanings in
terms of which life is judged, esteemed, and criticized. For an outside spectator,
they supply material for a critical evaluation of the life led by that community.
(Dewey, 1925/1994, pp. 168-169)
Because art is at once consummatory and instrumental, its power of
communication resides not only in conveying the mores of a community or culture but
also in impelling them imaginatively forward in new directions, toward new
relationships. Art subtly shapes our experience of the world by educing new possibilities.
If it simply conveyed what is customary and familiar, there would be little tendency to
reflect. The general result would be stasis and the entrenchment of dogmatic habit. This is
all too prevalent throughout history where rituals often become entrenched dogma.
Rituals themselves can be springboards to deeper experience or death marches toward
experiences cut off and sapped of meaning. The power of works of art is that they "are
means by which we enter, through imagination and the emotions they evoke, into other
forms of relationship and participation than our own" (Dewey, 1934/1980, p. 333).
Of importance, the language of art is an acquired language, and to the degree that
the arts of any community or culture fail to flourish, to the degree that they are denigrated
by any variety of external forces, marks the failure of effective education and
communication. Life's art is manifested when, through consciousness of a larger field of
meanings and values, we a,re able to imaginatively enter into new experiences. Art
sustains conscious activity, "and thereby exhibits, so that he who runs may read, the fact
that consciousness is not a separate realm of being, but is the manifest quality of
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existence when nature is most free and most active" (Dewey, 1925/1994, p. 318). The
lack of this fuller communication as it now exists between nations is steadily becoming
an inner cultural phenomenon as well. The cultural politics so prevalent in today's
societies, more than anything else, speaks to the erosion of full communication. It is not
that cultural subdivisions are inherently bad, but if these divisions are not informed b'y
fuller communication, that is, by a consciousness of the larger field of meanings and
values flowing within the culture at large, then there developes a corrosive isolationist
tendency. Under such conditions there is a marked disposition toward impulsive brutality
as a way of dealing with experience's emptiness brought on by the inability to artfully
communicate. These are deadening divisions, but add conscious and conscientious
communication, and deadening divisions might be transformed into productive
distinctions. Life's art becomes more fully realized under these conditions. Dewey
(1934/1980) extends art's full potential when he states:
Instruction in the arts of life is something other than conveying information about
them. It is a matter of communication and participation in values of life by means
of the imagination, and works of art are the most intimate and energetic means of
aiding individuals to share in the arts of living. Civilization is uncivil because
human beings are divided into non-communicating sects, races, nations, classes
and cliques. (p. 336)
We see the structure of another stale division begin to crumble-that between the
individual and the social.
Dewey clears the path for a more pragmatic exploration of our political
experiences. This becomes even more pressing in our contemporary global society where
171
it is not just a matter of "non-communicating sects, races, nations, classes and cliques,"
but rather the proliferation of insidious, noncritical forms of communication that are
successfully uniting masses of people with superficial consummations. Dewey's notion
of artful experience, I think, shoulders well the burden of our most profound personal and
social experiences. Needless to say, artful conduct is not easy in today's world, but with
Dewey's complex and detailed reworking of the philosophical tradition, I think we have
something that we have not seen a great deal of since Dewey's time-a working
philosophy.
CHAPTER SIX: RORTY AND DEWEY: QUALITY AND ARTFULNESS
Ah! then, if mine had been the Painter's hand,
To express what then I saw; and add the gleam,
The light that never was, on sea or land,
The consecration, and the Poet's dream...
-William Wordsworthl
The primary and secondary experiential distinction that plays such a powerful role
in Dewey's aesthetics represents much of the (philosophical) hostility thrown his way by
Rorty. This needs to be explored in more detail, investigating Rorty's strong
antimetaphysical point. But Rorty's own professed linguistic overcoming of metaphysics
may not be as clean and clear as it looks, especially if Rorty assumes to have successfully
dissolved the possibility of there being anything meaningful that can be said about
Dewey's noncognitive and nonlinguistic starting point. Such an ineffable starting point is
a functional component of Dewey's broader realism (his organic naturalism), indeed, is
the most practical (because most thoroughly embodied) of starting points. Rorty denies
such a practical starting point any kind of meaningful practical status beyond the merely
causal, assuming all truly practical (read relevant and meaningful) functions to be
linguistic (or sentential) in scope. This is the basis of Rorty' s linguistic nominalism that is
meant to surpass Dewey's naturalism, which now, apparently, is a cleverly disguised
form of metaphysics, if not mysticism.
Critics have in tum charged Rorty with harboring an essentially theoretical
starting point due to the supposed fact that any linguistic base is already a facultative
outcome and therefore theoretical in scope.2 Rorty's philosophy, in their eyes, fails to be
really practical at all in-so-far as he reinstitutes a theory/practice dualism that Dewey
otherwise worked so diligently to dissolve. I'm not so sure that this is a charge that can
stick, however. A close look at Rorty's linguistified account shows him expending much
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effort to divest language of its theoretical entanglements, especially when language is
being used creatively and privatively-that is, metaphorically. Language itself (words
and sentences) becomes so qualitatively saturated so as to take on the feel of the kind of
ineffable noncognitive, nonlinguistic starting point that plays such a primary role for
Dewey.3 It thus occurs to me that both thinkers retain a practical starting point, which in
each case must be understood as some sort of theory of practice. But I would like to put
forward that it is a starting point that might more usefully be described as a qualitative
starting point (QSP). Calling it qualitative (rather than practical-though the qualitative
in each case I would argue is eminently practical) avoids the often too easy step into
dualistic thinking that artificially separates theory and practice. Of course, the challenge
in Rorty's case is to take a linguistically structured concept like metaphor, central to his
creative poetic aestheticism, and show how it appears to function in a predominantly
nonlinguistic way, playing a role comparable to the role played by Dewey's own notion
of "indeterminate situation." The question, however, is not the inherent nature of the
ineffable, qualitative starting point-that would surely lead us straight into some form of
(old style) metaphysics, but rather where does it all go? Pragmatism is a temporally
bound mode of inquiry and is concerned first and foremost with consequences, and
therefore one must ask what are the "ends in view" (to use Dewey's terms)? What shapes
up in virtue of our immediately qualitative contact with the world that might be
instrumental in bringing about some sort of improvement? It is not the ineffable that
matters most (in an in-itselfkind of way), but what becomes of it, what results accrue
from it. It is in this sense that both Rorty and Dewey come to a comparable conclusion-
that improving our modes of communication is an aesthetical imperative for pragmatism
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and for democratic flourishing. Whether one can make a judgment of which of the two
thinkers gets to this point more productively-who between them has the better
resources-is the only difference that matters philosophically speaking. And if such
differences matter philosophically, there is no automatic entailment that they necessarily
matter as much aesthetically.
Creative Misreading
What should be clear from the previous chapter dealing with Dewey's aesthetics
is the utter centrality of human "experience" to human flourishing and growth. Dewey
traces experience along a trajectory that ranges from some sort of qualitative
indeterminacy to some sort of (hopefully) consummatory close. The whole process is
indicative of human artfulness wherein even the way we do science, with its experimental
modes of inquiry, must be viewed as part of our larger conduct towards some as yet
undetermined (or perhaps underdetermined) artful closure or stability. Like all good
pragmatists, Dewey foregoes positing some foundational or transcendental absolute as
that which is either given or taken as the guide for our artful conduct. There is no
absolute antecedent that decrees any artful movement as a foregone conclusion of some
given situation, and therefore no absolute teleology either-in other words, no first or last
principles showing us the way. There is no a priori reality that we represent in some one-
to-one correspondence. Our destinies are ours, we its creators. What tremendous abilities
we have, and what tremendous potential as well, for crafting ourselves and our societies
in better ways. The contes~ between Dewey's and Rorty's respective aesthetical positions
really comes down to how we go about so creating ourselves. As I noted above, Rorty
and Dewey come to a comparable pragmatic and aesthetic (that is, working) conclusion,
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but their respective articulations as to how they arrive at such a point puts them,
seemingly, worlds apart. If, as this whole project has tried to show, pragmatism gains its
most powerful force by turning to the future, or at least relying for its justification on the
future, it might be said that its most trenchant, and perhaps most intractable philosophical
debates have been about the past-that is, about the processes (experiential or linguistic)
that make such a move into the future most relevant and meaningful. In short, it is a
metaphilosophical problem (as it must be for us late modems). Ralph Waldo Emerson
(1803-1882), who inspired much of what Nietzsche went on to say, said this: "It is very
unhappy, but too late to be helped, the discovery we have made that we exist. That
discovery is called the Fall of Man. Ever afterwards, we suspect our instruments" (cited
in Poirier, 1995, p. 271).
That Rorty's pragmatism has situated itself at odds with what many Dewey
scholars consider the heart of Dewey's entire philosophical project-his notion of
experience - cuts, in tum, to the heart of much of the criticism brought against Rorty's
own aestheticized position. Getting this part of Dewey's philosophy wrong, so the
standard critical line goes, transgresses even a responsibly oriented "creative
misreading." Some misreadings just go too far, especially if there is the danger of the
younger generation starting to see the predecessor who is being creatively misread in a
predominantly misguided way. Surely, a philosopher of Dewey's stature needs to be
protected from such rogue misreaders. I must admit that I grow weary of this line within
predominantly Deweyan s~holarship, though I do appreciate the spirit of it. The beauty
and the danger of inspired reading is that one can easily get off the path of the pilgrim
and onto the path of the disciple.4 Yet, it depends who you are reading. Students of
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Dewey must be students of Dewey rather than primarily students of others who are
students of Dewey. They must engage his original works for themselves, and therefore
the charge that Rorty is tainting the reception by neophytes of Dewey's work (or tainting
the reception of pragmatism generally) is not Rorty's problem per see The best that the
self-appointed guardians of Deweydom can (and should) do (and I consider myself in
their camp) is tum their students to the very difficult engagement that needs to be taken
up with Dewey's primary works. Admittedly, this can easily tum into a life's work itself,
but I say more Dewey readers, not fewer-and yes, more Rorty readers too.
So, perhaps discipleship is not such a bad thing, nor has it ever been (how many
among us, after all, are really pilgrims in the strongest poetic sense?). Discipleship
contains its own rigors. "In fact," as Emerson noted, "it is as difficult to appropriate the
thoughts of others as it is to invent" (cited in Stuhr, 1997, p. 234). Clearly, in both
Dewey's and Rorty' s cases, there are rigorous demands for the would-be disciple. But
this kind of inspired reader (myself included) suffers a different sort of agony than the
reader who suffers what Harold Bloom (1973) famously called "the agony of influence."s
Those who suffer 'the agony of influence' (a dis-ease that both Dewey and Rorty can be
said to suffer) manifest in their own works a kind of rebellion against death, death
representing (as noted earlier with Nietzsche) a failure to create something new-~ost
importantly oneself.
Most of us inspired disciples construe our own agony, not so much as the "agony
of influence," but more as ,the agony to get it right. We read our heroes quite self-
consciously and quite carefully so as to avoid egregious misreadings. This more or less
straightforward take on Emerson's line quoted above says that self-conscious, careful
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reading is the very difficulty ofappropriating the thoughts ofothers. It is not necessarily
the case that there is only one right reading of some given text, but nor is it the case that
anything goes. But to put a NietzscheanlBloomian spin on Emerson's line and see the
inspired reading of one's heroes as entailing the "agony of influence" is to see that
appropriating the thoughts of others is the difficulty of invention. In other words, there is
no appropriation that is merely an inherited copy of what was there before. There can
only be some sort of (necessary) creative misreading. This is a decisive shift for the most
original pragmatists. They have all suffered the "agony of influence," itself a kind of
terror, but the results have been wondrous, lending further evidence to the notion that the
pragmatic tradition has a powerful aesthetical axis. Rorty has captured it as a matter of
critical import for pragmatism, and in the process has forged a new poeticized
pragmatism itself.6 He captures the spirit of such aesthetical agony in Contingency, Irony,
and Solidarity (1989):
In this Nietzschean view, the impulse to think, to inquire, to reweave oneself ever
more thoroughly, is not wonder but terror. It is, once again, Bloom's "horror of
finding oneself to be only a copy or replica." The wonder in which Aristotle
believed philosophy to begin was wonder at finding oneself in a world larger,
stronger, nobler than oneself. The fear in which Bloom's poets begin is the fear
that one might end one's days in such a world, a world one never made, an
inherited world. The hope of such a poet is that what the past tried to do to her she
will succeed in doiJ.?g to the past: to make the past itself, including those very
causal processes which blindly impressed all her own behavings, bear her
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impress. Success in that enterprise - is success in what Bloom calls "giving birth
to oneself." (p. 29)
To repeat, this represents the agony of the poetic genius. Most of us, alas, never achieve
such a status and therefore never suffer in quite the same way. Our agony, as I said
above, is the agony to get something right. We disciples are concerned, after all, with
retaining some degree of discipline in our otherwise inspired reading. I would argue,
then, that the majority of critical hostility thrown Rorty's way is the criticism of the
disciple-it is a criticism that expresses more than anything else the agonal awareness
that Rorty has failed to get important elements of Dewey's, and perhaps more broadly,
philosophy's work right. And from such a disciplined purview, they (we) are right. Under
the disciplined agony to "get it right" it is clear, for example, that Rorty has gotten
Dewey's metaphysics wrong. Of this there is not much of critical debate left. Dewey
scholars are virtually unanimous that in this regard Rorty was the most undisciplined
reader of Dewey's works-those fine works of inquiry into inquiry that witnessed Dewey
positing revolutionary reconstructions of such tradition-soaked philosophical terrain as
logic and metaphysics-works like Experience and Nature (1925) and Logic: The Theory
ofInquiry (1938). Rorty, so the indictment goes, has egregiously misread these works,
and has, on no good grounds, summarily dismissed them. This is not to say that there is
unanimous agreement among Dewey scholars' readings of these particular works-there
is, in fact, still much disagreement, but most are agreed that Rorty is so far off as to be
not in the picture at all (see Garrison, 2001; Hildebrand, 2003; Margolis, 2002; Sleeper,
1985, 1986; Stuhr, 1997).
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The question is, is such an egregious misreading of certain thematic elements in
Dewey's work by Rorty a fatal blow to pragmatism? I hardly think so, but who really
knows? Pragmatism could be just another passing vocabulary, to be replaced by some
other, more advanced 'ism.' Or maybe it is the last gasp of 'isms,' sooner or later to be
replaced by some sort of non-ism. Whatever, the case, what I am taking some pains to
articulate here is that there are two important streams in the American pragmatic tradition
that implicate some possible directions that tradition might take. I have expressed these
two streams under the auspices of two trajectories; the first is represented by the poet's
"agony of influence" (most important to Rorty), and the other is represented by the more
common "agony of getting it right." Now it might be argued that Dewey was such a
capacious thinker, and wrote so much on so many different topics, that the two streams
exist in his work together-flowing constantly between the precarious (poetic) and the
stable (getting it right). He is anxious to get something right even as he boldly and
poetically reinvents much of what he comes into contact with. For example, he was a
bold philosophical visionary who managed virtually to reinvent the entire western
tradition, but he was also an educator concerned that such radical philosophical
reinvention entailed perhaps getting something right when it came to the education of our
young. In Dewey's work there is the continual dynamic play between the precariousness
of poetic novelty and the stability that comes by way of the feeling that you have gotten
something right, even if such rightness lasts but a fleeting moment. Those who read
Dewey closely see that his, "creative misreadings" are never egregious misreadings, more
like patient reconstructions, that nonetheless often have revolutionary implications. This
is so because as soon as you zoom in on what Dewey is trying to get right, even his most
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patient reconstructions, you will find him defending some set of conditions for continual
growth. The only manner in which "conditions for growth" is saved from spinning into
some sort of contradiction, is by recognizing something like an "agony of influence,"
thus resulting in the very pragmatic notion that conditions themselves are constantly
changing so as to satisfy their own conditionality for growth.
As far as our twin trajectories go, they are not just American trajectories. They
might be said to be Enlightenment or modem or Western trajectories. The most
convenient expression of these has come down to us in our scientific and literary
impulses. When C.P. Snow presented his famous Rede Lecture in the Senate House in
Cambridge in 1959, he set the intellectual world afire. His message was fairly
straightforward, but the controversy that was ignited came to indicate just how deep the
divide was between the two trajectories I have highlighted-what for convenience I will
now refer to as the scientific and the literary. So vociferous was the attack against Snow's
1959 lecture that he wrote this response in his "The Two Cultures: A Second Look"
(1963). I quote at length to get the spirit of what Snow was saying:
In our society (that is, advanced western society) we have lost even the pretense
of a common culture. Persons educated with the greatest intensity we know can
no longer communicate with each other on the plane of their major intellectual
concern. This is serious for our creative, intellectual and, above all, our moral life.
It is leading us to interpret the past wrongly, to misjudge the present and to deny
our hopes of the fu~ure. It is making it difficult or impossible for us to take good
action.
I gave the most pointed example of this lack of communication in the
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shape of two groups of people, representing what I have christened "the two
cultures." One of these contained the scientists, whose weight, achievement and
influence did not need stressing. The other contained the literary intellectuals. I
did not mean that literary intellectuals act as the main decision-makers of the
western world. I meant that literary intellectuals represent, vocalize and to some
extent shape and predict the mood of the non-scientific culture: they do not make
the decisions, but their words seep into the minds of those who do. Between these
two groups - the scientists and the literary intellectuals - there is little
communication and, instead of fellow-feeling, something like hostility.
This was intended as a description of, or a very crude first approximation
to, our existing state of affairs. That it was a state of affairs I passionately
disliked, I thought was made fairly clear. (p. 59)
I do not know whether Snow was at all familiar with Dewey's work, but it might be said
that the same animating criticism is at work in Dewey's pragmatism-the hope for
communication across largely artificial boundaries. But in the end we must still come
back to that radical notion of "growth" that infuses Dewey's work and that finally
establishes the aesthetic dimension of his pragmatism as the most important. Perhaps it is
a response to Snow's lecture that Rorty makes in a footnote in his Consequences of
Pragmatism (1982) that is most telling. Rorty states:
The opposition between the literary and the scientific cultures which C.P. Snow
drew... is, I think, even deeper and more important than Snow thought it. It is
pretty well co-incident with the opposition between those who think of
themselves as caught in time, as an evanescent moment in a continuing
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conversation, and those who hope to add a pebble from Newton's beach to an
enduring structure. It is not an issue which is going to be resolved by literary
critics learning physics or physicists reading the literary quarterlies. It was already
drawn in Plato's time, when physics had not yet been invented, and when Poetry
and Philosophy first squared off. (I think, incidentally, that those who criticize
Snow along the lines of "not just two culture, but many" miss his point. If one
wants a neat dichotomy between the two cultures he was talking about, just ask
any Eastern European censor which Western books are importable into his
country. The line he draws will cut across fields like history and philosophy, but
will almost always let physics in and keep highbrow novels out. The
nonimportable books will be the ones which might suggest new vocabularies for
self-description). (p. xlvii, n50)
In a sense, then, novelty is always dangerous. We tum to the comforts of past habitual
modes, and lack an abiding trust in our abilities to create new futures and thereby recreate
ourselves. We have little faith in our poet-selves, and this in tum can devolve into a kind
of institutional malaise or dogmatism.
Perhaps the metaphors of pilgrimage and discipleship are suggestive of this
tension between stability and precariousness. While Dewey's more robust organicism
entails an appreciation of both the stable and precarious nature of our lives, his
pragmatism (right up through his most elaborate aesthetical writings), is a search for
stability, or more appropri~tely, is a prolonged inquiry into the art of inquiry itself, and
the ways inquiry, as such, can establish some sort of stable bearing within our world as
well as with our fellow human beings. In his aesthetical writings looked at already, the
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most desired state of equilibrium is a result of those moments of aesthetic intensity, what
he calls moments of "heightened vitality." His entire notion of consummatory experience
is meant to signal the power of an aesthetic experience that is indicative of some kind of
closure and fulfillment, that is, some sort of achieved (albeit powerful, perhaps even
profound) stable bearing. Because Dewey retains experience as an existential category of
embodied contact with the world and others, even his most aesthetical writings have
empirical implications, as I hope my overview of habit, sense, and imagination indicates.
Dewey is certainly interested in how things work, how we come to acquire knowledge
about things and ourselves. In other words there is a lot we can learn about bringing some
control to bear on the precarious flux that is also a part of our existential reality.
Rorty, on the other hand, relishes the precarious and the unstable. He is less
interested in those forces that stabilize and more interested in those forces that
destabilize-forces that shake up and disorient an otherwise taken-for-granted or
dogmatic situation or context. There is, of course, a strong sense in which Dewey's
notion of consummatory experience, while indicative of some kind of-closure or
fulfillment, is also a disorienting of the taken-for-granted-the artful inquirer who
achieves some kind of consummatory fulfillment has, in many ways, made a new world.
But Rorty's disorienting poeticism is much more radical in that it is divested of any sort
of antecedent structural meaning. And equally little is offered, by way of theoretical
guidance, for how a novel disorientation might become oriented into some future stable
situation. Novel self-creation, as we noted earlier, is also a matter for the private sphere,
for the individual. Whatever comes by way of such stark novelty in the public sphere is a
political more than an aesthetical matter (although aesthetical elements may, hopefully,
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be retained), and substantially different forces are at work (as highlighted in Chapter
Three).
Yet, this difference between Dewey and Rorty's aesthetic emphases might appear
greater than it really is. Much has been made, to be sure, of Rorty' s "linguistic tum"
against Dewey's "experiential" philosophy, but a closer look at this so-called "linguistic
tum" may show there to be less difference than at first appears. There are no absolutes, so
Rorty's tum should not be construed as a denial of experience per se, and it would be
senseless to construe Dewey's tum to experience as representing a denial of language.
There is a tendency, when closely analyzing the poetic/aesthetic aspects of these
pragmatists' works, to fall into what I will call the trap of linear closure. We are
comfortable with linear projections-the following or tracing of some precognitive
experience through to some sort of cognitive (rational/logical/meaningful/linguistic)
closure. We are more comfortable reading a novel (or a dissertation) with a clear
beginning, middle, and conclusion. We are shaken into discomfort trying to read more
experimental stream-of-consciousness novels like Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dallowayor
Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier. We seem acclimated to linear closure. Indeed, my
previous chapter might be just such an indication. There is a kind of neatness to the way I
show Dewey's linear development of an experience out of some precognitive,
prelinguistic indeterminate situation toward some eventual consummatory close, the
development, that is, of an experience into an experience.
But let us keep in mind Dewey's notion of growth as an ongoing process rather
than as an outcome achieved once and for all. The dynamic of living a life is an ongoing
concatenation of precariousness and stability-what Dewey (1925/1994), borrowing
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from William James, refers to as "flights and perchings" (p. 323). We can say with some
precision that Rorty relishes the precarious (as a poetic force) where Dewey relishes
stability (as a force for richer forms of communication in the polis), but we have not
therein rendered the political irrelevant to Rorty and the poetic irrelevant to Dewey. We
emphasize different things along the linear paths we chart as being good for different
purposes, but every consummatory closure opens into a new indeterminate situation (at
some point), and every starkly new poetic metaphoric interjection has a chance of being
picked up and made normal (or dead) within a community. As Dewey says: "A
consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to the dust and ashes of
boredom. The 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further
consummatory experiences" (p. 296). The only tension worth debating about between
these two pragmatists, and it is one that I think is worked out, more or less, in their
aesthetical positions, is between their respective starting points, or rather, more precisely,
how they express their respective staring points. We must return, then, to the notion of
qualitative immediacy that comes to infuse what Dewey refers to as the "indeterminate
situation." I will argue that Rorty's notion of metaphor is virtually synonymous with
Dewey's notion of "pervasive quality" and "indeterminate situation," that is, Rorty
institutes a linguistic device in the service of a qualitative event that can initiate problems
that might find potential refinements in some future communal reckoning. But what gets
potentially reckoned with or normalized in some unknowable future does not divest the




David Hall (1994), one of Rorty's most astute readers, places Rorty squarely in
that stream of American pragmatic thinking he calls "aesthetic pluralism" (p. 66). This
stream dates back to the Puritan theologian Jonathon Edwards (1703-1758) and extends
through the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-
1914), William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and Alfred North
Whitehead (1862-1947). What makes this aesthetic axis of American thought particularly
relevant is that all these thinkers presupposed the same problematic. As Hall says:
Each of them at least implicitly asked, given the plurality and complexity of
experiencing, how one might realize order without the undue exclusion of
particularity at the ontological, epistemological, and practical levels.
American philosophy is pluralistic. Thinking remains legitimately pluralistic only
if it discovers some means other than logical or rational organization to realize the
appropriate ordering of the insistent particulars which comprise our
psychological, social, and natural environs. This is the basis of the aesthetic
orientation of American philosophy. (p. 73)
Such an aesthetic axis necessitates in some strong measure a tum to the future that I have
been highlighting as the most important tum of the American pragmatic tradition. Such a
tum recognizes and values the aesthetic pluralist thrust of the tradition that tries to protect
"particularity" against an overly aggressive and ordering conformism. Against such a
backdrop, Rorty's distincti~nbetween the private and the public does not look all that
controversial. Such a distinction is an indelible part of the tradition, for Dewey no less
than for any of the others. So what is it about "particularity" that is worth protecting and
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valuing? Is particularity a particular kind of thing? Or is it no thing in particular? We
might say that the particular is the individual-·the messy, ever-complicated, and
complicating individual. Aesthetic pluralism recognizes the space of a plurality of messy,
complicated, and ever-complicating individuals. Whatever order comes about, whatever
richer modes of communication are developed that lead to hopefully richer communities,
there is no denying the individual as the irreducible focal point of all such creative
potential.
Hall (1994) further refines this aesthetic axis by distinguishing between the
"systematic pluralists" and the "interpretive pluralists" (p. 79). Each group, representative
of late modem intellectuals, establishes a metatheoretical stance in the face of our ever-
thickening theoretical layering (what we might more generally call the theoretical attitude
of the sciences). We have become, indeed, we have had to become, hyperconscious in the
face of such a plurality of often mutually incompatible theoretical language games. The
"systematic pluralists" recognize diversity as an integral element in the American ethos,
but are also cognizant of the dangers of relativism. They therefore advocate taxonomical
approaches to our sophisticated and multifarious theoretical environments that, in the
manner of toolboxes, place every theory in its appropriate box and then designate which
few bo~es out of the many are best to rely on.7 Such taxonomists have provided us with
the many "isms" that dot the philosophical landscape. This has led to the closed-shop
mentality that exists throughout much of academia, each theoretical enclave doing its
own thing with not much c~mmunication across boundaries (pace Snow's observation
above). Rorty is a metaphilosopher whose principal goal is communication that denies
the toolbox taxonomic approach, only because there is no way of intra- or
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intertheoretically dissolving or resolving differences. Refinement of theory usually leads
to deepened incompatibilities rather than heightened clarity between opposed theoretical
camps. The task for Rorty is not better and more refined philosophical theories that can
then be pigeonholed into their proper philosophical toolbox, but rather just the
construction of more and more tools that might lend to richer and more diverse channels
of communication without concern for what the right box is that such tools must be
slotted into. The "interpretive pluralist" is therefore Rorty's true pragmatist.
Interpretive pluralists eschew toolboxes but love to invent or identify tools for any
variety of interpretive projects. They are the artists that tum to the future and away from
what we might call the de-creative impulse to nail everything down into its proper
antecedently defined place. True progressives, interpretive pluralists try to come up with
more imaginative ways of engaging with reality, but importantly, engaging reality is not
through some form of representationalism. Facing the future boldly and imaginatively is
an intellectual liberation. As Rorty (2000a) states in a talk given at the Museum of
Modem Art in reference to the work of Jacques Derrida:
I think of this [intellectual liberation] as it appears within philosophy as a
repudiation of representationalism. What binds Derrida to the American
pragmatists, and both to Nietzsche, is the idea that thought and language are not
attempts to get in touch with reality, but attempts to find more imaginative ways
of describing reality. What binds Derrida to Wittgenstein is the idea that linguistic
meaning is not a referential relation between words and world but a relation
between the uses of some words and the uses of other words. What binds both
Derrida and Wittgenstein to such contemporary analytic philosophers as Davidson
189
and Brandom is that the latter have developed "a way of talking about language
that defines reference in terms of the acceptability of inferences, and makes this
acceptability a matter of changing social practice. (pp. 2-3)
Apart from being a consummate namedropper, we can see Rorty's point. The most
important tools for imaginative advancement in the interpretive pluralists' arsenal are
words. And so, if the larger culture is reducible to the messy individuals that make up that
culture, then individuals are further reducible to the words (tools) they use. There is no
need for further reduction past that. Of course, this is problematic for Dewey's
experiential pragmatism, because although Dewey recognized the necessity of language
for suiting our purposes, such articulation was itself an epistemic outcome. Prior to
words there was some sort of organic precognitive and prelinguistic transaction with a
surrounding environmental milieu. This is perhaps the most intriguing area of debate
when it comes to comparisons of Dewey's and Rorty's pragmatism-is it language or is
it experience? I have provided already an ample survey of Dewey's conception of
experience. Let us look more closely at what Rorty makes of language.
Rorty's strong anti-essentialist position holds that the function of words and
sentences is always a function of the contingent contexts in which words and sentences
are being used. As I have mentioned above, there is no systematic structural aspect to
language that establishes it as a medium between us and the world. Language does not
objectively represent an outside reality, nor does it represent some internal human
essence. Rather words and ~entences are simply "strings of marks and noises used by
human beings in the development and pursuit of social practices" (Rorty, 1967, cited in
Calder, 2003, pp. 27-28). The words and sentences we use are not being used in the
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service of solving some big mystery called Truth. That is to say, they are not puzzle
pieces slowly and inexorably piecing together the master picture. They are, as Rorty
suggests, alternative tools for describing our world, satisfying our needs, and establishing
our purposes, and there are as many alternative descriptions as there are words and
sentences. This pragmatic/utilitarian account of language eschews the tradition that
has seen language as interposed, like a cushion, between us and the world. It has
regretted that the diversity of language games, of interpretive communities,
permits us so much variation in the way in which we respond to causal pressures.
It would like us to be machines for cranking out true statements in "direct"
response to the pressures of reality upon our organs. Pragmatists, by contrast,
think the metaphor of language as cushioning the effect of causal forces is not one
which can fruitfully be spun out any further. But if that metaphor goes, so does
the traditional notion of an ideal language, or of the ideal empirical theory, as an
ultrathin cushion which translates the brutal thrust of reality into statement and
action as directly as possible. (Rorty, 1991a, p.81)
For Rorty's pragmatist, the causal forces that impact us are just that, causal forces. As
such they are not under any description, only our explanations can be under descriptions.
Nature and reality then drop from the picture as being describable things-that is, the
nature of Nature, the nature of Reality, the nature of Humanness-have no accurate or
absolutely perdurable one-to-one description that would indicate our cleanest of knowing.
The point is, Rorty says in fhilosophy and Social Hope (1999d):
We shall never be able to step outside of language, never be able to grasp reality
unmediated by a linguistic description. So both are ways of saying that we should
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be suspicious of the Greek distinction between appearance and reality, and that
we should try to replace it with something like the distinction between 'less useful
description of the world' and 'more useful description of the world' ....If you put
the two slogans together, you get the claim that all our knowledge is under
descriptions suited to our current social purposes. (p. 48)
One of Rorty' ~ most basic challenges to the tradition comes when he says that we
have no access to analyzing the conditions of possibility. Note that this does not entail
that there are no conditions of possibility. But we must recognize, pace Rorty, that such
conditions are, as already noted, merely causal. They are not analyzable. They impact us,
causing a shaking up (or not) of our present purposes, our present beliefs and desires. We
are not impacted by some antecedently representable and describable Truth. Every impact
is a possiblizing of some new future. This is not to say, in response to the invariable
charge of relativism, that our descriptions are merely arbitrary, that we, as Calder (2003)
says, "simply do what we like in a world of our own making" (p. 42). There are always
constraints on our descriptions, and these constraints are embodied in the norms, mores,
and customs of whatever community we live in. To reiterate, these cannot be construed as
absolute constraints, but they do impact our descriptions in-so-far as these constraints are
themselves descriptions to which any future description will be relative. We never create
ex nihilo. Calder continues by citing this passage from Rorty in which Rorty stresses that
the tools we use are not random or the product of blind (ex nihilo) invention:
Nor do I think that language is 'an arbitrary system of signs,' any more than that
the constellations are arbitrary arrangements of stars. Given the conditions we
live in, they are among the arrangements of stars that it is useful for us to talk
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about. More generally, given the conditions we live in, the language we use is the
obvious way for us to talk. There may be better ways, but they will not be
discovered by analyzing the 'conditions of possibility' of present ways ....They
will be discovered by somebody proposing a new idiom, its being tried out, and
its being found to work better than its predecessor. (pp. 42-43)
Clearly, the traditional notion of "discovery" as an antecedent finding is shaken up. Here
discovery is conflated with invention, in the very process of "proposing a new idiom."
This brings us to Rorty's pivotal notion of metaphor and the way metaphor situates the
creative individual within the larger social context.
We have developed a sense thus far of how Rorty comes to linguistify Dewey's
larger experiential matrix, and why. There has arisen substantial debate about Rorty's
linguistified pragmatism (or poeticism)-that somehow there is a part, at least, of the
larger pragmatic story that he has neglected. Substantive critiques by thinkers well versed
in the pragmatic tradition have led to what many consider a trenchant undermining of
Rorty's linguistic position. Such thinkers as Sleeper (1985), Margolis (2002), and
Hildebrand (2003) have leveled serious charges against Rorty's linguistic pragmatism,
the general tenor of which posits Rorty's position as harboring a theoretical starting point
(TSP) as opposed to a more organic and embodied Deweyan practical starting point
(PSP). What I intend to show is that these critics have overstated their case, even as they
stand as some of the ablest readers of Dewey's pragmatism. Construing Rorty's works
along the lines of a TSP an~Dewey's along the lines of a PSP unnecessarily confuses
what is most important (and most pragmatically artful) about starting points-namely,
that they are thoroughly qualitative. All starting points in a pragmatic universe are
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qualitative starting points (QSP). As such, a QSP is an indeterminate event that can cause
some future event(s) to unfold, that is, can either cause some present normality to suffer a
(sudden or shocking) rupture that will need working out (via conscious, reflective
inquiry) or alternatively can cause present normality to slowly take on a different hue by
seeping into the minds of more and more members within the larger community (much
like an artist's work occasionally does).
I will focus, to begin, on Hildebrand's (2003) work. His can stand as proxy for the
others, if only because his is the most recent and perhaps the most comprehensive attack
on Rorty's position yet written. Hildebrand (2003) is an able reader of both Dewey and
Rorty. His book, Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism, claims that Rorty's linguistic starting
point contravenes Dewey's more embodied experiential practical starting point
(articulated in Chapters Two and Five of my own work above as the dimension of had
rather than known experience). Hildebrand argues that because every thing, person, and
poem in Rorty's universe is under a description, Rorty can only ever be speaking from
some sort of knowing (or epistemological) starting point, in short, a TSP. In this way, our
richer experiential contexts of immediately had qualities gets short shrift, indeed, gets
veritably amputated from the equation of blossoming life. In Rorty's world, so
Hildebrand's interpretation goes, the pragmatist creates problems rather than finding
them to be there, and this in tum provides "tremendous latitude for creative thought"
(Hildebrand, 2003, p. 183). Hildebrand then cites this passage from Rorty's
Consequences ofPragmati~m(1982) as an example:
We should relax and say, with our colleagues in history and literature, that we in
the humanities differ from natural scientists precisely in not knowing in advance
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what our problems are, and in not needing to provide criteria of identity which
will tell us whether our problems are the same as those of our predecessors. To
adopt this relaxed attitude ... is to admit that our geniuses invent problems and
programs de novo, rather than being presented with them by the subject-matter
itself, or by the "current state of research." (p. 183)
Hildebrand then goes on to emphasize Rorty's suggestion in the above quoted passage
that we "admit that our geniuses invent problems and programs de novo, rather than
being presented with them by the subject-matter itself' as being indicative of a TSP, "for
only theoretically," Hildebrand continues, "could it be possible for an individual, no
matter how brilliant, to absent herself from all of the influences that shape her life and
work" (p. 183). I find this a problematic interpretation of what Rorty is saying. There is a
marked difference between de novo creation and ex nihilo creation. It seems as though
Hildebrand is attributing the latter rather than the former to Rorty's meaning, and as such
he is making an unwarranted leap. As should be apparent from everything I have
articulated above, nowhere does Rorty say that we create ex nihilo, but we do create de
novo, to the extent that the causal pressures of the norms, mores, and customs of one's
community constrain whatever new inventions or metaphors come about. The most one
can say about such fresh inventions is that they may seem to have come about ex nihilo,
but this is just a mistaken conflation of novelty with arbitrariness. Nothing comes of
nothing, and surely Rorty is not making the mistake of saying that something does.
Clearly Rorty recogpized the importance of our acculturated status as being a
constraining factor in our unfolding lives. Sometimes the constraint is so pervasive and
overriding as to hardly be noticed. In such a state we are in the equivalent of what Dewey
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called a habitual mode wherein such habitual residing is largely untroubled. In other
cases we may feel something vaguely to be out of sorts. In these cases we are subject to
the sense of the situation being indeterminate. Out of this sense of indeterminacy (which
is the QSP) the situation may evolve to a problematic phase wherein it is becoming
consciously manifest for some future unfolding, and hopefully resolution, of whatever the
problem comes consciously to be understood as being the problem of that given situation.
The important point with regard to Rorty's fit in this otherwise Deweyan experiential
rendering (spelled out in greater detail in Chapters Two and Five), is that for him (Rorty)
the use of metaphor serves the exact same role of indeterminacy that Dewey's notion of
qualitative immediacy serves. One who experiences a metaphor does not know it per se,
but rather has it in much the same way a primary experience is had in Dewey's lexicon.
Notice how Rorty lays out his understanding of how a metaphor works. He suggests in
his essay "The Higher Nominalism in a Nutshell: A reply to Henry Staten" (1986) that
we look at metaphor "as a use of language as yet insufficiently integrated into the
language-game to be captured in a dictionary definition" (cited in Calder, 2003, p. 45).
Words and sentences that come to us this way are, as such, ruleless. There are no
antecedent criteria for such metaphors' rational reception. A new metaphoric idiom, upon
first reception, is often greeted as just plain weird or strange. For example, says Rorty
(1991a):
When the Christians began saying "Love is the only law", and when Copernicus
began saying "The earth goes round the sun", these sentences must have seemed
merely "ways of speaking". Similarly, the sentences "history is the history of
class struggle" or "matter can be changed into energy" were, at first utterance,
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prima facie false. These were sentences which! a simple-minded analytic
philosopher might have diagnosed as "conceptually confused", as false by virtue
of the meanings of such words as "law", "sun", "history", or "matter". But when
the Christians, the Copemicans, the Marxists, or the physicists had finished
redescribing portions of reality in the light of these sentences, we started speaking
of these sentences as hypotheses which might quite possibly be true. In time, each
of these sentences became accepted, at least within certain communities of
inquiry, as obviously true. (p. 124)
As was mentioned above, the invention of new idioms is the invention of new
"marks and noises." There is no tension, as such, between older meaning and newer
meaning. A new metaphorical interjection is not a new meaning. It may over time evolve
into a new meaning-may be picked up within a community and so endowed. But in the
immediacy of its interjection it is merely a qualitative event (a QSP), the possible cause
of some possible effect. Rorty is here drawing on the work of his contemporary, Donald
Davidson, and what is quite novel about Davidson's reading of metaphor is that he denies
its traditional (classical) status as a transfer from some literal to some figurative meaning.
For words or sentences to have meaning is for them to be already wrapped up in some
more or less established language game. Metaphors are meaningless "marks and noises"
and therefore do not (yet) have a place in a language game. As Rorty (1989) says:
Davidson denies, in his words, "the thesis that associated with a metaphor is a
cognitive content that its author wishes to convey and that the interpreter must
grasp if he is to get the message." In [Davidson's] view, tossing a metaphor into a
conversation is like suddenly breaking off the conversation long enough to make a
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face, or pulling a photograph out of your pocket and displaying it, or pointing at a
feature of the surroundings, or slapping your interlocutor's face, or kissing him.
Tossing a metaphor into a text is like using italics, or illustrations, or odd
punctuation or formats. (p. 18)
This account of metaphor, as Malachowski (2002) point out "tips the balance of power in
favour of 'imagination' over 'reason'" (p. 102). The central point I wish to make,
however, is that Rorty, in so tipping the balance in favor of imagination, is using
language to initiate a completely qualitative starting point (QSP) by divesting new
idiomatic expressions or new "marks and noises" of any antecedent meaning. In-so-far as
these "marks and noises" are meaningless does not entail that no new meaning, per se,
has been released. Whatever the future makes of it, the future makes of it. It is just, after
all, a novel use of otherwise conventional meanings. It is not the inventing of new words
(though such is possible-Shakespeare, for example, was a wonderful inventor of new
words) that is of the essence. It is the creation of a new quality that is important, and any
new quality, by virtue of being a quality, is in some way a subordination of existence to
imagination. I would argue that in both Dewey's and Rorty's aesthetical positions, in-sa-
far as they take a serious tum to the future, the role of what Kestenbaum (2002) calls the
"insubordinate imagination" is central.
Kestenbaum (2002) provides a rich analysis of Dewey's Art as Experience, one
that I think provides a nice link to Rorty's work on metaphor and the necessity in any
poetic reconstruction of a thoroughly qualitative staring point. The central point as I read
Kestenbaum's argument is that Dewey makes partial use of Keats' notion of "negative
capability." Kestenbaum highlights that it is a partial use because a full endorsement and
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use of negative capability as Keats outlined it-what Dewey (1934/1980) refers to as
"[the capability] of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable
reaching after fact and reason" (p.33), would take Dewey too far afield of his pragmatic
aspirations. So Kestenbaum is careful to call it a "pragmatic negative capability." In this
case the "pragmatic" makes all the difference, but that being said, Kestenbaum is making
the argument that readers (proponents and detractors alike) tend still to underestimate the
subtle treatment that Dewey gives to the human imagination.
In a tricky and sometimes elusive argument (only because it is elusive to Dewey
as well), Kestenbaum (2002) first makes a distinction between two poles of the
imagination-what he calls the "insubordinate imagination" and the "natural
imagination." Simply put, the insubordinate imagination "offers alternatives to reality"
and the natural imagination "completes reality" (p. 209). Now it is in the early stages of
aesthetic experience that the insubordinate imagination does its work-is necessary. It is
necessary for aesthetic consummations to have a chance to begin with, because such
"negative capability" is the reversal necessary to realizing possibilities not realized in
ordinary experience. As Kestenbaum argues, it is "'negative capability' [that] gives
Dewey the opportunity to be large-minded about reality-deferring acts of imagination,
including the make-believe, but it also requires him to find a path, a thread of continuity
from make-believe to material objects" (p. 219). Kestenbaum is careful to point out that
while Dewey was inspired by the Romanticism of Keats and Emerson (among others), he
could not endorse the annihilation of the self that tended to occur in their work. He
provides examples of each Romantic's moments of excess, and then shows how Dewey
was a pragmatist where they were not. The main tension he sums up as such:
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Can imagination survive reality? Can reality survive imagination? Both questions
can be answered affirmatively if reality and imagination resist each other. If
imagination is not to destroy the self, it must give the self a place to stand, to
behold the real world. But such a standpoint cannot be too beholden to the real
world. If imagination is to loosen reality's grip, it must offer resistance to the real,
stand up to it, penetrate it. Imagination cannot simply tum away from reality. In
short, it must be more of a force or center than what is suggested by Emerson's
"transparent eyeball." We imagine reality's resistance. (p. 221)
What is implied here is that there is always a contact with reality, but at times of
imaginative insubordination we are not "too beholden to the real world."
If we look at another passage from Dewey, we get an even clearer sense of how
reality and imagination pressure each other Dewey (1934/1980) says:
Imaginative experience exemplifies more fully than any other kind of experience
what experience itself is in its very movement and structure. But we also want the
tang of overt conflict and the impact of harsh conditions. Moreover, without the
latter art has no material; and this fact is more important for aesthetic theory than
is any contrast supposed to exist between play and work, spontaneity and
necessity, freedom and law. For art is the fusion in one experience of the pressure
upon the selfofnecessary conditions and the spontaneity and novelty of
individuality. (p. 28, italics mine)
As I read the last sentence in this quotation-'art is the fusion in one experience of the
pressure upon the self of necessary conditions and the spontaneity and novelty of
individuality'-I can see no great difference between what Dewey is saying and what
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Rorty is saying with his notion of metaphor. As acculturated individuals we live within a
web of preformed habits and dispositions, and these necessarily condition us. But as
imaginative creators, we also are capable of outstripping common meanings. This
capacity brings us, as Dewey (1925/1994) says, "to a consideration of the most far-
reaching question of all criticism: the relation between existence and value, or as the
problem is often put, between the real and ideal" (p. 336). Rorty cherishes the poetic
moments when we pierce through conventions and open up more than common
possibilities. Such moments are the establishing of qualitative events, and such new
qualitative events offer the only relevant condition for the world in some way becoming
new.
Now, in spite of the qualitative events that both Dewey and Rorty establish as the
integral starting point, it can be argued that Dewey provides a far richer account of our
embodied status in the world, and the way such embodiedness establishes us humans
(and other animals) as actually very complex webs of long evolutionary development.
Because Dewey retains a working conception of experience, he is able to further develop
his very subtle and nuanced articulations of that vast precognitive and prelinguistic
domain that he captures in terms like "habit," "sense," and "imagination." Last chapter
drew out the compelling and almost counterintuitive way in which our embodiment does
all the hard work of living. We tend to think of the hard work arising when we have to
consciously think and deliberate about some problem in order to come to or develop
some resolution. But what Dewey compellingly shows us (and at a time when advanced
cognitive science was not around) is that the real hard work is done by those deep sunk
201
dispositions to act rightly and behave accordingly that are the result of millennia of small
adjustments to our living contexts. As Francisco Varela (1992) says, we are just
waking up to the simple fact that just being there, immediate coping, is far from
simple or reflexive. Immediate coping is, in fact, the real "hard work," since it
took the longest evolutionary time to develop. The ability to make intentional,
rational analyses during breakdowns appeared only recently and very rapidly in
evolutionary terms. (p. 18)
This ties in nicely with this passage from Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct (1922)
cited by Varela:
We may be said to know how [italics added] by means of our habits ....We walk
and read aloud, we get off and on street cars, we dress and undress, and do a
thousand useful acts without thinking of them. We know something, namely how
to do [italics added] them.... [If] we choose to call [this] knowledge ... then other
things also called knowledge, knowledge of and about things, knowledge that
things are thus and so, knowledge that involved reflection and conscious
appreciation, remains of a different sort. (p. 19)
Now Rorty admittedly treats all this in a rather light-minded manner. He basically
takes all this evolutionary embodied sophistication and slots it neatly under the heading
"acculturation." He then separates the private from the public realm and further transfers
all this richness that Dewey ascribes to the realm of the individual via habit, sense, and
imagination to the public realm, indicating how such dispositions have led to the kinds of
democratic liberal institutions that we should take some care to protect. That is to say, in
a roundabout way, Rorty is defending all this precognitive, prelinguistic dimension, that
202
Dewey takes such pains to articulate in individual terms, for the public domain. Our
Western trajectory has evolved institutions harboring a fair degree of ethical know-how
(though much work is yet to be done) that is expressive in an abstract way of comparable
individual skills. To say that all this richness (1 do not think Rorty would deny that we are
embodied in the way Dewey says) is merely causal for our new inventions does sound
rather flat. But Rorty is not wrong either. All this richness that Dewey goes into great
detail in conveying-the richness of our vast evolutionary predispositions-do in the end,
playa causal role in the advent of new artful inventions. Rorty simply wants to
emphasize the newness and not from whence the newness came. We must remember that
the imagination, in its most powerful capacity (encompassed in the most progressive
aspect of what Dewey called "growth"), can even outstrip all of this antecedent
prelinguistic richness. The future is the site of pragmatism's unfolding, and the
imagination is so positioned to the future that it can never be "too beholden to the real
world" (read as embodying past conventionalized routines and habits) if it is to help bring
about a new real world.
For Dewey language was a reflective outcome in the resolution of some
indeterminate/problematic situation, our only mode of communicating our results. But
every result, every artful consummation, is the release of a new quality, and so life goes
on alternating between stability and precariousness, perchings and flights. Rorty's
articulation of metaphor divests words and sentences of any deliberative rational
accompaniment, and by this (Davidsonian) invention, he posits a'qualitative starting point
every bit as qualitative (and pragmatic) as Dewey's. Rorty helps us to see that language
itself is not merely a deliberative, rational enterprise, but a part of our habit-laden
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evolutionary disposition to be creative artists of our own existences. Once we get past
Rorty's rather unfortunate misreading of Dewey's event metaphysics, a misreading
(creative or not) that confuses Dewey's notion of experience, we start to see him doing
with language what Dewey was doing with experience. Are these different words for the
same thing? I'm not sure. But I think it is clear that Rorty need not have stripped Dewey
of his experience-talk to have made his own pragmatic point-especially when he uses
language in a (metaphorical) way capable of establishing its own pervasive qualitative
experience or event. Perhaps Dewey did get carried away when he posited a pervasive
controlling force to qualitative immediacy of situations. But I think he also spelled out
admirably the distinction between had and known experience, and it is a mistake to
assume that experience as had is a kind of epistemological foundation for what
eventually is known. As Rockwell (2001) points out: "Dewey wanted to claim that
experience is not just vaguely perceived knowledge, but something different in kind from
knowledge; something constituted by our habits, skills, and abilities, and necessarily
linked to our goals, aspirations, and emotions" (p. 21). I think Rorty, in his own
linguistified way, was trying to do the same thing with metaphor. Whether language can
serve a comparable task to what Dewey attributed to more behavioral, psychologistic, and
embodied concepts like habit, sense, and imagination is a point for further exploration.
Perhaps far less can be accounted for by linguistified concepts such as metaphor (in terms
of our dispositions and predispositions), but then again, to tum boldly to an open future
is, as this whole work as tri~d to indicate, a shift of emphasis from accounting to creating.
And l~nguage, as an artistic tool, need not be seen as utterly alien (read rational) to such
purposes. As Dewey clearly indicated all aspects of our daily lives lend to such artful
possibility.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AN EDUCATIONAL CONCLUSION
It is exceedingly difficult to write a conclusion when it feels as though one is just
beginning. The central focus of this work has been to expose a few of the implications
that have come by way of the pragmatic tradition's evolution of a rich and complex shift
away from many of the foundationalist and absolutist discourses of the Western
philosophical tradition. This shift, or "turning" as I have called it, has led, arguably, to a
more courageous confrontation with the future and its open possibilities. The pragmatic
tradition has thereby loosed itself from many of the taken-for-granted comforts that once
were available to philosophy (comforts that were most often constructed or posited by
philosophers) and that would seep into larger communities offering various forms of
transcendental or foundational guidance. Such comforts, often associated with
hierarchical metaphors that offered us "skyhooks" or "toeholds," that is, transcendental or
foundational stabilities, had to give way to a more realistic horizontalized (because
temporalized) axis that spread from some past established set of habits and conventions
(personal and social) through our embodied status in a concatenation of unfolding present
moments and onward to ever-unfolding future possibilities. Such a temporal movement
makes viable (and possible) pragmatism's dramatic tum to the future and the
philosophical necessity that all justification must now take into account some sort of
future reckoning. Past modes of conduct are not thereby rendered superfluous by such a
shift; they are instead rendered modifiable under the light of some future necessity.
, Democracy and Truthfulness
Indeed, the very idea of democracy (in its modernist North American context) has
always required such a necessity, and yet, even today, how aggressively we (and some of
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our intrepidly foolish leaders) hold on to the (dangerous) comforts of absolutist
antecedent existences. Of course not all antecedent exisJences are bad-nothing can be
bad simply in virtue of being antecedent, without some form of prejudicial ageism
manifesting itself. But as critical and intentional agents, to blindly give our allegiance to
past modes that have their moral footing in a different time and under different sets of
social conditions, is to effectively forgo our critical and intentional agency-our capacity
for self-creation out of a web of past contingencies. When the whole world seems to be
dividing and subdividing into more and more "noncommunicating sects, races, nations,
classes and cliques," what hope for richer modes of communication exists if we are
unable to at least loosen the grip of those antecedent conditions which effectively created
(though usually unintentionally) such divisions to begin with?
Democracy is a story ever-about-to-be-told, ever-about-to-be-written-it is the
necessity of imagination's freedom against the past's Truth. But it is never merely a
skipping from Truth to Freedom, that is, from one absolute to another, from one essence
to another. Imagination is as much a requirement of the past as it is of the future. Reality,
as Edwards (1997) says, "rarely gives us that free a hand" to "think or to believe
whatever we wish" (p. 229). We imagine our past, in the words of the American poet,
Wallace Stevens, "as an inevitable knowledge,/Required as a necessity requires" (cited in
Edwards, p. 229). We imagine an ordered past, and in the act of imagining, order the past.
Events follow events "as a necessity requires" and our present is infused by a pathos of
"inevitable knowledge"-as Luther said, "here I stand; I can do no other" (cited in
Edwards, p. 232). But the consciousness of our own historicity greets us too as an
"inevitable knowledge." And the recognition of contingency itself necessitates a further
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disciplining of the imagination-let us call it the discipline of invention. The disciplining
power of the imagination acts on our sense of truthfulness and insists that truthfulness
now requires an inventive or poetic kind of living. Truthfulness has charted the path here,
to the realization of a new necessity of truthfulness disciplined by the imagination. As
Edwards points out, "poetry is a practice that destroys both idolatry and anomie" (p. 234).
The sense of "normal nihilism" as I developed it in Chapter Four, represents the
tensive heart of this entire work. I have argued that it is a real, but not devastating result
of the journey that has brought us late modem, beginning-of-the-century Western
intellectuals to a new place. Pragmatism's recognition and realignment of truth away
from absolute antecedents to a concatenation of contingent presents on to the necessity of
an open future is not the abandonment of truth. But the tum is dramatic nonetheless.
Edwards (1997) says this:
We - we [beginning-of-century,] Western intellectuals - find our normal nihilist
understanding of "the plain sense of things" impressive because it impresses itself
on us in a particular way: we cannot help seeing things the normal nihilist way we
see them, once we have seen them that way. Even the post-Nietzschean
recognition that we see things only as we are conditioned to see them, and
conditioned not by hard-wired Kantian categories but by tropes and images and
grammatical pictures which themselves have a history and can in no way be
checked for their "accuracy," is not - in itself - sufficient cause for us to abandon
our hopes and claims of seeing....But this post-Nietzschean recognition of
contingency can and will on reflection diminish the Pathos of any particular thing
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seen, itself included; and that is because that recognition, like any such, can and
will itselfbe recognized to be "just another way \of seeing things." (p. 230)
But this new place comes with some new (and some old) dangers. The new danger, as
was highlighted, is the self's possible addiction to novel satisfactions, or a "runaway
humanism" that increases the proliferation of values in the shopping mall of values, each
value having a shorter and shorter half-life. The other older worry is that in the face of
such runaway diversity more and more people will settle into some comfortable and blind
conformity to one or another belief system, ideology, or marketplace niche.
Clearly, moral relativism arises as a real issue in an age of "normal nihilism" or
what Rorty alternately calls "irony" (though, more precisely, I think irony is necessitated
by the shift to "normal nihilism"). The shift (at least among intellectuals who have read
Hegel and Nietzsche, Emerson and Dewey) is, intellectually speaking, palpable, but how
much is to be made of it? If you endorse one or another form of metaphysical idealism
(say some form of religious or philosophical dogma) or metaphysical realism (say some
form of positivist scientism) and believe that there are only two realities, one entailing
necessary absolutes (moral and otherwise) and the other entailing sheer chaos in the
absence of such absolutes, then you will make a very great deal out of such a shift. If, on
the other hand, you see a tum to the future and to the imagination as not automatically
being an endorsement of chaos, then you will be less nervous. Turning to Rorty's notion
of "irony," let us reestablish what is most humane about it.
There is a mistaken tendency to think of the ironic individual as one who either
longs for cynical withdrawal or otherwise cherishes the notion of smashing apart
conventions as a form of philosophical sport. Clearly, this overshoots what Rorty is
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suggesting with his notion of "irony." As Malachowski (2002) decisively notes in Rorty's
behalf: "A 'refined', 'sympathetic' or 'light' form of irony may involve a very subtle
form of 'social reserve' - a 'distancing' that far from threatening 'truthfulness in
accountability', enhances it ... such irony is closer to 'impartiality' than cynical
withdrawal" (p. 149). I think Malachowski is right here. Irony actually enlivens the very
notion of "impartiality," for absolutist conceptions of "partiality" are no longer
sustainable. All this is to say that pragmatists have not turned their backs on truth telling,
on the idea of the importance of offering a sincere and honest account. We are all
acculturated-we all have histories and experiences that have brought us here. To be
ironic about this fact is just to recognize that your "final vocabulary" might not be the
same as someone else's-that there could be, indeed are, many "final vocabularies"
circulating about. Pluralism comes to replace monism under the trajectory of
imagination's own necessity of truthfulness.
Now, as was mentioned, ironic detachment is not for everyone. Intellectuals have
the heads-up in this regard. But just because everyone that lives in Rorty's utopian future
is not going to be an ironist, this does not mean that everyone is therefore destined to
become some sort of blinkered totalitarian or crazed anything-goes relativist. The
minimal requirement for most will be as it is now in Western democracies (albeit in an
increasingly precarious way) to respect that your beliefs and the truthfulness of your
rendering may not be the same as someone else's equally truthful rendering, but that also
if you have been raised in a particular society, yours and theirs should not be that far
apart. There can be a nonhomogenous, communal we even as the freedom of each I is
respected. The main thrust of both Dewey's and Rorty's works is therefore democratic in
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the sense of protecting the freedom to give a sincere and truthful account of oneself, and
such accounting makes it difficult to hold on to some overriding absolutist conception of
Truth that will invariably decide among competing vocabularies. Whatever gets hashed
out between two or more competing vocabularies becomes the truthfulness of the matter
without reliance on some outside abstract eternal value. Running Truth together with
truthfulness is no longer a warranted conflation. Truthfulness must win the day against its
own antecedent absolutes. Rorty (2000b) says, in a critical response to James Conant:
Pragmatists are often said not to recognize the political and moral importance of
truth-telling. I do not think this charge is even remotely plausible. Truthfulness, in
the relevant sense, is saying publicly what you believe, even when it is
disadvantageous to do so. This is a moral virtue whose exercise is punished by
totalitarian societies. This virtue has nothing to do with any controversy between
Realists and non-Realists, both of whom pay it equal honor. My claim that if we
take care of freedom truth will take care of itself implies that if people can say
what they believe without fear, then ... the task of justifying themselves to others
and the task of getting things right will coincide. My argument is that since we
can test whether we have performed the first task, and have no further test to
apply to determine whether we have performed the second, Truth as end-in-itself
drops out. (p. 347)
This aligns nicely with a Deweyan conception of "growth" as providing the impetus of its
own trajectory, as being its own moral end. To paraphrase what Dewey (1916/2004)
made clear, growth is not having an end; it is an end, its own end. It is in this sense, then,
that Truth's own grand narratives gave birth to the necessity of truthfulness, which in
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tum, and in virtue of an inexorable self-propelled logic, rendered Truth superfluous. It is
this tricky point that was the focus of my (big) fourth chapter and is the center of this
whole work. It is this notion of truth (and truthfulness), which itself tends to render Truth
theories problematic, that is still most contentious about the pragmatic tradition. But it is
also that which is the condition for its most artful turning to the future.
The pragmatist establishing of truthfulness over Truth is what infuses the
aesthetic axis of the American pragmatic tradition. Because pragmatism has forgone the
traditional philosophical task of progressively getting closer and closer to some abstract
antecedent Truth ("reality," "reason," or "nature"), it now fully takes up its task as "the
apotheosis of the future." This has led to certain controversial claims for the political and
educational spheres. I developed some of these political implications in Chapter Three,
especially with Rorty's division of the public and the private. Against prevalent criticisms
that Rorty was instituting a sterile dualism where Dewey had (more or less) successfully
collapsed it, I argued that this too was an overblown reading of what Rorty was saying.
Arcilla's (1995) words I think offer a reasonable corrective reading:
[Rorty] is not interested in separating the public and private realms on the basis of
some literal, naturalistic, absolute boundary. He wants only to determine degrees
of separation that emerge in certain circumstances, and which can be respected for
certain purposes. His critics have misunderstood him if they think that he
conceives of the separation in black-and-white terms, for the purposes of making
a point of theoretical principle. The public-private distinction is a pragmatic tool
that promises to help mitigate conflict between individuals and their society. Even
if it proves to be rough and fuzzy when contemplated in abstraction, if in using it
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we are able to iron out certain conflicts, then we have all the reason we need to
affirm its significance. (p. 124)
I do not see this distinction in any way being at odds with Dewey's collapsing of
dualisms. Rorty collapsed philosophical dualisms with as much fervor as Dewey,
breaking down absolutist abstract divisions that blocked the paths of inquiry. But equally
important, both Dewey and Rorty made relevant distinctions when and where they
needed to be made. A distinction does not invariably lead to a dualism. Rather a working
distinction fosters our practical engagements with what can otherwise tum into
intractable and incommensurable problems. For all the talk about Dewey's collapsing of
the dualism between the individual and the social, were there no working distinction
between the two spheres in his work, he would hardly have become the pragmatic thinker
he became. Some form of mysticism would more likely have been the result. No, the
distinction between the public and the private is alive and well in Dewey's works. Indeed
the entire aesthetic axis of his work would be unthinkable without it. Let us not lose sight
of the power of working distinctions within both Dewey's and Rorty's work. In this spirit
I tum now to an educational essay written by Rorty (one of few he's written), and while it
is not recent, I still find it to be an inspired piece of writing.
Education Left and Right
The essay, written in 1989 under the title "Education without Dogmas" was
republished in Rorty's (1999a) Philosophy and Social Hope under the new title
"Education as Socialization,and as Individualization." In it one can see Rorty following a
comparable trajectory to the one he followed in his autobiographical essay highlighted in
Chapter Three. In both cases, I would argue, working distinctions playa crucial role in
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getting his point across. In his educational piece Rorty opens with the familiar distinction
between left and right politics and the way this distinction manifests itself in the
educational sphere. Put simply, the right thinks of education in terms of truth while the
left thinks of education in terms of freedom. From the right, if you take care of truth,
freedom will take care of itself. From the left, if you take care of freedom, truth will take
care of itself. Where the right tends to appreciate the Platonic asceticism associated with
truth conservation, the left tends to invert Plato in order to exalt Socratic social criticism.
Now, while Rorty (1999a) aligns his own affiliations with the progressive side
more than the conservative side, he says that both the right and the left are beating around
the same philosophical bush:
On both the original, rightist and the inverted, leftist account of the matter, there
is a natural connection between truth and freedom. Both argue for this connection
on the basis of distinctions between nature and convention and between what is
essentially human and what is inhuman. Both accept the identification of truth and
freedom with the essentially human. The difference between them is simply over
the question: Is the present socioeconomic set-up in accordance, more or less,
with nature? Is it, on the whole, a realization of human potentialities, or rather a
way of frustrating those potentialities? Will acculturation to the norms of our
society produce freedom or alienation? (p. 115)
These phi,losophical variations end up manifesting themselves most interestingly in
education in concrete political ways. The right thinks that much of the conventional
educational wisdom is a product of reason's trajectory and that the left has turned against
important fundamental truths. The left thinks that the society in which we live is, in the
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main, unreasonable. As Rorty says, "[the left] regard the conservative's 'fundamental
truths' as what Foucault calls 'the discourse of power'" (p. 116). And so the left thinks
that an important part of the job of education is the promotion in the young of those
strong critical dispositions that can get them into a position as quickly as possible to
question, if not buck, the status quo.
Now clearly Rorty considers himself to be on the progressive side of the divide,
but he is also eminently practical. Our acculturation is that matrix out of which the very
idea of progressivism is possible. Socialization is a necessity of living in a culture, and
therefore in liberal democracies a compromise has been struck between the two sides:
The right has kept control of primary and secondary education, and the left has gradually
taken control of higher nonvocational education. This general common sense is
reinforced by the fact that school boards regulate public school teachers such that they
can never stray too far from local consensus (though there is some obvious flexibility that
mitigates against totalitarianism), whereas at the University level, academic freedom,
established as the sine qua non of the professoriate, allows professors to set their own
agendas. Truth, taking the form of the moral and political common sense of the society,
becomes the mainstay of education up to 18 or 19 years of age, while freedom, taking the
form of the moral and political ability to question established conventions, becomes the
mainstay of higher education.
For Rorty (1999a), where most of the skirmishes occur with regards to education
is at the borders between secondary and higher education:
Even ardent radicals, for all their talk of 'education for freedom', secretly hope
that the elementary schools will teach the kids to wait their tum in line, not to
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shoot up in the johns, to obey the cop on the comer, and to spell, punctuate,
multiply and divide. They do not really want the high schools to produce, every
year, a graduating class of amateur Zarathustras. Conversely, only the most
resentful and blinkered conservatives want to ensure that colleges hire only
teachers who will endorse the status quo. Things are difficult when one tries to
figure out where socialization should stop and criticism start. (p. 117)
When Rorty claims that the conservatives are wrong "in thinking that we have either a
truth-tracking faculty called 'reason' or a true self that education brings to
consciousness," he assumes the radicals to be right "in saying that if you take care of
political, economic, cultural and academic freedom, then truth will take care of itself' (p.
117). But, Rorty goes on to say, "the radicals are wrong in believing that there is a true
self that will emerge once the repressive influence of society is removed" (p. 117).
Rorty's whole philosophical point, made consistently throughout all of his work, is that
there is no human nature in the deep Platonic sense, nor is there alienation from such a
human nature via societal repression in the deep Rousseauian or Marxist sense. Rorty
plants himself, like Dewey, firmly as a moderate progressive, philosophically speaking.
Indeed, all of this Rorty tells us is in keeping with Dewey's own educational views.
Rorty (1999a) says that, "Dewey showed us how to drop the notion of 'the true
self' and how to drop the distinction between nature and convention" (p. 119). Indeed,
some dis~inctions, if they are based on already unproductive dualisms, are not worth
making. Dewey taught us that the only important freedom was the sociopolitical freedom
found in bourgeois democratic societies and that this freedom must always be the starting
point for any free inquiry. Freedom itself is a quality that is felt, and felt most strongly
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when it is absent. It was not a matter, for Dewey, of tracing such freedom back to some
account of human nature or the nature of reason. Looking\forward, as such, means that
the only criterion of truth is that which results from such free encounters. Instead of
criteria, Rorty tells us:
Deweyans offer inspiring narratives and fuzzy utopias. Dewey had stories to tell
about our progress from Plato to Bacon to Mills, from religion to rationalism to
experimentalism, from tyranny to feudalism to democracy. In their later stages,
his stories merged with Emerson's and Whitman's descriptions of the democratic
vistas - with their vision of America as the place where human beings will
become unimaginably wonderful, different and free ....Dewey's point was that
Emerson [and Whitman] did not offer truth, but simply hope. Hope - the ability to
believe that the future will be unspecifiably different from, and unspecifiably freer
than, the past - is the condition of growth. That sort of hope was all that Dewey
himself offered us, and by offering it he became our century's Philosopher of
Democracy. (p. 120)
In spite of this inspiring narrative, Rorty thinks that education, generally speaking, is still
in trouble. There have occurred certain educational travesties since the time Dewey wrote
his inspiring narratives that he could not have foreseen. Rorty tells us that Dewey did not
foresee that his country would decide to pay its teachers one fifth of what it pays its
doctors. ~or did Dewey foresee that a greedy and heartless middle class "would let the
quality of education a child,receives become proportional to the assessed value of the
parents' real estate" (p. 121). Finally, Dewey did not foresee that "most children would
spend 30 hours a week watching televised fantasies, nor that the cynicism of those who
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produce these fantasies would carryover into our children's vocabularies of moral
deliberation" (p. 121). I think Rorty's comments here while accurate to what has
transpired since Dewey wrote, are still slightly overblown when it comes to Dewey's own
foresight. While Dewey no doubt would have been terribly disappointed and depressed
with the state of things, it would not have come to him as a palpable shock. He spent
much time and energy exploring the very sorts of underlying conditions, what we might
in this case call the conditions of detachment, that lead to such educative failures, that
such news would only be a rather dreary confirmation for him that certain insidious
conditions had won out (see, for example, The Public and Its Problems, 1927/1991). At
any rate, none of this counts against Dewey's philosophical renderings of truth and
freedom, but clearly Rorty is right; the young have been losing contact with the vital
narratives that otherwise saturate their time and place and therefore are having a harder
and harder time managing, quite literally, their time.
The conservative agenda, then, in its most powerful educational manifestation is
not merely about the transfer of sterile information. It should be about enlivening the
young to the inspirational fabric of their rich, joyous, barbaric plural heritage. The young
need to see, says Rorty (1999a), that they are heirs to "a country that slowly and
painfully, threw off a foreign yoke, freed its slaves, enfranchised its women, restrained its
robber barons and licensed its trade unions, liberalized its religious practices, broadened
its religious and moral tolerance, and built colleges in which 50 per cent of its population
could enroll" (p. 121). If this fails to happen, then what is to stop a return to old forms of
prejudicial barbarism (do we not see it happening even now)? As it is now, not enough
money or inspiration is infusing the elementary and high school levels. Nonvocational
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higher education is being asked to take up increasing amounts of remedial work that
should be the mainstay of the high school level. There should be no need for Great Books
courses or general education courses-at least no remedial need-at the higher
educational level.
If society at all valued the narratives of its own past trajectory, it would be
inculcating the inspirational force of such narratives in its (at least) high school students.
Rorty takes to task both the radical left and the fundamentalist right for such neglect-the
neglect of a rigorous conservation that harbors its own reformist impulse. It is the most
rigorous form of democratic patriotism endorsed by both Dewey and Rorty. There need
not be the need for the convulsions of revolution in an inspired democratic culture. When
the culture's leftist revolutionaries begin to sound popular to larger and larger numbers of
the citizenry, then the vitality of an inspired democracy is drying up. When the
fundamentalist right begins to sound popular to larger and larger numbers of the
citizenry, then the vitality of inspired democracy also is drying up. The latter wants a
return to a simpler more comfortable (absolutist) past, while the former wants the past
erased and for poetic revolution to occur on a massive social scale. Rorty, ever the
staunch defender of revolutionary poetic creation in the private sphere, I think sensibly
recognizes what it can lead to on a broad social scale. History has shown that bad things
often happen when the private fantasies of some few become the socio-political
movements of the many (an obvious example being Hitler's Germany). Neither option is
a good one for a pragmatic d~mocratic society. But nor is apathy and sitting back
watching (or just plain ignoring) individuals slipping away into oblivion. It is an
educational problem and one that will not be solved overnight. Large social reforms take
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time, but the reformist impulse is nonetheless the more expedient in the public/political
sphere than is the revolutionary impulse. Such reformistjmpulses need not be antithetical
to revolutionary impulses. In the end perhaps a reformist pragmatic and democratic
impulse is just less impulsive-it is revolution taking its time and being careful not to
give away too much.
Educating Liberal Democracies
Rorty's (1999a) liberal humanist point is I think still a powerful one insofar as it
becomes the very condition for poetic self-growth. To the extent that nonvocational
institutions of higher learning have to take on the remedial work not being done at the
lower levels represents a diminishment of the democratic potential of a humanistic higher
education. Asking the question, "What should [students] learn in college?" is a bad
question to be asking at the college or university level. To ask this kind of question, says
Rorty, is to "suggest that [non-vocational] college faculties are instrumentalities that can
be ordered to a purpose" (p. 125). Rorty continues with these inspiring words:
The temptation to suggest [that faculties can be ordered to a purpose] comes over
administrators occasionally, as does the feeling that higher education is too
important to be left to the professors. From an administrative point of view, the
professors often seem self-indulgent and self-obsessed. They look like loose
canons, people whose habit of setting their own agendas needs to be curbed. But
administrators sometimes forget that college students badly need to find
themselves in a plac;e in which people are not ordered to a purpose, in which loose
canons are free to roll about. The only point in having real live professors around
instead of just computer terminals, videotapes and mimeoed lecture notes is that
220
students need to have freedom enacted before their eyes by actual human beings.
That is why tenure and academic freedom are more than just trade union
demands. Teachers setting their own agendas - putting their individual, lovingly
prepared specialties on display in the curricular cafeteria, without regard to any
larger end, much less any institutional plan - is what non-vocational higher
education is all about. (p. 125)
This is not the same as Edwards's "runaway humanism" where values are the fleeting
product of entertainment or infotainment that tend to die at the moment of reception. The
university is an intellectual culture. As such, it is meant to draw the forming (rather than
the already formed) student into the eros of learning. Professors "putting their individual,
lovingly prepared specialties on display" are fulfilling a function of freedom and growth
within an intellectual culture. Their task is not to open the tops of their students' heads
and dump information in. Their task is to fire their students' imaginations, or at least it is
the task of liberal education to do so. It is the task of creating the conditions of novelty
(where even science becomes an important art). As Rorty (2000a) said in a lecture at the
Museum of Modem Art: "The thing to do with novelty is just to be grateful for it, and to
create the socio-political conditions which will ensure that there will be a lot more of it"
(p. 5). Getting students to be comfortable with novelty and change is turning into an
uphill battle.
Rorty's individual/social distinction serves a liberal educational purpose that
resonates with his broader public/private distinction. It is very easy in administrative and
government circles to put the majority of efforts into fine-tuning the expectations of what
it is a university education should be offering and to lose sight of the individual. In the
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name of establishing those relevant "facts" that one should know in order to be
considered an "educated" person, or in establishing curricula that will ensure solid career
opportunities, students end up becoming mere receptacles for information, the rough
equivalent to Rorty's despised toolboxes. Douglas (1992) is I think correct in his own
writing on liberal education, and in his own way strikes a chord with what I think Rorty is
driving at. He says:
Unfortunately the receptacle or storage box imagery, while never precisely
incorrect, is simply inadequate, misleading, when it comes to pinning down what
is meant by liberal education: education for selfhood and citizenship. Liberal
education is a domain in which an individual has one foot in the established world
of learning and the other foot swinging free, moving towards one's own selfhood,
toward a world of one's own making. To assume that oI).ly the ground on which
that first foot is placed constitutes education is to fall prey to a woefully
impoverished notion of what higher education is about. (p. 151)
No wonder students get less and less joy out of learning' and tum to an ever-
increasing variety of quick-fix (and more entertaining) alternatives. As most such
entertainment is now the product of the broader marketplace (rather than the
intellectual/cultural marketplace of the university) so the university comes increasingly to
be viewed and treated by students and their parents as an economic marketplace. One
weakness of such a milieu is that the student is reduced to the status of mere buyer, and is
open to being cheated or ripped off. As Douglas (1992) says: "One is an outsider, a
passerby or passerthrough. One does not form any kind of permanent identity with the
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institution or with a particular way of life. The student who comes to buy an education is
an isolated being in an alien environment" (p. 165).
One great misfortune then, is that today's young people who come into the
university are from the outset disconnected from the intellectual culture of the university.
Young people still have a joie de vivre inside the university institution-partying,
gaming, carousing, chatting online, having sex-but less and less are their joys and
passions connected to what they learn and the larger intellectual environment of which
they are a part. It is not that the other "fun" things are without importance. They are, in
fact, centrally important to the forming of young people into adults. But such is only a
facet of this forming and surely the university must stake its public reputation on more
than just being a funhouse for forming young adults whose intellectual passions are fused
by no more than antecedently established career ambitions.
When Rorty writes about the kind of encounters between professor and student
that fuel the imagination, he is referring to that important human eros that comes alive in
such encounters and fosters a vibrant hope that is the condition-albeit the vague
condition-of growth. There is a poetic component of liberal learning that has always
appreciated the vague or the making vague of that which is customarily (and potentially
dogmatically) clear. The future depends on the vague piercing of imagination's probing if
the future is to be anything different from the past. As Poirier (1995) says, pragmatists
have always understood the necessity of vagueness. He goes on to say:
The virtue and necessity of vagueness is brought forward by...pragmatists as an
intellectual and poetic necessity, so that what has always been true of poetry and
of poetic language is by them made generally so. This vagueness is a function of
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sound, of the way the inflected sound of words is manipulated so as to take the
edge off words themselves, to blur and refract them.... [Even in our day-to-day
banter] it has mostly been sound, efforts to create the gel of human relationships,
even as the gel is forever melting away. (pp. 274-275)
What we have been led to in the preceding pages is a pragmatic poetics of growth
via a strong tum to the imaginative possibilities of an always yet to be written future. The
aesthetic axis of American pragmatism is its most vital axis because it is the axis of
democratic possibility. Presumably, even Rorty's (2004) literary culture will move
beyond itself and become "a self-consuming artifact, and perhaps the last of its kind"
(p.27). What is the ideal in such a liberal utopia? Rorty tells us:
[In such a utopia] the intellectuals will have given up the idea that there is a
standard against which the products of the human imagination can be measured
other than their social utility, as this utility is judged by a maximally free,
leisured, and tolerant global community. They will have stopped thinking that the
human imagination is getting somewhere, that there is one far off cultural event
toward which all cultural creation moves. They will have given up the
identification of redemption with the attainment of perfection. They will have
taken fully to heart the maxim that it is the journey that matters. (p. 27)
Now clearly Rorty's educational position comports best with the university level. It is
there, after all, that he is most comfortably ensconced, and liberal education is the
(dying?) parlance he most ~omfortablyendorses for proffering his own liberal utopian
ideals. But has Rorty somehow missed or neglected Dewey's richer educational
philosophy? Does Rorty's distinction between socialization and individuation still come
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across as simplistic in the light of Dewey's more detailed inquiries into primary and
secondary education?
It might profitably be argued that Dewey and Rorty have slightly different views
of what socialization means. When Rorty writes explicitly about education he applies the
socialization function to K-12 schooling. Dewey, on the other hand, views such schooling
as actually serving a rather modest socializing function. For Dewey, schooling is but one
of many socializing influences on the young. Political institutions, economic institutions
,
family institutions, media institutions, and religious institutions all playas much or more
of a role in the socialization of our young. Rorty, doubtless is aware of this, but he spends
less time articulating this fact when he writes on education explicitly. However, because
it is central in Dewey's writing on education, both elementary and primary education
become extremely relevant public sites for establishing the democratic dispositions
necessary for reflecting intelligently on all our social institutions. For Dewey, the most
important socializing function of K-12 schooling is not just enculturation via the
inheritance of the common mores and customs of one's cultural tradition(s) (which is, of
course, important and necessary), but also, and perhaps more importantly, the
establishing of those flexible habits of intelligence that allow for continual growth within
one's customary world. Educating the imagination is thus a potentially fruitful and
critically relevant endeavor at any level of education, and perhaps even more so at the
younger grades. Indeed, As Reich (1996) points out, against Rorty,
we must not consid~r the imagination to be a faculty of the mind which lays
dormant for years only to be stirred to life during college....Younger children, in
fact, appear to have quite potent powers of imagination, perhaps because they
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have not yet been snuffed and stamped out by a powerful socialization process.
Their great propensity to ask questions and explore both the natural and social
world is well documented by psychologists and philosophers alike. It seems that
young children are in some sense in the best position to exercise their
imagination. (p. 6)
Rorty's distinction does start to look a little simplistic against Dewey's more
comprehensive educational vision.
Yet, it is also possible that we readers of both Dewey and Rorty are positing an
overly simplistic dichotomy where there really is none. Clearly Rorty's distinction
between socialization and individualization appears to lend itself to a neat black-and-
white dichotomy. But when we look closely at what socialization (or enculturation)
entails it not so apparent that Rorty is all that far off from what Dewey was advocating.
Enculturation is not merely the passing on or the piling on of cultural information.
Enculturation, above and beyond acquiring the requisite three Rs, is exposure to the rich
stories that infuse the collective memory of one's community and culture, or at least it
should involve such exposure. This is not straightforward information transfer; one is not
exposed to a real story of past pain and suffering, without feeling vicariously in some
way the story's pain and suffering; one is not exposed to a real story of past joy and
liberation without feeling vicariously in some way the story's joy and liberation. If this is
information transfer then we are talking about a substantially richer process than we are
typically accustomed. In fact, it is the art of communication that keeps a society's
collective memory alive and vital. The stories that make up the rich fabric of a culture
come to energize that culture's sense of itself, and they energize as well a culture's sense
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of what it might become in the future. In the end, Rorty probably is too nonchalant in his
distinction where Dewey was more detailed and specific, but never is it implied by Rorty
that enculturation is mere information transfer, or at least it is never implied that the most
important elements of enculturation is mere information transfer.
There are, nonetheless, important differences between the two thinkers in terms of
what they are each willing to put forward in behalf of future community building, their
respective democratic visions. Here, education and politics merge as both Dewey and
Rorty try to work out what communities of memory and communities of hope actually
entail in a now contingently flexible world. Clearly, as I have shown in chapters Five and
Six, the aesthetic dimension of each of their works points to the future as being in some
important wayan extension and enhanc_ement of the ideals infusing any given present.
Communities and individuals are inextricably enmeshed in an ongoing temporal drama.
Drawing on the work of Josiah Royce, Alexander (1993) highlights this temporal
dynamic:
The interpretative meaning of an individual's present experience is set within a
context of memory and anticipation; so too a community is constituted insofar as
its members share a "community o/memory" and a "community o/hope." The
members identify themselves in terms of accepting a certain history as their own,
a history which helps explain who they are and which articulates a range of
values, meanings, and practices. Part of the shared human project of self-
understanding require,S that we have a shared past as well as an individual past.
This is the interpretive act of discerning the "community of memory." But
communities, like individuals, live forward: the shared range of hopes and
227
expectations constitutes the "community of hope." These are interpretive horizons
without which the community of the present could not exist, and they function as
the means whereby a continuous process of action is possible. (p. 215).
Crafting unity (community) with plurality (individuality) is far from easy. Dewey's
democratic educational vision sought just such an ongoing dynamic. It might be said that
Rorty's educational vision does as well.
Clearly, however, there is a difference of emphasis between the two pragmatists.
It can be argued that both Dewey and Rorty share a common emphasis when it comes to
"communities of memory." Each of their respective educational democratic visions
establishes such communities as being vital to the rich processes of enculturation. The
richness of such enculturation should Jead to "communities of hope" rather than
dogmatically held (dead) ends. But communities of hope arising out of communities of
memory vitalize the present, and there are no unassailable philosophical criteria, apart
from (hopefully) developing habits of humane action, that might ensure stable unity with
plurality in the future. To care for others, to attend with maximal care so as to not inflict
undue physical or psychological pain on others seems to me an integral, if not central
component of any democratic community (of both memory and hope). But future society
is perpetually unwritten and not so amenable to being engineered even under the noble
banner of Dewey's Great Society. It is a hoped for wish fuelled by maximally free
individuals. It is therefore not entirely fair to insinuate that because Rorty tends to
emphasize maximally free i~dividuals paying attention to their own private
idiosyncrasies, that he is endorsing some sort of future state of Babel. His equal
(Deweyan) emphasis on communities of memory and hope work against such a
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possibility. Indeed, truthfulness, as I have delineated it throughout this dissertation, works
against such a possibility.
I think both pragmatists thought that society could profitably educate the
democratic vision of its young people. The thinking is that a community of memory in
such a rich, barbaric, proud, evolving heritage should quite naturally be a community of
hope and increasing carefulness. But the future nonetheless is never more than vaguely
inscribed. It, like wisdom, "lies beyond knowledge of the actual" (Garrison, 1998, p. 80).
We need take care, but above all we need take care that individuals are allowed to grow
and that such is the primary condition of any potentially meaningful and rich
communities that might form. Any community of hope is thus a function of the quality of
individual imagination, which becaus~ it is fuelled within a community of memory is
made resistant to becoming a quality of solipsism. Garrison highlights this passage from
Dewey's Art as Experience as centrally relevant:
Imagination is the chief instrument of the good....The ideal factors in every moral
outlook and human loyalty are imaginative....Hence it is that art is more moral
than moralities ....The moral prophets of humanity have always been poets even
though they spoke in free verse or by parable. Uniformly, however, their vision of
possibilities has soon been converted into a proclamation of facts that already
exist and hardened into semi-political institutions. Their imaginative presentation
of ideals that should command thought and desire have been treated as rules of
policy. Art has been. the means of keeping alive the sense of purposes that outrun
evidence and of meanings that transcend indurated habit. (p. 80)
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Perhaps educating vision is educating for more democratic poets, more seers of
democracy like Emerson, Whitman, Stevens, and yes, Dewey and Rorty. In spite of the
much discussed differences between Dewey and Rorty I think they each ended up in the
same fertile soil trying to sow the same seed. But how future democracy will thrive and
flourish (if at all) is, of course, nothing we can guarantee in advance. Education, in the
best sense of artfulness, is the forming of those creative and imaginative dispositions that
energize democratic conduct and favor continuous growth. Both Dewey and Rorty
thought that communities of memory leading to communities of hope served as an
important condition for growth, if only because growth is temporal and always context
dependent. The aesthetic axis in each of their works makes clear that such a condition can
effectively promote the kind of artful <;ommunication necessary in a milieu of ever
complicating webs of relations. Neither thinker, in the end, could endorse some absolute
criteria or absolute principles that would ensure success. But they knew also that the
abandonment of such absolute guarantors did not automatically entail unintelligent
meandering.
This, in the end, is the heartbeat of pragmatism's aesthetic axis and its trajectory
for the hopeful and ongoing amelioration of our most seemingly intractable social
problems. Communities of hope which are necessarily fuelled by the most robust and
active memories, are powerful for a thriving democracy precisely because they can still
fail. That is what motivates the trajectories of individual growth and betterment within
increasingly complex webs ~f relations, and educating democratic vision as such must
take utmost caution to avoid the false promises that would claim to annul such risk, even
as it promotes increasingly nuanced and careful forms of intercommunicability. The
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pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty help us see that there are ways of
truthfully (artfully) moving into the future together that have no need for the kinds of
absolutes that once were thought to be absolutely required. This work has tried to show
how this is a viable pragmatic possibility.
And so, I find myself returned to what inspired me most about my undergraduate
days (or was it daze?). I have corne to the end of my dissertation journey and still feel
that it is the journey that matters most. This is not intended as a cliche; I consider it to be
a veritable miracle that what brought me to this point I still love-namely reading big
books by big thinkers. Nowhere throughout do I feel that I have focused my scholarly
lens to such a fine degree so as to have blocked out everything else. But the two
pragmatists that have been my focus have allowed such expansiveness, for they are
expansive-they contain multitudes. I might have focused in a more empirically
research-friendly way on some small component of their work, but that is not what
inspires me most. Educators have spent precious time adding copiously to the knowledge
stacks of the universities, but if wisdom "lies beyond knowledge of the actual" then we
might reasonably question if we have been educating vision so as to forge richer
democracies that are up to the task of enlivening communities of memory and hope. As I
hope to have shown this is not principally an information processing task that relies on
one or another absolutist principle or criterion of success.
Critics will continue to hash out fine grained differences between Dewey's and
Rorty's works, and this is g90d. But the sheer genius and capaciousness of their thinking
should ensure that pragmatism continues "suffering" from a surplus of definitions for a
long time to corne. And this also is good-leading to many journeys and many
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destinations. I agree full heartedly with Rorty that students in university need to see
professors who are free to put their "lovingly prepared specialties on display in the
curricular cafeteria." But professors who specialize should also continue to be what I
have elsewhere referred to as "generating generalists" (McClelland, 2002, p. 11). To put
it simply, a generating generalist is someone who loves learning, who is imaginatively
enlivened to ideas, both great ideas from the past as well as those being generated in the
present, and who wishes to impart this love to his or her students. Such a love draws the
student out, patiently and with care, into a world of imaginative possibility where future
horizons are projected in hope and in deepening thoughtfulness. It is fair to say that
taking our young undergraduates and setting them on a fast track to narrow specialization
does a great disservice to their generative potential. It closes the world in on them too
quickly and suffocates the very kind of love and zest for life and learning that is requisite
to any kind of healthy specialization. Our young are not yet full-fledged adults, they are
fledglings, and if for us adults as the poet William Wordsworth (1975/1807) said, "the
world is too much with us; late and soon" it should not be too much with our young. For
the generating generalist, as for the unformed student, the world is both half real and half
imagined-we are in a constant process of becoming.
These words form Alfred North Whitehead (1929) sum up nicely what sustained
me as a young undergraduate and what, thankfully, I continued to received from reading
John Dewey and Richard Rorty as a graduate student.
The justification for. a university is that it preserves the connection between
knowledge and the zest for life, by uniting the young and the old in an
imaginative consideration of learning....A university which fails in this respect
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has no reason for existence. This atmosphere of excitement, arising from
imaginative consideration, transforms knowledge. A fact is no longer a bare fact;
it is invested with all its possibilities. It is no longer a burden on the memory: it is
energizing as the poet of our dreams and as the architect of our purposes. (p. 97)
I yet feel an eros for learning, and what better should be expected at the end of a
dissertation journey, but that the journey should continue. That is, after all, what is most
compelling about the future; its mystery laden prospects-enough mystery, anyway, to
sustain the human imagination's yearning to make something better of ourselves and our
world. Both Dewey and Rorty should prove fruitful for a long time to come.
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Endnotes
Notes to Chapter 2
IPor a brief overview of Woodbridge's influence on Dewey's thinking
about Metaphysics see Westbrook, R. (1991). (pp. 118-119).
2See Hildebrand, D.L. (2003). Beyond realism and anti-realism: John
Deweyand the neo-pragmatists. This book is a valuable resource in its overview
of some of Dewey's early debates regarding his metaphysics - debates with B.R.
Bode (1906), George Santayana, (1925), W.P. Montague (1937), and Roy Wood
Sellars (1939).
3Dewey writes in 1951: "Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and
Nature today I would entitle the book Culture and Nature and the treatment of
specific subject-matters would be correspondingly modified. I would abandon the
term 'experience' because of my growing realization that the historical obstacles
which prevented understanding of my use of 'experience' are, for all practical
purposes, insurmountable. I would substitute the term 'culture' because with its
meaning as now firmly established it can freely carry my philosophy of
experience." Cited in Campbell, J. (1995).
4See Cunningham, C.A. (1995). The metaphysics of Dewey's conception
of the self. Therein, Cunningham offers a nice treatment of Dewey's notion of
"generic traits of existence."
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Notes to Chapter 3
IPor an excellent overview of Dewey's theory of inquiry, especially as it
relates to educational research, see Biesta, G.J.J. & Burbules, N.C. (2003).
Pragmatism and educational research.
2Wordsworth, W. (1798). Lines: Composed a few miles above Tintem
Abbey. In Perkins, D. (Ed.). (1967). English romantic writers. (pp. 209-211).
3Por a good account of Dewey's tum away from pantheism to Darwinism
see Campbell, J. (1995). Understanding John Dewey. (pp. 26-31). See also
Margolis, J, (2002). Reinventing pragmatism: American philosophy at the end of
the twentieth century. (p. 108-130). Margolis, in particular shows what Dewey got
right about Hegel and what Rorty seems to have missed. But I'm not sure the
"experiential" account Dewey gives of his move from Hegel to Darwin, and
Rorty's "linguistic" account of the same add up to as much as Margolis thinks it
does. I explore this in more detail in chapter 6.
4Rorty (1979). Philosophy and the mirror ofnature. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press. Therein, of the analytic tradition, Rorty says this: "I
do not think that there any longer exists anything identifiable as "analytic
philosophy" except in some such stylistic or sociological way...The analytic
movement in philosophy (like any movement in any discipline) worked out the
dialectical consequences of a set of assumptions, and now has little more to do.
The sort of optimistic faith which Russell and Carnap shared with Kant - that
philosophy, its essence and right method discovered at last, had finally been
placed upon the secure path of science - is not something to be mocked or
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deplored. Such optimism is possible only for men of high imagination and daring,
the heroes of their times." (pp. 172-173)
51t might be said that much of Rorty' s writing, rather than arguing one or
another thesis, is an ongoing conversation/debate with his critics. He is
tremendously gracious in his far-ranging responses to critics. See for example the
edited volume by Brandom, R.B. (2000). Rorty and his critics, and the edited
volume by Saatkamp, H.J. Jr. (1995) Rorty and pragmatism: The philosopher
responds to his critics.
61 explore in more detail in the next chapter Rorty' s notion of a literary
culture. In his recent essay Philosophy as a transitional genre (2004), Rorty says:
"Philosophers have often described religion as a primitive and insufficiently
reflective attempt to philosophize. But... a fully self-conscious literary culture
would think of both religion and philosophy as relatively primitive, yet glorious,
literary genres. They are genres in which it is now becoming increasingly difficult
to write, but the genres that are replacing them might never have emerged had
they not been read as swerves away from religion, and later as swerves away from
philosophy." (p. 13)
7Fellow leftists have called Rorty a political conservative in the most
pejorative sense. This is a mistaken take on Rorty - he is progressivist through
and through, though having, sensibly enough, and in good pragmatic fashion, a
respect for conserv,ation. For a few typical responses along these lines see
McLaren, P., Farahmandpur, R., & Suoranta, J. (2001). Rorty's self-help
liberalism: A Marxist critique of America's most wanted ironist, and Warehime,
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N. (1993). To be one o/us: Cultural conflict, creative democracy, and education.
For Rorty's response to this political strand see his Achieving our country
(1998a).
8Kaufman-Osbom (1991) is thoroughly pragmatic when he makes this
correction in regards to the traditional philosophical appearance/reality dualism:
"The term "appearance," consequently, does not refer, as it did in classic and
medieval philosophy, to a realm of being infected with the defect of non-Being.
Nor does it refer, as it does in modem epistemology, to the ontological gulf
between things as they really are and things as they seem to be, where "seeming"
designates what exists only in virtue of the subject's distortion of the single kind
of Being that remains when the ancients' graded cosmos is denied its sense.
Neither of these two understandings can acknowledge that things appear and
disappear only because temporality, altering the relations among nature's
interwoven affairs, presses experience past what would otherwise be
contemplation's blank stare. The term "appearance," accordingly, denotes the fact
that at any given moment in time some matters are showing and hence
conspicuous, while others are latent and hence withdrawn. Its antonym is not
reality but disappearance." (p. 107)
Notes to Chapter 4
IMany critics have responded to Rorty's strong antiepistemological
position. For a robust challenge along these lines see Allan, B. (2000) along with
Rorty's response in Rorty and his critics.
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2Rorty cites Bloom, H. (2000) How to read and why, and Heidegger's
(1967) Sein und zeit as being influential to his own notions of "autonomy" and
"authenticity."
3As we shall see in chapters 5 & 6, Rorty's linguistified pragmatism shares
a tense relationship to Dewey's experiential-focused organic pragmatism.
However, the way words and sentences are connected to the world, for Rorty, as
dynamic constituents and constituters of the world, is not that far removed from
Dewey's experiential organicism, especially when looked at against the fluxive
dynamism of time's ongoing movement between problems and consummations.
4In Dewey's (1938) Logic: A theory of inquiry, he says: "What has been
said helps to explain why the term 'warranted assertion' is preferred to the terms
beliefand knowledge. It is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it
involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion."
5Clearly, Rorty thinks that Dewey falters from time to time in this turn to
the future, not quite willing to give up outdated language games, getting himself
caught up in them in spite of himself. I think this is because Dewey has more of a
pragmatic emphasis on stability whereas Rorty has more of a pragmatic emphasis
on novelty. I explore this in more detail in chapter 6. That Dewey, in spite of this
modest pragmatic difference of emphasis, was not doing old-style language
games in the old style is just something Rorty ignores. That it doesn't amount to
much in terms of what both pragmatists were trying to say is something Rorty's
critics do not want to see.
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6See Critchley, S. (2001) Continental philosophy: A very short
introduction for an intriguing tracing of the postmodem predicament back to
around the late 1780s when the problem of the authority of reason first manifested
itself. What heated up as the central debate at that time was that between the
rational atheism of the budding Enlightenment and its rejection through some
irrational leap of faith. It is this rationalism/irrationalism debate that is at the heart
(still) of the so-called postmodern predicament.
71t needs to be stressed that Luntley is in no way endorsing or acquiescing
the inevitability of antirationalism. His suggestions for ways out of the mess are
actually quite pragmatic and not far removed from Dewey's suggestions, though a
little more critical of Rorty' s.
8What Edwards posits to Nietzsche, here, resonates with Rorty's notion of
culture-that a sense of "us" precedes autonomous self-creation. It also contains a
hint of metaphysics which Rorty would deny. But I think Nietszche's "will to
power" was a kind of metaphysics, an event or process metaphysics that is alive
in the pragmatic tradition. In this regard, Dewey was more honest than Rorty. I
think Rorty just developed a sheer aversion to the word, loaded as it is with
shopworn historical baggage, and refused to use it in any productive pragmatic
way. Needless to say, refusal to use the word does not make the notion of it
disappear from the universe, which lends further weight, perhaps, to the
robustness of exp~rientialover linguistic accounts of our comportment in the
world.
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91 take the notion of "truth disciplined by imagination" from the last
chapter of Edwards (1997) The plain sense of things: Thefate of religion in an
age ofnormal nihilism. (pp. 195-239).
Notes to Chapter 5
IStevens, H. (Ed.) (1972). Wallace Stevens: The palm at the end of the
mind, selected poems and a play. New York: Random House Inc., (p. 229).
2Por two recent writers who have taken Dewey's aesthetics quite
seriously, see Alexander, T.M. (1987). John Dewey's theory ofart, experience,
and nature, and Shusterman, R. (1992). Pragmatist aesthetics: Living beauty,
rethinking art.
3Por good examples of this ongoing debate see Sleeper, R.W. (1986). The
necessity ofpragmatism: John Dewey's conception ofpragmatism, Stuhr, J.J.
(1997). Genealogical pragmatism: Philosophy, experience, and community, and
Hildebrand, D.L. (2003). Beyond realism and anti-realism: John Dewey and the
neopragmatists.
4Shusterman, R. (1999) offers an intriguing, but in the end, I think
misplaced critique of Dewey's notion of "pervasive quality" in his Dewey on
experience: Foundation or reconstruction? (p. 193-220) See also Rorty's (1982)
Dewey's metaphysics, in his Consequences ofpragmatism, and Rorty's (1998)
Dewey between Hegel and Darwin, in his Truth and progress.
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Notes to Chapter 6
lWordsworth, W. (1805). Elegiac stanzas: Suggested by a picture of Peele
Castle, in a storm, painted by George Beumont. In. Perkins, D. (1967). English
Romantic writers.
2See especially Hildebrand's (2003), Beyond realism and anti-realism.
3The more I read both Dewey's and Rorty's works, the more I find myself
tom between the use of the prefix "non" in noncognitive and nonlinguistic
experience and the prefix 'pre' in pre-cognitive and pre-linguistic experience. In
much of the literature they are used interchangeably. Given the kind of linear way
Dewey shows experiences developing, my own intuition tells me that it makes
better sense to use "pre" when talking about the qualitative dimensions of
experience. Of course, Rorty has little patience for either of these choices because
their experiential qualitativeness cannot be rendered linguistically. Yet, his use of
metaphor (as I shall show in this chapter), as a linguistic poetic device seems to
divest itself so thoroughly of any cognitive meaningfulness as to warrant the
prefix 'non.' It seems to me to establish the relevance of a qualitative starting
point for both of their aesthetical positions.
41 take the notion of "discipleship" and "pilgrimage" from the title of Tony
Johnson's book Discipleship or pilgrimage: The educators quest for philosophy.
5Rorty quotes Bloom from The anxiety of influence in his Contingency,
irony, and solidari.ty as saying "every poet begins (however 'unconsciously') by
rebelling more strongly against fear of death than all other men and women do."
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60f course, Rorty extends his use of "poet" beyond those who, strictly
speaking, write verse. He is using in a large generic sense "so that Proust and
Nabokov, Newton and Darwin, Hegel and Heidegger, also fall under the term.
Such people are also to be thought of as rebelling against 'death-that is, against
the failure to have created - more strongly than most of us" (Rorty, 1989, p. 24).
7Hall refers specifically to the taxonomical approaches of Stephen Pepper
and Richard McKeon. Hall refers to them as "metatheoretical pluralists" and
places them in the pragmatic aesthetic tradition. For more detail in this regard see
Hall (1994). Richard Rorty: Prophet and poet of the new pragmatism. pp. 73-76.
